Off-The-Shelf Image-to-Image Models Are All You Need To Defeat Image Protection Schemes
Organizations: University of Texas at San Antonio San Antonio, TX, USA
Abstract
Advances in Generative AI (GenAI) have led to the development of various protection strategies to prevent the unauthorized use of images. These methods rely on adding imperceptible protective perturbations to images to thwart misuse such as style mimicry or deepfake manipulations. Although previous attacks on these protections required specialized, purpose-built methods, we demonstrate that this is no longer necessary. We show that off-the-shelf image-to-image GenAI models can be repurposed as generic ``denoisers" using a simple text prompt, effectively removing a wide range of protective perturbations. Across 8 case studies spanning 6 diverse protection schemes, our general-purpose attack not only circumvents these defenses but also outperforms existing specialized attacks while preserving the image's utility for the adversary. Our findings reveal a critical and widespread vulnerability in the current landscape of image protection, indicating that many schemes provide a false sense of security. We stress the urgent need to develop robust defenses and establish that any future protection mechanism must be benchmarked against attacks from off-the-shelf GenAI models. Code is available in this repository: https://github.com/mlsecviswanath/img2imgdenoiser
Figures & tables
| Case study # | Our attack against protection schemes | |
| Protection type | Protection scheme (venue) | |
| 1 | Preventing deepfake face manipulation | UnGANable (USENIX Sec’23) [ 61 ] |
| 2 | In-processing watermarking | PRC (ICLR’25) [ 34 ] |
| 3 | Post-processing watermarking | VINE (ICLR’25) [ 68 ] |
| 4 | Traceability when misused for model personalization | SIREN (IEEE S&P’25) [ 59 ] |
| Our attack Vs. protection-specific attacks | ||
| 0.06 | ||||
| Attacker | Matching Rate ↑ | PSNR ↑ | SSIM ↑ | MSE ↓ |
| No attack | 0.00% | 32.417 | 0.924 | 0.0006 |
| Smoothing | 63.25% | 32.355 | 0.947 | 0.0006 |
| DiffPure | 48.29% | 25.781 | 0.830 | 0.0028 |
| SD1.5 | 63.25% | 29.077 | 0.904 | 0.0013 |
| SDXL | 63.68% | 30.726 | 0.925 | 0.0010 |
| Attacker | TPR@FPR ↓ | PSNR ↑ | SSIM ↑ | KID ↓ |
| No attack | 1.000 | - | - | 0.0183 |
| Smoothing (Avg.) | 1.000 | 30.656 | 0.868 | 0.0294 |
| DiffPure | 0.280 | 21.694 | 0.305 | 0.0302 |
| Regen-VAE B | 0.312 | 28.859 | 0.770 | 0.0618 |
| SD1.5 | 0.878 | 23.314 | 0.611 | 0.0248 |
