Voice Authentication Systems (VAS) use unique vocal characteristics for verification. They are increasingly integrated into high-security sectors such as banking and healthcare. Despite their improvements using deep learning, they face severe vulnerabilities from sophisticated threats like deepfakes and adversarial attacks. The emergence of realistic voice cloning complicates detection, as systems struggle to distinguish authentic from synthetic audio. While anti-spoofing countermeasures (CMs) exist to mitigate these risks, many rely on static detection models that can be bypassed by novel adversarial methods, leaving a critical security gap. To demonstrate this vulnerability, we propose the Spectral Masking and Interpolation Attack (SMIA), a novel method that strategically manipulates inaudible frequency regions of AI-generated audio. By altering the voice in imperceptible zones to the human ear, SMIA creates adversarial samples that sound authentic while deceiving CMs. We conducted a comprehensive evaluation of our attack against state-of-the-art (SOTA) models across multiple tasks, under simulated real-world conditions. SMIA achieved a strong attack success rate (ASR) of at least 82% against combined VAS/CM systems, at least 97.5% against standalone speaker verification systems, and 100% against countermeasures. These findings conclusively demonstrate that current security postures are insufficient against adaptive adversarial attacks. This work highlights the urgent need for a paradigm shift toward next-generation defenses that employ dynamic, context-aware frameworks capable of evolving with the threat landscape.
Recent advances in text-to-speech and voice cloning make high-quality spoofing inexpensive and scalable, threatening voice authentication systems, especially automatic speaker verification (ASV). Existing defenses mainly address this threat through binary countermeasures (CMs) for deepfake detection or spoofing-aware speaker verification (SASV), where current systems are dominated by modular ASV-CM fusion and cascaded pipelines. Although large audio language models (LALMs) have shown promise on related audio tasks, including CM and ASV, their use for SASV remains unexplored, despite their capacity to produce natural-language rationales for auditing and robustness beyond discriminative predictions. This work systematically evaluates LALMs for SASV against conventional pipelines under zero-shot prompting, supervised adaptation, reasoning-oriented training, and reinforcement-learning-based optimization. Our results show that pretrained LALMs are near chance in the zero-shot setting, confirming that they are not natively suited to SASV, but that task-specific adaptation closes this gap. We further find that competitive SASV performance can be achieved through several distinct routes. These findings position LALMs as a promising and auditable foundation for unified SASV, while clarifying where conventional cascade systems still lead.
The rapid advancement of generative AI has made audio deepfakes increasingly indistinguishable from authentic human vocals, posing significant threats to persons-of-interest (POI) such as public figures. Current detection systems primarily rely on generic, black-box models that fail to capture speaker-specific idiosyncratic traits and lack interpretability. In this paper, we propose Phoneme-based Voice Profiling (PVP), a novel personalized defense framework. By shifting the detection paradigm from macro-utterance analysis to micro-phonetic modeling, PVP captures the unique acoustic distributions underlying a POI's habitual articulatory patterns. Specifically, our framework models speaker-specific phonetic realizations using lightweight Gaussian Mixture Models (GMMs) estimated solely from bona fide reference speech. This design enables data-efficient profiling and robust generalization to previously unseen spoofing attacks without requiring heavy spoof-specific training. Furthermore, we introduce the first large-scale Chinese POI deepfake dataset to benchmark speaker-specific detection. Experimental results demonstrate that PVP significantly outperforms state-of-the-art generic detectors in POI spoofing scenarios, achieving substantial EER reductions while providing fine-grained, phoneme-level interpretability for forensic analysis. Code and data are available at: https://github.com/JunXue-tech/PVP
Audio anti-spoofing systems are typically trained to assign one authenticity label to an entire speech utterance. This formulation becomes under-specified for transformations where the underlying speaker identity and linguistic content remain unchanged. We study this problem using benign, authenticity-preserving speech transformations, including voice quality conversion and speech restoration, applied to both bona fide and spoofed speech. Instead of treating all processed audio as spoofed, we factorise labels into source authenticity and processed status. Across SSL representations and DF-Arena fine-tuning experiments, we find that utterance processing status can transfer more reliably than source attribution: detectors can often identify that speech has been processed, while still confusing processed bona fide and processed spoofed speech. These results suggest that audio deepfake defences must move beyond the binary spoofed/authentic paradigm. Robust detection requires granular reporting on source authenticity, processing status, and precise processing localisation.