When Can Large Reasoning Models Save Thinking? Mechanistic Analysis of Behavioral Divergence in Reasoning
Authors: Rongzhi Zhu, Yi Liu, Jiancheng Wang, Xiangyu Liu, Zequn Sun, Yiwei Wang, Yu Deng, Zijian Zhou, +1 more
Organizations: State Key Laboratory for Novel Software Technology, Nanjing University, China · China Unicom Software Research Institute, China · National Institute of Healthcare Data Science, Nanjing University, China · University of California, Merced, USA
Large reasoning models (LRMs) have achieved remarkable success on complex tasks, yet their tendency to "overthink" leads to inefficiencies. Although "save-thinking" prompts are intended to mitigate this issue, we find that LRMs still frequently enter the "Still-thinking" mode instead of the expected "No-thinking" mode, especially on difficult queries. To analyze this behavioral divergence, we examine LRMs from three perspectives: confidence at the thinking-termination boundary, divergence in internal attention distributions, and attention allocation across prompt segments. We find that high perplexity is associated with later Still-thinking behavior, and that Still-thinking cases allocate more attention to the original question. Based on these observations, we propose an attention intervention method to regulate this behavior. While this intervention suppresses explicit thinking, it also causes a drop in accuracy, suggesting that the suppressed reasoning behavior is often useful for correctness. Our work provides confidence- and attention-level evidence for this behavior, highlighting the trade-off between instruction following, inference efficiency, and reasoning correctness.
Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) improve performance by generating explicit intermediate reasoning traces through increased test-time compute, yet the assumption that longer reasoning is consistently beneficial remains under-examined. While recent evidence shows that additional reasoning can lead models to overthink, we ask: "Once a model has reached the correct answer, does further reasoning refine the solution, or deviate from it?" To study the dynamics after correctness, we introduce a prefix-level trajectory evaluation protocol grounded in reasoning sufficiency, defining the minimum reasoning budget required for a model to first generate the correct answer. This allows us to disentangle verbose overthinking, where additional reasoning is redundant but harmless, from harmful overthinking, where continued reasoning destabilizes an already-correct trajectory. Starting from multimodal benchmarks, we find that many instances considered reasoning-intensive require surprisingly little reasoning. Moreover, stopping at the first correct prefix improves accuracy over standard reasoning up to 21%, revealing that current models are limited not only by their ability to reason, but also by their inability to stop at the right time. Furthermore, while common efficiency strategies like early stopping substantially reduce verbose overthinking (up to 50%), they fail to mitigate harmful overthinking. Failure analysis reveals that correctness deviations are mainly driven by logical drift and visual reinterpretation. Finally, we show that our findings generalize to language-only reasoning benchmarks, highlighting harmful overthinking as a broader reliability risk. Code available at https://simonecaldarella.github.io/thinking-past-the-answer.
Current answering paradigms for Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) often fail to account for the fact that some questions may lie beyond the model's operational capability boundary, leading to long but unproductive reasoning. In this paper, we study whether LRMs expose early signals predictive of such cases, and whether these signals can be used to mitigate unproductive reasoning. In black-box settings, we find that reasoning expressions contain failure-predictive signals. In white-box settings, we show that the hidden states of the last input token contain information that is predictive of whether a question will not be solved correctly under our evaluation setup. Building on these observations, we propose two test-time monitoring strategies: reasoning expression monitoring and hidden states monitoring, that reduce token usage by 62.7-93.6%, substantially improving efficiency and reliability while largely preserving accuracy.
While Large Language Models (LLMs) employing Chain-of-Thought (CoT) exhibit superior reasoning capabilities, the neural mechanisms distinguishing this explicit Thinking mode from direct answer generation (NoThinking mode) remain poorly understood. To deconstruct this cognitive process, we apply Top-K Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs) to the intermediate representations of DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-7B and examine the model's divergent behaviors across math-solving tasks of three distinct difficulty levels. Observationally, we identify a clear distinction in how the model functions under two reasoning modes: Thinking mode relies on sparse and high-intensity feature activations driving verbal deduction independent of problem complexity, whereas NoThinking mode exhibits an adaptive and diffuse pattern prioritizing symbolic manipulation. Causally, suppressing the three most active sparse features by Total Activation Volume reveals three principles: (i) reasoning and syntactic structure are tightly coupled, as interventions consistently degrade \LaTeX{} and boxed-solution formatting; (ii) Thinking responds to disruption with compensatory over-generation marked by increased metacognitive cues and repetitive, low-information continuations; and (iii) coherent CoT behavior depends on a fragile coordination among specialized features, yielding distinct failure modes under perturbation but a consistently impaired output structure.