Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models map multimodal perception and language instructions to executable robot actions, making them particularly vulnerable to behavioral backdoor manipulation: a hidden trigger introduced during training can induce unintended physical actions while nominal task performance remains intact. Prior work on VLA backdoors primarily studies untargeted attacks or task-level hijacking, leaving fine-grained control over individual actions largely unexplored. In this work, we present DropVLA, an action-level backdoor attack that forces a reusable action primitive (e.g., open_gripper) to execute at attacker-chosen decision points under a realistic pipeline-black-box setting with limited data-poisoning access, using a window-consistent relabeling scheme for chunked fine-tuning. On OpenVLA-7B evaluated with LIBERO, vision-only poisoning achieves 98.67%-99.83% attack success rate (ASR) with only 0.31% poisoned episodes while preserving 98.50%-99.17% clean-task retention, and successfully triggers the targeted action within 25 control steps at 500 Hz (0.05 s). Text-only triggers are unstable at low poisoning budgets, and combining text with vision provides no consistent ASR improvement over vision-only attacks. The backdoor remains robust to moderate trigger variations and transfers across evaluation suites (96.27%, 99.09%), whereas text-only largely fails (0.72%). We further validate physical-world feasibility on a 7-DoF Franka arm with pi0-fast, demonstrating non-trivial attack efficacy under camera-relative motion that induces image-plane trigger drift. These results reveal that VLA models can be covertly steered at the granularity of safety-critical actions with minimal poisoning and without observable degradation of nominal performance.
Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models are deployed through pipelines that end users cannot audit, and a poisoned VLA can behave normally on clean observations while a small visual trigger redirects a long-horizon robot policy before any failure becomes observable. Existing vision or language defenses rarely explain what a triggered VLA representation looks like or how to recover behavior without retraining. We study this gap through two independently proposed VLA attacks from groups with distinct injection strategies, BadVLA and INFUSE; the latter persists after downstream clean adaptation. Across the evaluated poisoned models, we identify a recurring internal mechanism: a \emph{compact causal footprint}, namely a small visual support that is attention-seeded, spatially compact, and \emph{causal} in a precise sense -- masking it returns a clean-calibrated evidence-evolution score to the normal operating region. This footprint motivates TrustVLA, a mechanism-guided inference-time defense that adapts the Dirichlet evidence framework from trusted classification to monitor per-token, per-layer epistemic uncertainty in VLA policies. With only a small clean calibration set, TrustVLA (i)~detects abnormal evidence evolution, (ii)~localizes the compact support by counterfactual mechanism-score drop, and (iii)~recovers the observation by localized inpainting. Across OpenVLA/LIBERO and π0.5 transfer evaluations, TrustVLA reduces attack success while preserving clean-task performance, providing a retraining-free, mechanism-guided defense for visual-triggered VLA backdoors.
Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models enable instruction-driven robotic manipulation, but they inherit oversized language backbones from pretrained VLMs whose capacity far exceeds what is needed for short robotic instructions. This raises a basic question: how much of a VLA model is actually necessary for closed-loop control? In this work, we study architectural redundancy in VLA models by using transformer block removal as a controlled intervention. We introduce \textbf{Drop-Then-Recovery (DTR)}, an analysis protocol that removes selected blocks from a pretrained VLA model and then fine-tunes the resulting model to measure whether the removed capacity was necessary for downstream control. To make this intervention reliable, we propose \textbf{GateProbe}, a one-shot virtual-gate sensitivity metric that ranks blocks by their contribution to the downstream action loss. Across multiple VLA architectures, manipulation benchmarks and even real-robot industrial scenarios, we find a strong asymmetry in post-removal recoverability: \ul{\textit{language backbones are highly redundant for standard robotic manipulation tasks, whereas vision and action pathways are substantially less tolerant to removal}}. On LIBERO, removing half of the LLM blocks even improves OpenVLA-OFT from 95.0% to 98.3% under the same downstream fine-tuning budget, and retaining only two language blocks still recovers baseline-level performance. These results suggest that current VLA benchmarks may exert limited pressure on deep language grounding and compositional instruction understanding, and that future VLA architectures should allocate capacity more deliberately across language, vision, and action components. The code is available at https://github.com/s1ghhh/VLADrop.
Vision-Language-Action models (VLAs) support generalist robotic control by enabling end-to-end decision policies directly from multi-modal inputs. As trained VLAs are increasingly shared and adapted, protecting model ownership becomes essential for secure deployment and responsible open-source usage. In this paper, we present GuardVLA, the first backdoor-based ownership verification framework specifically designed for VLAs. GuardVLA embeds a stealthy and harmless backdoor watermark into the protected model during training by injecting secret messages into embodied visual data. For post-release verification, we propose a swap-and-detect mechanism, in which the trigger projector and an external classifier head are used to activate and detect the embedded backdoor based on prediction probabilities. Extensive experiments across multiple datasets, model architectures, and adaptation settings demonstrate that GuardVLA enables reliable ownership verification while preserving benign task performance. Further results show that the embedded watermark remains detectable under post-release model adaptation.