Who Benchmarks the Benchmarks? Towards Comprehensive Evaluation of Commonsense Reasoning Benchmarks

Predicting LLM's capabilities on real-world tasks is essential, yet the extent to which performance on commonsense benchmarks predicts downstream performance remains underspecified. To establish the practical usability of widely adopted commonsense benchmarks, we evaluate 23 models from six families on four established commonsense benchmarks, four reworked variants, three non-commonsense controls, and eight downstream tasks requiring implicit social, pragmatic, temporal, or physical reasoning. We compare model rankings, compute controlled correlations, and use leave-one-family-out cross-validation to assess the criterion validity of commonsense benchmarks. Our results show that revised benchmarks largely preserve original model rankings and do not improve downstream predictive power. Commonsense benchmarks show consistent cross-family predictive validity for only a narrow subset of downstream tasks, with smaller or metric-specific gains elsewhere. Overall, standardized commonsense benchmarks provide task-dependent rather than broad evidence of downstream commonsense competence.

Should we trust Large Language Models (LLMs) with high accuracy? LLMs achieve high accuracy on reasoning benchmarks, but correctness alone does not reveal the quality of the reasoning used to produce it. This highlights a fundamental limitation of outcome-based evaluation: models may arrive at correct answers through flawed reasoning, and models with substantially different reasoning capabilities can nevertheless exhibit similar benchmark accuracy, for example due to memorization or over-optimization. In this paper, we ask: given existing benchmarks, can we move beyond outcome-based evaluation to assess the quality of reasoning itself? We seek metrics that (1) differentiate models with similar accuracy and (2) are robust to variations in input prompts and generation configurations. To this end, we propose a reasoning score that evaluates reasoning traces along dimensions such as faithfulness, coherence, utility, and factuality. A remaining question is how to aggregate this score across multiple sampled traces. Naively averaging them is undesirable, particularly in long-horizon settings, where the number of possible trajectories grows rapidly, and low-confidence correct traces are more likely to be coincidental. To address this, we introduce the Filtered Reasoning Score (FRS), which computes reasoning quality using only the top-K% most confident traces. Evaluating with FRS, models that are indistinguishable under standard accuracy exhibit significant differences in reasoning quality. Moreover, models with higher FRS on one benchmark tend to perform better on other reasoning benchmarks, in both accuracy and reasoning quality. Together, these findings suggest that FRS complements accuracy by capturing a model's transferable reasoning capabilities. We open source our evaluation codebase: https://github.com/Manas2006/benchmark_reproducibility.

As large language models (LLMs) continue to advance in complex reasoning tasks, they have learned to heavily prioritize explicit conditions provided in the input. However, in everyday commonsense reasoning, this mechanism exposes a critical vulnerability which we term Salience Bias: models become easily hijacked by useless explicit distractors (e.g., numerical values), leading them to ignore the implicit physical or commonsense prerequisites of a task. A critical open question is whether this failure reflects a genuine gap in commonsense knowledge or merely its suppression under misleading task framing. To investigate this, we construct the SaliTrap Benchmark, a high-quality dataset across four trap dimensions. Evaluating 12 state-of-the-art LLMs, we find that all mainstream models suffer significantly from salience bias, with severity scaling with distractor density and detecting the trap often decoupled from actually avoiding it. Crucially, by re-eliciting the same models with the task framing stripped away, we show that this is overwhelmingly a failure of \textbf{knowledge suppression rather than knowledge absence}: a context-free knowledge probe alone recovers over 90% of sycophantic-compliance failures, revealing that the requisite commonsense is intrinsically present but actively crowded out by salient distractors that lure the model into over-compliant, unnecessary computation. Building on this diagnosis, we further show that lightweight, inference-time prompting alone substantially closes the gap without any retraining. Our findings relocate the bottleneck of commonsense reasoning failures from model competence to elicitation, and we release SaliTrap as a testbed for this blind spot. The codes are available at https://github.com/Wuzheng02/SaliTrap.