| SDXL | 0.000 | 24.018 | 0.652 | 0.0142 |
| Attacker | TPR@FPR ↓ | PSNR ↑ | SSIM ↑ | LPIPS ↓ | KID ↓ |
| No Denoising | 1.000 | 37.479 | 0.993 | 0.007 | 0.0000 |
| DiffPure | 0.991 | 22.087 | 0.336 | 0.575 | 0.0033 |
| Regen-VAE B | 0.976 | 29.424 | 0.832 | 0.275 | 0.0194 |
| Sto. Regen. | 0.981 | 22.325 | 0.636 | 0.270 | 0.0106 |
| Det. Inver. | 0.997 | 25.408 | 0.750 | 0.225 | 0.0072 |
| FLUX | 0.878 | 26.646 | 0.775 | 0.154 | 0.0006 |
| Attacker | TPR@Sign. ↓ | PSNR ↑ | SSIM ↑ | KID ↓ | LPIPS ↓ |
| No attack | 1.000 | 39.142 | 0.880 | 0.070 | 0.016 |
| DiffPure | 0.101 | 29.835 | 0.596 | 0.084 | 0.215 |
| Regen-VAE C | 0.591 | 31.886 | 0.890 | 0.071 | 0.085 |
| SD1.5 | 0.147 | 22.348 | 0.803 | 0.100 | 0.122 |
| SDXL | 0.000 | 22.049 | 0.765 | 0.100 | 0.136 |
| SD3 | 0.001 | 22.935 | 0.612 | 0.112 | 0.121 |
| CLIP Accuracy | Generated Utility | Denoising Utility | ||||
| Attacker | Top-1 | Top-3 | BRISQUE | PSNR | SSIM | BRISQUE |
| Mist | 0.0% | 1.3% | 60.883 | 25.941 | 0.813 | 33.174 |
| + INSIGHT | 0.7% | 48.2% | 29.229 | 17.945 | 0.393 | 28.231 |
| + FLUX | 4.1% | 74.6% | 22.684 | 19.570 | 0.431 | 21.206 |
| Performance | Denoising Utility | |||
| Protection | Inv. Dist. ↓ | TPR@FPR = 0.01 ↓ | CLIP FID ↓ | BRISQUE ↓ |
| UnMarker (HL) | 0.0162 | 0.9011 | 6.774 | 62.969 |
| UnMarker (L) | 0.0166 | 0.9560 | 5.771 | 7.728 |
| FLUX | 0.0153 | 0.7912 | 11.549 | 13.958 |
| GPT-4o | 0.0149 | 0.6813 | 12.559 | 8.002 |
| Domain | Category | Published Papers |
| Image | Watermarking / Copyright Protection | [ 28 ] (AAAI) [ 128 , 72 , 27 ] (ACM MM) [ 142 , 132 ] (CVPR) [ 19 ] (ECCV) [ 107 ] (ICASSP) [ 30 ] (ICCV) [ 34 , 68 ] (ICLR) [ 29 ] (ICML) [ 139 , 35 , 127 , 43 , 123 ] (NeurIPS) [ 71 ] (IEEE TETCI) [ 84 ] (IEEE TIFS) [ 138 , 76 ] (IEEE TMM) [ 69 ] (USENIX Security) |
| Art Style Protection | [ 110 ] (ICCV) [ 129 ] (ICLR) [ 62 , 93 ] (ICML) [ 97 ] (USENIX Security) | |
| Facial Privacy | [ 104 , 112 , 96 , 119 , 42 ] (CVPR) [ 144 ] (ICASSP) [ 122 , 131 ] (ICCV) [ 2 ] (IEEE ICME) [ 111 ] (NeurIPS) [ 57 , 56 , 17 ] (PETS) [ 115 ] (IEEE TIFS) [ 99 ] (USENIX Security) | |
| Deepfake Manipulation | [ 44 ] (AAAI) [ 116 , 14 ] (CVPR) [ 26 ] (ICASSP) [ 114 ] (IJCAI-ECAI) [ 22 , 85 ] (IEEE TIFS) [ 61 ] (USENIX Security) [ 133 ] (WACV) | |
| Data Traceability | [ 54 ] (CVPR) [ 118 ] (ICLR) [ 59 ] (IEEE S&P) | |
| Video | - | [ 67 ] (ICASSP) [ 89 ] (ICCV Workshop) [ 36 ] (IEEE Access) [ 4 ] (IEEE ICMLA) [ 105 ] (IEEE LSP) [ 58 ] (IEEE TDSC) [ 13 ] (IEEE TIFS) [ 66 ] (IEEE TIP) [ 100 ] (IEEE TPAMI) [ 102 ] (USENIX Security) |
