Speculating LLMs' Chinese Training Data Pollution from Their Tokens

Chinese web pollution has surfaced in LLMs, motivating audits of upstream Chinese corpora. However, auditing such corpora faces three challenges: (1) their web-scale size makes full scan costly; (2) prior analyses are often too coarse to expose token-level pollution; (3) Chinese web pollution is implicit and rapidly changing. We propose Sampled-BPE, a lightweight token-level auditing pipeline that sample a small subset and train BPE tokenizer to surface polluted tokens. Experiments show that Sampled-BPE preserves usable estimates while substantially reducing runtime and memory: a 148.4 $\times$ speedup and a 35.8 $\times$ memory reduction induce only 4.25% relative error for pollution categories. We apply the pipeline to 11 open Chinese corpora and 6 Chinese Common Crawl snapshots from 2021 to 2026. The audit reveals widespread but uneven pollution across open corpora, as well as highly polluted and temporally shifting Chinese web content. We further release a hierarchical Chinese web token dataset with 660k+ token records, each with web context, category, and explanation fields, organized as trees to support review and tracing of pollution.

Tokenization is a necessary component within the current architecture of many language mod-els, including the transformer-based large language models (LLMs) of Generative AI, yet its impact on the model's cognition is often overlooked. We argue that LLMs demonstrate that the Distributional Hypothesis (DH) is sufficient for reasonably human-like language performance (particularly with respect to inferential lexical competence), and that the emergence of human-meaningful linguistic units among tokens and current structural constraints motivate changes to existing, linguistically-agnostic tokenization techniques, particularly with respect to their roles as (1) vehicles for conveying salient distributional patterns from human language to the model and as (2) semantic primitives. We explore tokenizations from a BPE tokenizer; extant model vocabularies obtained from Hugging Face and tiktoken; and the information in exemplar token vectors as they move through the layers of a RoBERTa (large) model. Besides creating suboptimal semantic building blocks and obscuring the model's access to the necessary distributional patterns, we describe how tokens and pretraining can act as a backdoor for bias and other unwanted content, which current alignment practices may not remediate. Additionally, we relay evidence that the tokenization algorithm's objective function impacts the LLM's cognition, despite being arguably meaningfully insulated from the main system intelligence. Finally, we discuss implications for architectural choices, meaning construction, the primacy of language for thought, and LLM cognition. [First uploaded to arXiv in December, 2024.]

Character-level perturbations bypass safety alignment in modern LLMs despite leaving prompts human-readable. We identify and test a central structural mechanism: BPE tokenization fragments safety-critical words into sub-word pieces, and the three public alignment datasets we surveyed contain no intentionally fragmented inputs. The mechanism is a chain, tested end-to-end on five model families (Qwen-3-4B, Qwen-2.5-7B, Gemma-3-4B, Llama-3.1-8B, Mistral-7B). An optimization targeting safety-token fragmentation flips the first-token refusal trigger on 80-100% of refused HarmBench prompts, with 48% of those flips producing genuinely harmful outputs (per-model 29-65%; gap-vs-behavior ROC-AUC 0.66-0.98, pooled 0.84). Activation patching localizes the disrupted signal to the last ${\sim}30\%$ of layers; an alignment-data scan finds zero fragmented prompts among 30,000 examples (positive-control recall $\geq 99\%$ at attack-relevant intensities); and targeted-mutation experiments isolate safety words as the disruption locus. On the defense side, a 68-cell grid (55 trained checkpoints) shows that no DPO configuration achieves seed- and pool-stable ASR closure on the three families with closed pool-size confounds. SFT trained on fragmented prompts closes ASR on 3/5 families but only via global collapse that raises refusal on benign prompts as well, indicating the missing distribution is necessary but not sufficient under the LoRA-16 recipe we tested. To distinguish selective repair from global collapse, we introduce Conv-Benign, a candidate paired diagnostic. All ASR claims are 3-judge-calibrated (cell rankings stable across judges; absolute levels $\pm$18pp; see App.~B.13).