Adversarial Patch Generation for Visual-Infrared Dense Prediction Tasks via Joint Position-Color Optimization
Authors: He Li, Wenyue He, Weihang Kong, Xingchen Zhang
Organizations: School of Artificial Intelligence (School of Software), Yanshan University, Qinhuangdao 066004, China. · Fusion Intelligence Laboratory, Department of Computer Science, University of Exeter, EX4 4RN, United Kingdom.
Multimodal adversarial attacks for dense prediction remain largely underexplored. In particular, visual-infrared (VI) perception systems introduce unique challenges due to heterogeneous spectral characteristics and modality-specific intensity distributions. Existing adversarial patch methods are primarily designed for single-modal inputs and fail to account for crossspectral inconsistencies, leading to reduced attack effectiveness and poor stealthiness when applied to VI dense prediction models. To address these challenges, we propose a joint position-color optimization framework (AP-PCO) for generating adversarial patches in visual-infrared settings. The proposed method optimizes patch placement and color composition simultaneously using a fitness function derived from model outputs, enabling a single patch to perturb both visible and infrared modalities. To further bridge spectral discrepancies, we introduce a crossmodal color adaptation strategy that constrains patch appearance according to infrared grayscale characteristics while maintaining strong perturbations in the visible domain, thereby reducing cross-spectral saliency. The optimization procedure operates without requiring internal model information, supporting flexible black-box attacks. Extensive experiments on visual-infrared dense prediction tasks demonstrate that the proposed AP-PCO achieves consistently strong attack performance across multiple architectures, providing a practical benchmark for robustness evaluation in VI perception systems.
Figures & tables
Fig. 1: Comparison of existing adversarial attack work and this study. The security of visual–infrared dense prediction models, remains underexplored compared with single-modal settings. This study aims to fill this gap.
Fig. 2: Comparison between traditional adversarial patches (“Trad-Patch”) and the proposed patch (“AP-PCO”). Traditional methods determine the patch position based on a single forward pass of the target model and do not optimize color for multimodal data, which limits their effectiveness and stealthiness in visual–infrared settings. In contrast, our approach performs iterative, gradient-free global search to jointly determine position and color, and incorporates a cross-modal color reuse strategy to achieve stronger attacks and better stealthiness.
Fig. 3: Framework of cross-modal adversarial patches with position-color joint optimization. The initial population consists of a series of randomly generated circular samples. Then, through mutation, crossover, and boundary handling, a child population with diverse positions and colors is generated. A fitness function is then applied for cross-modal evaluation to compare the parent and child populations and repeat the iterative loop, ultimately obtaining the optimal patch deployed for dense prediction tasks.
Fig. 4: Variation trajectory of patch positions across iterations. Yellow markers denote the patch center coordinates of all individuals in each generation, while red markers indicate the center coordinate of the individual with the highest fitness in that generation. As iterations progress, the population gradually converges toward crowd-dense regions and ultimately stabilizes at the optimal patch location.
Effectiveness
Stealthiness
GAME(0) ↑
GAME(1) ↑
GAME(2) ↑
GAME(3) ↑
RMSE ↑
PSNR_RGB ↑
SSIM_RGB ↑
PSNR_T ↑
SSIM_T ↑
Clean
13.7001
18.3601
22.1256
28.6380
24.4166
-
-
-
-
PAP
14.9798
20.9912
26.6463
33.4813
25.1726
23.5981
0.9768
23.7474
0.9747
APAM
14.6624
19.1693
23.1393
30.0921
25.9723
28.0505
0.9822
26.7175
0.9738
AP-PCO(Ours)
40.5543
51.2453
56.7172
63.6817
45.1786
25.6450
0.9832
28.2151
0.9850
TABLE I: Comparison of experimental results with existing methods. Single-modal adversarial patch methods adapted to the cross-modal BL+IADM crowd counting model. “PSNR_RGB” and “PSNR_T” denote the PSNR values for visible images and infrared images, respectively. “SSIM_RGB” and “SSIM_T” denote the SSIM values for visible images and infrared images, respectively. Bold indicates the best results.
Model
Settings
Effectiveness
Stealthiness
GAME(0) ↑
GAME(1) ↑
GAME(2) ↑
GAME(3) ↑
RMSE ↑
PSNR_RGB ↑
SSIM_RGB ↑
PSNR_T ↑
SSIM_T ↑
BL+IADM
Clean
13.70
18.36
22.13
28.64
24.42
-
-
-
-
Random
14.20
18.80
22.80
29.32
24.36
27.01
0.99
31.31
0.99
AP-PCO (Ours)
40.55
51.25
56.72
63.68
45.18
25.65
0.98
28.22
0.99
CAGNet
Clean
11.15
14.43
18.19
23.37
17.66
-
-
-
-
Random
11.41
14.66
18.41
23.56
18.12
27.04
0.99
31.28
0.99
TABLE II: Attack Effectiveness and Stealthiness of Our Method on Different Models for the Crowd Counting Task. “Clean” Denotes the Original Image, “Random” Denotes Images With Patches Added Using Randomly Sampled Positions and Colors.
Fig. 5: Visualizations of patch attacks for the crowd counting, semantic segmentation, and image fusion tasks. As can be seen, the proposed method shows strong attack performance across three VI dense prediction tasks.
Fig. 6: Comparison of ablation experiment results for the crowd counting task (BL+IADM model), the semantic segmentation task (Openress) and the image fusion task (UNFusion). In this figure, “clean” denotes the original image; “random” denotes images with randomly added patches in both positions and color; “position” denotes images with patches optimized only for positions while color remains random; and “position-color” denotes images with patches optimized for both positions and color.
