Paper ID: 2202.02672

(Almost) Envy-Free, Proportional and Efficient Allocations of an Indivisible Mixed Manna

Vasilis Livanos, Ruta Mehta, Aniket Murhekar

We study the problem of finding fair and efficient allocations of a set of indivisible items to a set of agents, where each item may be a good (positively valued) for some agents and a bad (negatively valued) for others, i.e., a mixed manna. As fairness notions, we consider arguably the strongest possible relaxations of envy-freeness and proportionality, namely envy-free up to any item (EFX and EFX$_0$), and proportional up to the maximin good or any bad (PropMX and PropMX$_0$). Our efficiency notion is Pareto-optimality (PO). We study two types of instances: (i) Separable, where the item set can be partitioned into goods and bads, and (ii) Restricted mixed goods (RMG), where for each item $j$, every agent has either a non-positive value for $j$, or values $j$ at the same $v_j>0$. We obtain polynomial-time algorithms for the following: (i) Separable instances: PropMX$_0$ allocation. (ii) RMG instances: Let pure bads be the set of items that everyone values negatively. - PropMX allocation for general pure bads. - EFX+PropMX allocation for identically-ordered pure bads. - EFX+PropMX+PO allocation for identical pure bads. Finally, if the RMG instances are further restricted to binary mixed goods where all the $v_j$'s are the same, we strengthen the results to guarantee EFX$_0$ and PropMX$_0$ respectively.

Submitted: Feb 6, 2022