Cloud-edge AI must jointly satisfy model compression and security under tight device budgets. While Tensor-Train Decomposition (TTD) shrinks on-device models, prior selective-encryption studies largely assume dense weights, leaving its practicality under TTD compression unclear. We present TT-SEAL, a selective-encryption framework for TT-decomposed networks. TT-SEAL ranks TT cores with a sensitivity-based importance metric, calibrates a one-time robustness threshold, and uses a value-DP optimizer to encrypt the minimum set of critical cores with AES. Under TTD-aware, transfer-based threat models (and on an FPGA-prototyped edge processor) TT-SEAL matches the robustness of full (black-box) encryption while encrypting as little as 4.89-15.92% of parameters across ResNet-18, MobileNetV2, and VGG-16, and drives the share of AES decryption in end-to-end latency to low single digits (e.g., 58% -> 2.76% on ResNet-18), enabling secure, low-latency edge AI.
Figures & tables
Figure 1. Transfer-based adversarial attack using JBDA. Blue lines: the attacker queries oracle O(x) with clean inputs, trains a substitute F(x) , and augments data x′ near decision boundaries. Red lines: F generates adversarial examples xadv that transfer to O .
Figure 2. Substitute-model accuracy vs. selective encryption ratio in ResNet-18 with dense and TTD-compressed weights.
Figure 3. Relationship between Iacc and substitute-model accuracy for TTD-compressed ResNet-18, MobileNetV2 and VGG-16.
Figure 4. Image-classification demo running on the FPGA-prototyped processor, illustrating a transfer-based misclassification: an original ship is predicted as a cat under the configured threat model.
IP Block
LUTs
FFs
IP Block
LUTs
FFs
Rocket RISC-V Core
15,040
9,880
Peripherals (incl. DMA)
5,043
10,370
SRAM
166
323
System Interconnect
9,745
17,375
DDR Controller
7,950
7,571
GEMM Engine
84,150
32,939
Table 1. FPGA resource utilization of the prototype edge AI processor.
Table 2. Transfer ratios (%) across ResNet-18, MobileNetV2, and VGG-16 for different perturbation strengths ϵ and attack types. Results are shown under three encryption levels: W-B (white-box), TH ( Iacc_th ), and B-B (black-box). The comparison highlights how TT-SEAL suppresses transferability to the B-B robustness level.
Figure 5. Visualization of adversarial examples generated from the substitute of the TT-SEAL-encrypted model. As ϵ increases, stronger perturbations are progressively added to the input image.
Figure 6. Effect of selective encryption under non-targeted attacks ( ϵ=32/255 ). Across ResNet-18, VGG-16, and MobileNetV2, the transfer ratio remains suppressed until Iacc falls below Iacc_th , demonstrating its effectiveness as a robustness threshold.
Figure 7. Transfer ratios across models for diverse adversarial example generation methods under the non-targeted attack with ϵ=16/255 .
Iacc
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Iacc_th
ResNet-18
Encrypted Parameters
21,028
72,208
134,604
465,068
89,685
Encryption Ratio (%)
1.14
3.94
7.35
25.41
4.89
tTT−SEAL / tBB (%)
1.13
4.16
7.23
25.7
4.87
tTT−SEAL / tInf (%)
0.66
2.37
4.04
13.02
2.76
MobileNetV2
Encrypted Parameters
15,317
19,143
29,794
74,706
71,268
Encryption Ratio (%)
3.42
4.29
6.66
16.7
15.92
Table 3. Selective-encryption parameters and decryption times for each model under Iacc intervals and at Iacc_th .