| Label | prompts | negative prompts |
| C1 | Denoise the image | Add noise to the image |
| C2 | Smoothen the image | Add noise to the image |
| C3 | Denoise the image while preserving content of the image | Add noise to the image |
| C4 | Remove adversarial perturbations | Add noise to the image |
| C5 | Denoise the image | Add adversarial perturbation to the image |
| C6 | Smoothen the image | Add adversarial perturbation to the image |
| 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.07 | ||||||||||
| Attacker | Matching Rate ↑ | PSNR ↑ | SSIM ↑ | MSE ↓ | Matching Rate ↑ | PSNR ↑ | SSIM ↑ | MSE ↓ | Matching Rate ↑ | PSNR ↑ | SSIM ↑ | MSE ↓ |
| No Denoising | 0.00% | 33.880 | 0.944 | 0.0004 | 0.00% | 32.417 | 0.924 | 0.0006 | 0.00% | 31.218 | 0.903 | 0.0008 |
| Smoothing | 57.44% | 32.881 | 0.954 | 0.0006 | 63.25% | 32.355 | 0.947 | 0.0006 | 56.52% | 31.856 | 0.940 | 0.0007 |
| DiffPure | 45.13% | 25.810 | 0.831 | 0.0028 | 48.29% | 25.781 | 0.830 | 0.0028 | 46.01% | 25.731 | 0.828 | 0.0028 |
| SD1.5 | 64.62% | 29.400 | 0.913 | 0.0014 | 63.25% | 29.077 | 0.904 | 0.0013 | 54.71% | 28.684 | 0.894 | 0.0014 |
| SDXL | 72.31% | 31.097 | 0.932 | 0.0008 | 63.68% | 30.726 | 0.925 | 0.0010 | 64.49% | 30.388 | 0.918 | 0.0010 |
| Attacker | TPR@FPR ↓ | PSNR ↑ | SSIM ↑ | KID ↓ |
| No attack | 1.000 | - | - | 0.0183 |
| Smoothing (Avg.) | 1.000 | 30.656 | 0.868 | 0.0294 |
| DiffPure | 0.280 | 21.694 | 0.305 | 0.0302 |
| Regen-VAE B | 0.312 | 28.859 | 0.770 | 0.0618 |
| Regen-VAE C | 0.360 | 29.741 | 0.786 | 0.0543 |
| SD1.5 | 0.878 | 23.314 | 0.611 | 0.0248 |
| Full Set | 100 Remaining Images | |||
| Attacker | TPR@ FPR ↓ | KID ↓ | TPR@ FPR ↓ | BRISQUE ↓ |
| FLUX | 0.258 | 0.0196 | 1.000 | 5.164 |
| + GPT-4o | 0.060 | 0.0174 | 0.010 | 2.859 |
| Attacker | TPR@ FPR ↓ | PSNR ↑ | SSIM ↑ | LPIPS ↓ | KID ↓ |
| No Denoising | 1.000 | 37.479 | 0.993 | 0.007 | 0.0000 |
| Smoothing (Avg.) | 1.000 | 32.524 | 0.917 | 0.182 | 0.0015 |
| DiffPure | 0.991 | 22.087 | 0.336 | 0.575 | 0.0033 |
| Regen-VAE B | 0.976 | 29.424 | 0.832 | 0.275 | 0.0194 |
| Regen-VAE C | 0.982 | 29.949 | 0.840 | 0.240 | 0.0182 |
| Sto. Regen. | 0.981 | 22.325 | 0.636 | 0.270 | 0.0106 |
| Attacker | TPR@Sign. ↓ | PSNR ↑ | SSIM ↑ | KID ↓ | LPIPS ↓ |
| No Denoising | 1.000 | 39.142 | 0.880 | 0.070 | 0.016 |
| DiffPure | 0.101 | 29.835 | 0.596 | 0.084 | 0.215 |
| Regen-VAE B | 0.652 | 30.552 | 0.702 | 0.062 | 0.110 |
