Unknown Unknowns: Do Hidden Intentions in LLMs Evade Detection?

When model developers or users fine-tune an LLM, this can induce behaviors that are unexpected, deliberately harmful, or hard to detect. It would be far easier to audit LLMs if they could simply describe their behaviors in natural language. Here, we study a scalable approach to rapidly identify learned behaviors of many LLMs derived from a shared base LLM. Given a model $M$, our method works by finetuning models $M_i$ from $M$ with implanted behaviors $b_i$; the $(M_i, b_i)$ pairs serve as labeled training data. We then train an introspection adapter (IA): a single LoRA adapter jointly trained across the finetunes $M_i$ to cause them to verbalize their implanted behaviors. We find that this IA induces self-description of learned behaviors even in finetunes of $M$ that were trained in very different ways from the $M_i$. For example, IAs generalize to AuditBench, achieving state-of-the-art at identifying explicitly hidden concerning behaviors. IAs can also be used to detect encrypted finetuning API attacks. They scale favorably with model size and training data diversity. Overall, our results suggest that IAs are a scalable, effective, and practically useful approach to auditing fine-tuned LLMs.

Large language models can deceive by subtly manipulating truthful information -- omitting key facts, shifting focus, or obscuring meaning -- making such behavior difficult to detect. Existing black-box methods rely on coarse-grained judgments, offering limited interpretability and failing to pinpoint which facts were distorted and how. We introduce DECOR, a multi-agent framework grounded in Information Manipulation Theory for fine-grained auditing of strategic deception in LLM responses. DECOR decomposes input contexts into atomic informational units and scores each unit against the response across four dimensions of manipulation, producing interpretable manipulation profiles that are aggregated into a global deception index. We comprehensively evaluate DECOR on both single-turn and multi-turn deception detection benchmarks spanning real-world domains, and show that DECOR achieves state-of-the-art performance on both, outperforming competitive baselines. The framework generalizes across 15 frontier models, and ablation studies confirm the contribution of each key design component. Our findings demonstrate that fine-grained, theory-grounded auditing of information manipulation offers an effective and interpretable path for LLM deception detection.

Language models deployed in high-stakes roles can potentially favor certain entities, brands, or viewpoints, steering user decisions at scale. Such preferential biases can be introduced by any actor in the model's supply chain and are most dangerous when the model reveals its preference only on the relevant topic while behaving identically to its unmodified base on all other inputs. Recent work has shown that these biases can transfer through context distillation on semantically unrelated data, with the signal residing entirely in the soft logit distribution and remaining invisible to text-based inspection. However, the defender faces a fundamental asymmetry: without knowing the bias topic, no detection method can reliably surface a stealth preferential bias, regardless of whether it examines generated text, internal representations, or model weights. Here we introduce Distill to Detect (D2D), a method that surfaces hidden biases by distilling the distributional shift between a suspected model and its base into a cartridge (a KV-cache prefix adapter), concentrating the dominant divergence and amplifying the bias signal into generated text. We show that D2D successfully amplifies the hidden biases of stealth models to the extent that they can be reliably detected across multiple bias types. We also propose a theoretical framework that explains the efficacy of D2D through the lens of Fisher-weighted projection of the logit distribution shift, supported by empirical observations. By turning the capacity bottleneck of prefix-tuning adapters into a detection tool, D2D provides a practical building block for auditing hidden behaviors in deployed language models.