Robustness and Cybersecurity in the EU Artificial Intelligence Act

AI agents - i.e. AI systems that autonomously plan, invoke external tools, and execute multi-step action chains with reduced human involvement - are being deployed at scale across enterprise functions ranging from customer service and recruitment to clinical decision support and critical infrastructure management. The EU AI Act (Regulation 2024/1689) regulates these systems through a risk-based framework, but it does not operate in isolation: providers face simultaneous obligations under the GDPR, the Cyber Resilience Act, the Digital Services Act, the Data Act, the Data Governance Act, sector-specific legislation, the NIS2 Directive, and the revised Product Liability Directive. This paper provides the first systematic regulatory mapping for AI agent providers integrating (a) draft harmonised standards under Standardisation Request M/613 to CEN/CENELEC JTC 21 as of January 2026, (b) the GPAI Code of Practice published in July 2025, (c) the CRA harmonised standards programme under Mandate M/606 accepted in April 2025, and (d) the Digital Omnibus proposals of November 2025. We present a practical taxonomy of nine agent deployment categories mapping concrete actions to regulatory triggers, identify agent-specific compliance challenges in cybersecurity, human oversight, transparency across multi-party action chains, and runtime behavioral drift. We propose a twelve-step compliance architecture and a regulatory trigger mapping connecting agent actions to applicable legislation. We conclude that high-risk agentic systems with untraceable behavioral drift cannot currently satisfy the AI Act's essential requirements, and that the provider's foundational compliance task is an exhaustive inventory of the agent's external actions, data flows, connected systems, and affected persons.

The EU AI Act introduces mandatory requirements for high-risk AI systems with the explicit goal of ensuring the development and operation of trustworthy AI. At the same time, AI risk management practices rely on structured risk taxonomies to systematically identify and treat AI-specific risk sources. As both the AI Act and established risk taxonomies aim to address AI-induced risks, a natural question is whether they align in the risk sources they cover. However, no clear mapping exists between the risks implicitly addressed by the Act's high-risk requirements and established taxonomies, leaving practitioners without a structured basis for aligning regulatory obligations with AI risk management practice. This paper presents a systematic classification of the requirements extracted from the EU AI Act Section 2 (Requirements for high-risk AI systems), revealing that only a minority directly address AI-specific risk sources, while the majority impose organizational process and documentation obligations. From the AI risk-related requirements, a consolidated list of distinct AI-specific risk sources is derived. The resulting EU AI Act Risk Source List takes an important step towards bridging the gap between legal obligation and AI risk management practice, providing a structured reference for explicit comparison between existing AI risk taxonomies and the risk sources implicitly addressed by the EU AI Act. Important Note: This is the authors' preprint. The paper was presented at the 4th International Conference on Frontiers of Artificial Intelligence, Ethics, and Multidisciplinary Applications. A link to the conference's official proceedings will be provided upon publication.

Large language models now produce legal text of at least median quality, yet no existing benchmark can evaluate whether they perform doctrinal legal reasoning, which forms the interpretive core of legal work, rather than the ancillary, paralegal tasks that most current legal-AI evaluations measure. This measurement gap is not only methodological but legal: the EU AI Act makes "appropriate accuracy" a binding requirement for high-risk AI used in the judicial domain, yet that requirement cannot acquire operational content without the very doctrinal-reasoning benchmark the field lacks.