Markov Game
Markov games model strategic interactions among multiple agents in dynamic environments, aiming to find equilibrium solutions like Nash equilibria that represent stable outcomes. Current research focuses on developing efficient algorithms for learning these equilibria, particularly in large-scale settings, often employing techniques like mean-field games, actor-critic methods, and policy gradient approaches, and addressing challenges posed by incomplete information, asymmetry, and robustness to uncertainty. This field is crucial for advancing multi-agent reinforcement learning and has significant implications for diverse applications, including robotics, economics, and energy systems.
Papers
One Policy is Enough: Parallel Exploration with a Single Policy is Near-Optimal for Reward-Free Reinforcement Learning
Pedro Cisneros-Velarde, Boxiang Lyu, Sanmi Koyejo, Mladen Kolar
Simplex Neural Population Learning: Any-Mixture Bayes-Optimality in Symmetric Zero-sum Games
Siqi Liu, Marc Lanctot, Luke Marris, Nicolas Heess
Nearly Minimax Optimal Offline Reinforcement Learning with Linear Function Approximation: Single-Agent MDP and Markov Game
Wei Xiong, Han Zhong, Chengshuai Shi, Cong Shen, Liwei Wang, Tong Zhang