Paper ID: 2410.23137 • Published Oct 30, 2024
Fair Division with Market Values
Siddharth Barman, Soroush Ebadian, Mohamad Latifian, Nisarg Shah
TL;DR
Get AI-generated summaries with premium
Get AI-generated summaries with premium
We introduce a model of fair division with market values, where indivisible
goods must be partitioned among agents with (additive) subjective valuations,
and each good additionally has a market value. The market valuation can be
viewed as a separate additive valuation that holds identically across all the
agents. We seek allocations that are simultaneously fair with respect to the
subjective valuations and with respect to the market valuation.
We show that an allocation that satisfies stochastically-dominant
envy-freeness up to one good (SD-EF1) with respect to both the subjective
valuations and the market valuation does not always exist, but the weaker
guarantee of EF1 with respect to the subjective valuations along with SD-EF1
with respect to the market valuation can be guaranteed. We also study a number
of other guarantees such as Pareto optimality, EFX, and MMS. In addition, we
explore non-additive valuations and extend our model to cake-cutting. Along the
way, we identify several tantalizing open questions.