Paper ID: 2309.16188

Stackelberg Batch Policy Learning

Wenzhuo Zhou, Annie Qu

Batch reinforcement learning (RL) defines the task of learning from a fixed batch of data lacking exhaustive exploration. Worst-case optimality algorithms, which calibrate a value-function model class from logged experience and perform some type of pessimistic evaluation under the learned model, have emerged as a promising paradigm for batch RL. However, contemporary works on this stream have commonly overlooked the hierarchical decision-making structure hidden in the optimization landscape. In this paper, we adopt a game-theoretical viewpoint and model the policy learning diagram as a two-player general-sum game with a leader-follower structure. We propose a novel stochastic gradient-based learning algorithm: StackelbergLearner, in which the leader player updates according to the total derivative of its objective instead of the usual individual gradient, and the follower player makes individual updates and ensures transition-consistent pessimistic reasoning. The derived learning dynamic naturally lends StackelbergLearner to a game-theoretic interpretation and provides a convergence guarantee to differentiable Stackelberg equilibria. From a theoretical standpoint, we provide instance-dependent regret bounds with general function approximation, which shows that our algorithm can learn a best-effort policy that is able to compete against any comparator policy that is covered by batch data. Notably, our theoretical regret guarantees only require realizability without any data coverage and strong function approximation conditions, e.g., Bellman closedness, which is in contrast to prior works lacking such guarantees. Through comprehensive experiments, we find that our algorithm consistently performs as well or better as compared to state-of-the-art methods in batch RL benchmark and real-world datasets.

Submitted: Sep 28, 2023