| Regen-VAE C | 0.591 | 31.886 | 0.890 | 0.071 | 0.085 |
| SD1.5 | 0.147 | 22.348 | 0.803 | 0.100 | 0.122 |
| SDXL | 0.000 | 22.049 | 0.765 | 0.100 | 0.136 |
| Proportion of image pairs where clean image has better utility | ||||||
| Quality metrics ↑ | Concept-appropriateness metrics ↑ | |||||
| Noise | Artifacts | Detail | Concept fit | Prompt fit | Overall realism | |
| Clean image vs. Mist + GPT-4o | 0.08 | 0.29 | 0.10 | 0.00 | 0.10 | 0.18 |
| Clean image vs. Mist + FLUX | 0.95 | 0.33 | 0.20 | 0.42 | 0.36 | 0.30 |
| Clean image vs. Mist + LightShed | 0.94 | 0.88 | 0.85 | 0.90 | 0.90 | 0.90 |
| Clean image vs. Mist + Noisy Upscaling | 1.00 | 0.92 | 0.93 | 0.60 | 0.58 | 0.85 |
| Proportion of image pairs where GPT-4o image has better utility | ||||||
| Quality metrics ↑ | Concept-appropriateness metrics ↑ | |||||
| Noise | Artifacts | Detail | Concept fit | Prompt fit | Overall realism | |
| GPT-4o vs. LightShed | 1.00 | 0.94 | 0.87 | 1.00 | 0.94 | 0.94 |
| GPT-4o vs. Noisy Upscaling | 1.00 | 0.89 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.95 |
| Performance | Denoising Utility | |||
| Protection | Inv. Dist. ↓ | TPR@MAE = 68.48 ↓ | CLIP FID ↓ | BRISQUE ↓ |
| UnMarker (HL) | 0.0162 | 0.9011 | 6.774 | 62.969 |
| UnMarker (L) | 0.0166 | 0.9560 | 5.771 | 7.728 |
| FLUX | 0.0153 | 0.7912 | 11.549 | 13.958 |
| GPT-4o | 0.0149 | 0.6813 | 12.559 | 8.002 |
| UnMarker (CHL) | 0.0140 | 0.1758 | 8.785 | 67.552 |
| Attacker | Matching Rate ↑ | PSNR ↑ | SSIM ↑ | MSE ↓ |
| UnGANable Cloak v1 | 100.0% | 33.819 | 0.943 | 0.0004 |
| + SDXL C6 Denoising | 82.4% | 29.155 | 0.928 | 0.0013 |
| Attacker | TPR@ Sign. ↓ | KID ↓ | PSNR ↑ | SSIM ↑ | LPIPS ↓ |
| SIREN Coating | 0.991 | 0.078 | 36.040 | 0.816 | 0.030 |
| + FLUX | 0.000 | 0.069 | 36.866 | 0.827 | 0.029 |
| FLUX | TPR@FPR ↓ | PSNR ↑ | SSIM ↑ | KID ↓ |
| Strength 0.05 | 0.982 | 32.399 | 0.894 | 0.0198 |
| Strength 0.15 | 0.258 | 28.042 | 0.775 | 0.0196 |
| Strength 0.25 | 0.002 | 25.944 | 0.703 | 0.0214 |
| FLUX | TPR@Sign. ↓ | KID ↓ | PSNR ↑ | SSIM ↑ | LPIPS ↓ |
| Strength 0.25 | 0.089 | 0.066 | 31.748 | 0.828 | 0.034 |
| Strength 0.35 | 0.016 | 0.071 | 28.882 | 0.787 | 0.050 |
| Strength 0.45 | 0.000 | 0.079 | 26.188 | 0.731 | 0.075 |
| Attacker | TPR@FPR ↓ | PSNR ↑ | SSIM ↑ | KID ↓ |
| SD1.5 | 0.862 | 23.334 | 0.612 | 0.0244 |
| SDXL | 0.004 | 24.172 | 0.657 | 0.0144 |
| SD3 | 0.286 | 25.656 | 0.701 | 0.0187 |
| FLUX | 0.420 | 28.478 | 0.791 | 0.0199 |
