Paper ID: 2302.12735

Regulating Clients' Noise Adding in Federated Learning without Verification

Shu Hong, Lingjie Duan

In federated learning (FL), clients cooperatively train a global model without revealing their raw data but gradients or parameters, while the local information can still be disclosed from local outputs transmitted to the parameter server. With such privacy concerns, a client may overly add artificial noise to his local updates to compromise the global model training, and we prove the selfish noise adding leads to an infinite price of anarchy (PoA). This paper proposes a novel pricing mechanism to regulate privacy-sensitive clients without verifying their parameter updates, unlike existing privacy mechanisms that assume the server's full knowledge of added noise. Without knowing the ground truth, our mechanism reaches the social optimum to best balance the global training error and privacy loss, according to the difference between a client's updated parameter and all clients' average parameter. We also improve the FL convergence bound by refining the aggregation rule at the server to account for different clients' noise variances. Moreover, we extend our pricing scheme to fit incomplete information of clients' privacy sensitivities, ensuring their truthful type reporting and the system's ex-ante budget balance. Simulations show that our pricing scheme greatly improves the system performance especially when clients have diverse privacy sensitivities.

Submitted: Feb 24, 2023