Fine-grained Analysis of Brain-LLM Alignment through Input Attribution

Brain alignment of large language models (LLMs) offers a way to investigate representational similarities between LLMs and the human brain during language processing. While previous studies have mainly focused on passive language comprehension, little is known about such alignment during dialogue, in which speakers engage in both language production and comprehension. In this study, using fMRI data collected during dialogue, we examine brain alignment during language production and comprehension across LLM layers and brain regions. We assess its association with the intrinsic dimension (ID) of LLM representations and the contributions of several interpretable linguistic and communicative features. Our results reveal distinct patterns of brain alignment between production and comprehension, as well as strong associations with ID in brain regions associated with each processing mode. Furthermore, we show that the contributions of linguistic and communicative features also vary across processing modes, LLM layers, and brain regions.

Brain-language model alignment is often interpreted as evidence that transformer models implement computations similar to those of the human brain. This assumes that neural predictivity reflects internal computational properties of large language models (LLMs), such as hierarchical contextual processing, predictive coding, or representational compression. An alternative possibility is that brain scores primarily reflect stable lexical-semantic correspondences shared by language models and the brain. Here we tested these interpretations using whole-brain encoding models across Mandarin, English, and French. Across all three languages, transformer representations significantly predicted activity in a distributed network spanning classical language regions, transmodal cortical systems, and subcortical structures. These spatial patterns showed substantial cross-linguistic overlap and remained remarkably stable across layers, providing little evidence that model depth systematically maps onto cortical processing hierarchies. Likewise, contextual transformer embeddings did not consistently outperform static lexical embeddings, despite providing some unique predictive variance. Finally, neither surprisal nor intrinsic dimensionality reproduced the layer-wise profile of brain scores, arguing against prediction and information compression as primary explanations for brain-LLM alignment. Together, these findings suggest that brain-LLM alignment is more robust across languages, transformer depth, and model architectures than previously appreciated, but less informative about shared computational mechanisms. Our results are more consistent with neural predictivity reflecting stable representational structure preserved across model transformations than with a one-to-one correspondence between their underlying computations.

Nastase et al. (2026) argue that large language models (LLMs) may illuminate language processing because both rely on distributed, context-sensitive representations shaped by statistical learning. Their rejection of simple cortical "boxology" is persuasive, and they articulate a strong case for the value of LLM-brain alignment research. The key question is what kind of inference LLM-brain alignment licenses. My claim here will be narrow: representational alignment can in principle constrain mechanistic hypotheses, but it does not by itself identify a mechanism. Nastase et al. acknowledge that an encoding model can capture features represented in neural activity without establishing a shared architecture or algorithm. Yet the authors sometime move from alignment to "shared computational principles" and ultimately to LLMs as mechanistic models of natural language. Indeed, their methodological caveat that alignment does not establish a shared architecture or algorithm sits uneasily with their conclusion that LLMs might instantiate the same computational principles as biological brains and provide a "fully mechanistic model" of language. I discuss what I consider to be problems of logical, causal, and computational underdetermination in Nastase et al.'s (2026) proposal.