Paper ID: 2207.11315

Tradeoffs in Preventing Manipulation in Paper Bidding for Reviewer Assignment

Steven Jecmen, Nihar B. Shah, Fei Fang, Vincent Conitzer

Many conferences rely on paper bidding as a key component of their reviewer assignment procedure. These bids are then taken into account when assigning reviewers to help ensure that each reviewer is assigned to suitable papers. However, despite the benefits of using bids, reliance on paper bidding can allow malicious reviewers to manipulate the paper assignment for unethical purposes (e.g., getting assigned to a friend's paper). Several different approaches to preventing this manipulation have been proposed and deployed. In this paper, we enumerate certain desirable properties that algorithms for addressing bid manipulation should satisfy. We then offer a high-level analysis of various approaches along with directions for future investigation.

Submitted: Jul 22, 2022