VISOR: Visual Input-based Steering for Output Redirection in Vision-Language Models

As Vision Language Models (VLMs) are deployed across safety-critical applications, understanding and controlling their behavioral patterns has become increasingly important. Existing behavioral control methods face significant limitations: system prompting approaches could easily be overridden by user instructions, while applying activation-based steering vectors requires invasive runtime access to model internals, precluding deployment with API-based services and closed-source models. Finding steering methods that transfer across multiple VLMs is still an open area of research. To this end, we introduce universal visual input based steering for output redirection (VISOR++), to achieve behavioral control through optimized visual inputs alone. We demonstrate that a single VISOR++ image can be generated for an ensemble of VLMs to emulate each of their steering vectors. By crafting universal visual inputs that induce target activation patterns, VISOR++ eliminates the need for runtime model access while remaining deployment-agnostic. This means that when an underlying model supports multimodal capability, model behaviors can be steered by inserting an image input replacing runtime steering vector based interventions. We first demonstrate the effectiveness of the VISOR++ images on open-access models such as LLaVA-1.5-7B and IDEFICS2-8B along three alignment directions: refusal, sycophancy and survival instinct. Both the model-specific steering images and the jointly optimized images achieve performance parity closely following that of steering vectors for both positive and negative steering tasks. We also show the promise of VISOR++ images in achieving directional behavioral shifts for unseen models including both open-access and closed-access ones. Furthermore, VISOR++ images are able to preserve 99.9% performance on 14,000 unrelated MMLU evaluation tasks.

Vision--Language Models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed through a model supply chain in which pretrained checkpoints, architecture definitions, text encoders, and exported computation graphs are distributed by third parties and reused across downstream services. This reuse model creates a security-critical trust boundary: VLM deployments inherit not only learned parameters but also executable behavior encoded in shared model artifacts. In this paper, we show that a malicious provider can exploit this trust boundary by embedding architectural backdoors into VLM supply chains through representation steering. Our attack introduces dormant steering logic into the model architecture through a trigger-gated additive modification of an intermediate representation, without poisoning training data, controlling downstream fine-tuning, or modifying prompts at deployment time. When the trigger is absent, the modification reduces to zero and the model follows its normal computation, preserving clean utility. When the trigger is present, a steering direction shifts the internal representation toward an attacker-defined objective. We evaluate the attack across multiple VLM families and downstream tasks, including visual question answering, text-to-image generation, retrieval, and semantic response biasing. The results show that the proposed architectural steering backdoor compromises integrity, safety enforcement, and ranking fairness while preserving normal behavior on clean inputs. We further show that shared VLM artifacts can carry dormant steering logic against downstream services, and we propose an auditing defense that inspects the executable logic distributed with model artifacts rather than only their learned weights.

Large vision language models (LVLMs) have made rapid advancements and are deployed across various applications, yet hallucinations remain a major challenge. Activation steering is appealing due to its minimal training overhead and controllability at inference time. However, we found that during autoregressive decoding, visual conditioning affects token prediction sparsely and locally across decoding steps, and many existing methods that average image-versus-no-image differences over the entire sequence dilute these critical signals, yielding low signal-to-noise ratio steering directions. Additionally, many existing methods apply a fixed steering strength, which misallocates the intervention budget, over-perturbs non-critical tokens, and can cause instability. To address these limitations, we propose Token-Level Visual-Sensitivity Steering (TLVS) for hallucination mitigation. Our approach first extracts token-level steering vectors and refines them, and then applies fine-grained, visual-sensitivity-adaptive steering only where it matters. This lightweight, plug-and-play mechanism requires only minimal training for calibration and can be applied across diverse vision-language models. It modulates the steering strength at each decoding step, selectively suppressing hallucination-prone spans while preserving evidence-grounded content. We evaluate TLVS on several benchmarks, including POPE, AMBER, CHAIR (COCO), MMHal, and HallusionBench, demonstrating consistent improvements over previous steering methods.