Byzantine-Robust Aggregation for Securing Decentralized Federated Learning

Federated learning (FL) is a popular distributed learning paradigm in machine learning, which enables multiple clients to collaboratively train models under the guidance of a server without exposing private client data. However, FL's decentralized nature makes it vulnerable to poisoning attacks, where malicious clients can submit corrupted models to manipulate the system. To counter such attacks, although various Byzantine-robust methods have been proposed, these methods struggle to provide balanced defense against multiple types of attacks or rely on possessing the dataset in the server. To deal with these drawbacks, thus, we propose an effective multi-layer defensive adaptive aggregation for Bzantine-robust federated learning (AdaBFL) based on a novel three-layer defensive mechanism, which can adaptively adjust the weights of defense algorithms to counter complex attacks. Moreover, we provide convergence properties of our AdaBFL method under the non-convex setting on non-iid data. Comprehensive experiments across multiple datasets validate the superiority of our AdaBFL over the comparable algorithms.

We investigate robust federated learning, where a group of workers collaboratively train a shared model under the orchestration of a central server in the presence of Byzantine adversaries capable of arbitrary and potentially malicious behaviors. To simultaneously enhance communication efficiency and resilience against such adversaries, we propose a Byzantine-resilient Nesterov-accelerated federated learning (Byrd-NAFL) algorithm. Byrd-NAFL seamlessly integrates Nesterov's momentum into the federated learning process alongside Byzantine-resilient aggregation rules to achieve fast and safe convergence against gradient corruption. We establish a finite-time convergence guarantee for Byrd-NAFL under non-convex and smooth loss functions with relaxed assumptions on the aggregated gradients. Extensive numerical experiments validate the effectiveness of Byrd-NAFL and demonstrate the superiority over existing benchmarks in terms of convergence speed, accuracy, and resilience to diverse malicious attacks.

Federated learning (FL) enables multiple intelligent devices to collaboratively train a high-accuracy model without sharing raw data. However, due to its distributed nature, FL is vulnerable to Byzantine attacks. Existing defense methods rely on strong assumptions, such as the proportion of malicious devices not exceeding 50%, or the server having an additional root dataset that matches the training task. Moreover, they show limited efficacy as they overlook $(i)$ the divergence among benign updates and $(ii)$ the curse of dimensionality involved in comparing two high-dimensional updates. To solve these concerns, we propose FL-OA, a Byzantine-robust federated learning framework utilizing outsourced auditing. In FL-OA, the server collaborates with third-party organization that holds an additional root dataset to perform outsourced auditing, thereby enabling the server to achieve robust aggregation without strong assumptions. Additionally, FL-OA introduces a gradient ascent step and a correction term during local training to mitigate the divergence among benign updates, and designs a parameter importance indicator to extract critical parameters for auditing, alleviating the curse of dimensionality. We further provide a detailed theoretical analysis of FL-OA. Extensive experiments demonstrate that FL-OA outperforms existing defense methods against Byzantine attacks.