| Attacker | TPR@FPR ↓ | PSNR ↑ | SSIM ↑ | LPIPS ↓ | KID ↓ |
| SD1.5 | 0.987 | 22.863 | 0.650 | 0.203 | 0.0002 |
| SDXL | 0.774 | 23.269 | 0.682 | 0.204 | 0.0008 |
| SD3 | 0.854 | 23.911 | 0.691 | 0.179 | 0.0003 |
| FLUX | 0.956 | 27.415 | 0.797 | 0.132 | 0.0001 |
| Attacker | TPR@Sign. ↓ | KID ↓ | PSNR ↑ | SSIM ↑ | LPIPS ↓ |
| SD1.5 | 0.120 | 0.091 | 22.401 | 0.812 | 0.121 |
| SDXL | 0.000 | 0.101 | 22.541 | 0.745 | 0.119 |
| SD3 | 0.015 | 0.096 | 23.179 | 0.636 | 0.111 |
| FLUX | 0.472 | 0.079 | 29.243 | 0.827 | 0.054 |
| 0.06 | ||||
| Attacker | Matching Rate ↑ | PSNR ↑ | SSIM ↑ | MSE ↓ |
| SD3 | 77.78% | 31.488 | 0.937 | 0.0007 |
| FLUX | 76.07% | 31.552 | 0.941 | 0.0007 |
| SDXL | 63.68% | 30.726 | 0.925 | 0.0010 |
| Supervised SDXL | 69.66% | 25.302 | 0.873 | 0.0034 |
| 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.07 | ||||||||||
| SD3 | Matching Rate ↑ | PSNR ↑ | SSIM ↑ | MSE ↓ | Matching Rate ↑ | PSNR ↑ | SSIM ↑ | MSE ↓ | Matching Rate ↑ | PSNR ↑ | SSIM ↑ | MSE ↓ |
| Prompt C1 | 68.21% | 31.672 | 0.939 | 0.0007 | 67.09% | 31.204 | 0.931 | 0.0008 | 61.96% | 30.679 | 0.921 | 0.0009 |
| Prompt C2 | 77.44% | 31.923 | 0.943 | 0.0007 | 72.65% | 31.495 | 0.937 | 0.0007 | 68.48% | 31.044 | 0.929 | 0.0008 |
| Prompt C3 | 73.33% | 31.632 | 0.939 | 0.0007 | 65.81% | 31.108 | 0.930 | 0.0010 | 63.04% | 30.579 | 0.920 | 0.0013 |
| Prompt C4 | 77.44% | 31.820 | 0.942 | 0.0007 | 67.09% | 31.351 | 0.935 | 0.0008 | 67.39% | 30.870 | 0.926 | 0.0008 |
| Prompt C5 | 70.26% | 31.671 | 0.939 | 0.0007 | 63.68% | 31.193 | 0.931 | 0.0008 | 61.96% | 30.640 | 0.921 | 0.0009 |
| 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.07 | ||||||||||
| Attacker | Matching Rate ↑ | PSNR ↑ | SSIM ↑ | MSE ↓ | Matching Rate ↑ | PSNR ↑ | SSIM ↑ | MSE ↓ | Matching Rate ↑ | PSNR ↑ | SSIM ↑ | MSE ↓ |
| SD1.5 | 68.21% | 31.314 | 0.936 | 0.0008 | 66.24% | 30.870 | 0.928 | 0.0009 | 64.13% | 30.402 | 0.919 | 0.0009 |
| SDXL | 75.38% | 32.513 | 0.948 | 0.0006 | 74.79% | 32.064 | 0.941 | 0.0006 | 72.46% | 31.580 | 0.935 | 0.0007 |
| SD3 | 73.85% | 31.909 | 0.943 | 0.0007 | 70.94% | 31.432 | 0.935 | 0.0007 | 68.12% | 30.940 | 0.927 | 0.0008 |
| FLUX | 76.92% | 32.150 | 0.947 | 0.0006 | 76.07% | 31.708 | 0.940 | 0.0007 | 72.10% | 31.238 | 0.932 | 0.0008 |
Adversarial Attacks
Adversarial attacks exploit crafted inputs, poisoned data, or system interactions to manipulate AI predictions, behavior, privacy, or reliability.
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