Contract Design
Contract design, focusing on optimizing agreements between principals and agents in various settings, seeks to create incentives aligning the interests of both parties. Current research emphasizes dynamic environments, employing reinforcement learning, Bayesian optimization, and generative models like diffusion models to design optimal contracts, particularly in multi-agent scenarios and online learning contexts. This field is crucial for addressing challenges in diverse areas, including AI delegation, data brokerage, and resource allocation in complex systems like vehicular networks, offering solutions to incentive misalignment and information asymmetry.
Papers
October 2, 2024
August 19, 2024
July 1, 2024
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July 5, 2023
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November 10, 2022
November 25, 2021