Nash Equilibrium
Nash equilibrium, a cornerstone of game theory, describes a stable state in a game where no player can improve their outcome by unilaterally changing their strategy. Current research focuses on developing efficient algorithms, such as those based on reinforcement learning, online learning, and Gaussian processes, to compute Nash equilibria in increasingly complex scenarios, including multi-agent systems, Markov games, and games with incomplete information. These advancements are crucial for addressing challenges in diverse fields like robotics, resource allocation, and cybersecurity, where understanding strategic interactions between agents is paramount for designing effective and robust systems.
Papers
Direct Nash Optimization: Teaching Language Models to Self-Improve with General Preferences
Corby Rosset, Ching-An Cheng, Arindam Mitra, Michael Santacroce, Ahmed Awadallah, Tengyang Xie
Convergence to Nash Equilibrium and No-regret Guarantee in (Markov) Potential Games
Jing Dong, Baoxiang Wang, Yaoliang Yu
Human Alignment of Large Language Models through Online Preference Optimisation
Daniele Calandriello, Daniel Guo, Remi Munos, Mark Rowland, Yunhao Tang, Bernardo Avila Pires, Pierre Harvey Richemond, Charline Le Lan, Michal Valko, Tianqi Liu, Rishabh Joshi, Zeyu Zheng, Bilal Piot
Tractable Local Equilibria in Non-Concave Games
Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, Haipeng Luo, Chen-Yu Wei, Weiqiang Zheng