Deploying proprietary Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) on commodity edge devices demands hardware-backed Digital Rights Management (DRM) capable of withstanding both software-level and physical adversaries. In Unified Memory Architecture (UMA) systems, the host CPU and Neural Processing Unit (NPU) share physical DRAM, leaving plaintext model weights directly readable by a compromised OS kernel. Existing defenses fail in this constrained setting: trusted execution environments monopolize scarce memory with permanently reserved regions, while full-memory encryption operates at page granularity. This forces the system to fetch massive 4 KB memory pages for sub-page tensor tiles, severely crippling bandwidth. We present Tessera, a reference architecture for inline, cache-line granularity weight decryption on UMA edge accelerators. The design intercepts 64-byte AXI bursts, computing AES-256-CTR keystreams in parallel with DRAM fetches. This streams plaintext directly into isolated NPU SRAM, creating a transient memory footprint confined to the active tile and eliminating the need for permanent memory carve-outs. Measurements across three distinct SoC platforms demonstrate that this parallelization hides cryptographic latency behind standard DRAM fetch times, a condition that holds even under worst-case timing variations. Consequently, Tessera is projected to achieve 98.4% of the theoretical memory bandwidth ceiling (a mere 1.6% overhead). Across standard vision and language models, page-level memory encryption suffers up to a 32x bandwidth penalty, whereas Tessera maintains an optimal 1x footprint for all layer geometries. Finally, Tessera neutralizes major UMA-specific attack vectors -- including physical DRAM extraction, rogue DMA, and compute hijacking -- and formally prevents plaintext leakage across sparse tensors.
Cryptographically secure neural network inference typically relies on secure computing techniques such as Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC), enabling cloud servers to process client inputs without decrypting them. Although prior privacy-preserving inference systems co-design network optimizations with MPC, they remain slow and costly, limiting real-world deployment. A major bottleneck is their use of a single, fixed transformer model for all encrypted inputs, ignoring that different inputs require different model sizes to balance efficiency and accuracy. We present SecureRouter, an end-to-end encrypted routing and inference framework that accelerates secure transformer inference through input-adaptive model selection under encryption. SecureRouter establishes a unified encrypted pipeline that integrates a secure router with an MPC-optimized model pool, enabling coordinated routing, inference, and protocol execution while preserving full data and model confidentiality. The framework includes training-phase and inference-phase components: an MPC-cost-aware secure router that predicts per-model utility and cost from encrypted features, and an MPC-optimized model pool whose architectures and quantization schemes are co-trained to minimize MPC communication and computation overhead. Compared to prior work, SecureRouter achieves a latency reduction by 1.95x with negligible accuracy loss, offering a practical path toward scalable and efficient secure AI inference. Our open-source implementation is available at: https://github.com/UCF-ML-Research/SecureRouter
Yukuan Zhang, Mengxin Zheng, Qian Lou
University of Central Florida · Orlando, Florida, USA
Despite their remarkable success, machine learning models, particularly in vision applications, are alarmingly vulnerable to a range of security threats. One key factor in the attack landscape is the distinction between white-box and black-box threat models, as the latter poses challenges that limit attack effectiveness when access to model information is limited. As a result, using Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) enhances security for machine learning applications by protecting model confidentiality and execution integrity, effectively shifting the execution environment from the white-box to the black-box side of the threat model spectrum. While adopting TEEs for large vision models, e.g., Vision Transformers (ViTs), is crucial for enhancing security and privacy, significant challenges related to memory constraints and increased computational latency must be addressed, especially in time-sensitive edge applications where safety and privacy are paramount. The objective of this work is to enable large vision models to be fully hosted within TEEs, achieving GPU-level inference latency for time-sensitive edge vision applications while maintaining performance. To this end, we propose TEE-X, a TEE-aware acceleration framework that introduces a sensitivity-aware modularization technique and enables vectorization in TEE inference. This design is validated on OP-TEE for Arm TrustZone, configured to optimize performance on the NVIDIA Jetson AGX Xavier for efficient edge vision applications using ViT models. The findings reveal that TEE-X delivers an effective TEE-aware acceleration framework that achieves minimal accuracy-latency trade-offs while ensuring fast and secure edge inference for vision models.
Kurt M Wilson, Mohaiminul Al Nahian, Abeer Matar A. Almalky +5
North Carolina State University · Binghamton University (SUNY) · Florida International University +1