Model
Settings
Effectiveness
Stealthiness
mIoU ↓
Recall ↓
PSNR _RGB ↑
SSIM _RGB ↑
PSNR _T ↑
SSIM _T ↑
Open ress
Clean
24.41
31.63
-
-
-
-
Random
6.99
10.64
18.65
0.86
30.69
0.98
AP-PCO (Ours)
6.69
9.90
20.05
0.86
31.88
0.98
FEA Net
Clean
52.52
70.68
-
-
-
-
Random
50.32
68.06
21.50
0.86
36.12
0.99
TABLE III: Attack effectiveness and Stealthiness of the Proposed Method on Different Models for the Semantic Segmentation Task.
Model
Setting
Qabf ↓
PSNR ↓
SSIM ↓
VIFF ↓
CC ↓
UNFusion
Clean
0.52
13.89
0.65
0.74
0.61
Random
0.51
13.88
0.64
0.72
0.60
AP-PCO (Ours)
0.50
13.50
0.64
0.72
0.56
Res2Fusion
Clean
0.44
15.84
0.68
0.61
0.62
Random
0.44
15.74
0.67
0.60
0.62
AP-PCO (Ours)
0.43
15.00
0.67
0.59
0.56
TABLE IV: Attack Effectiveness and Stealthiness of the Proposed Method on Different Models for the Image Fusion Task.
GAME(0) ↑
GAME(1) ↑
GAME(2) ↑
GAME(3) ↑
RMSE ↑
clean
13.70 ± 19.99
18.36 ± 19.90
22.13 ± 20.35
28.64 ± 22.21
24.42 ± 20.06
AP-PCO(Ours)
40.55 ± 19.73
51.25 ± 19.83
56.72 ± 20.29
63.68 ± 21.13
45.18 ± 20.00
TABLE V: Stability analysis of adversarial attack performance for BL+IADM crowd counting model (mean ± std).
Effectiveness
Stealthiness
mIoU ↓
Recall ↓
PSNR_RGB ↑
SSIM_RGB ↑
PSNR_T ↑
SSIM_T ↑
Not used
36.06
42.86
20.4394
0.8543
26.2563
0.9802
Used
39.62
56.78
20.7228
0.8544
33.3521
0.9835
TABLE VI: Effect of the Cross-modal Color Parameter Reuse Strategy on the Semantic Segmentation Task.
Modal
Crowd Counting
Semantic Segmentation
Image Fusion
GAME(0) ↑
GAME(1) ↑
GAME(2) ↑
GAME(3) ↑
RMSE ↑
mIoU ↓
Recall ↓
Qabf ↓
PSNR ↓
SSIM ↓
VIFF ↓
CC ↓
Visible
21.3622
25.8889
30.4938
36.2902
30.7622
6.97
9.96
0.4347
15.0853
0.6672
0.5956
0.5668
Infrared
36.9179
47.8553
54.7607
62.1525
43.8502
7.56
10.75
0.4347
15.1014
0.6710
0.5963
0.5695
VI
40.5543
51.2453
56.7172
63.6817
45.1786
6.69
9.90
0.4309
14.9952
0.6659
0.5912
0.5600
TABLE VII: Effect of Different Attack Modalities of Three Dense Prediction Tasks. “Visible” and “Infrared” Denote Attacks Applied to the Visible or Infrared Modality Only, While “VI” Denotes Attacks Applied to Both Modalities Simultaneously.
Effectiveness
Stealthiness
α
GAME(0) ↑
GAME(1) ↑
GAME(2) ↑
GAME(3) ↑
RMSE ↑
PSNR_RGB ↑
SSIM_RGB ↑
PSNR_T ↑
SSIM_T ↑
1
39.5844
53.0996
61.2997
68.8205
44.4267
25.2850
0.9792
28.1450
0.9792
0.5
39.2131
51.5339
61.2194
69.1666
46.6531
26.4535
0.9800
28.8502
0.9799
0.1
30.8848
43.2991
50.7023
58.2660
38.2710
32.8543
0.9855
33.6389
0.9837
TABLE VIII: Effect of Different Fitness Function Weights on the Crowd Counting Task.
Effectiveness
Stealthiness
α
mIoU ↓
Recall ↓
PSNR_RGB ↑
SSIM_RGB ↑
PSNR_T ↑
SSIM_T ↑
1
6.69
9.90
20.0540
0.8612
31.8827
0.9834
0.5
6.88
10.36
24.7938
0.8734
59.0620
0.9996
0.1
6.88
10.36
24.7985
0.8736
59.2910
0.9996
TABLE IX: Experimental results on different fitness function weights for the semantic segmentation task.
Fig. 7: Visualization of patch radius parameters attack performance. As the radius of the adversarial patch increases, its occlusion ratio in the image gradually rises, resulting in a significant degradation of stealthiness in cross-modal scenarios.
Fig. 8: Visualization results of adversarial patches against physical attacks in crowd counting, semantic segmentation, and image fusion tasks. As can be seen, the proposed method shows strong attack performance across three VI dense prediction tasks.
Effectiveness
Stealthiness
GAME(0) ↑
GAME(1) ↑
GAME(2) ↑
GAME(3) ↑
RMSE ↑
PSNR_RGB ↑
SSIM_RGB ↑
PSNR_T ↑
SSIM_T ↑
Clean
13.7001
18.3601
22.1256
28.6380
24.4166
-
-
-
-
r=20
20.3511
25.2802
29.4354
35.0948
29.6377
29.7634
0.9922
31.1696
0.9901
r=40
25.8050
30.3045
33.6848
38.7906
34.7603
22.8577
0.9864
25.3934
0.9854
r=80
34.1544
39.5820
42.4527
47.1011
44.3972
17.4165
0.9518
20.2550
0.9475
TABLE X: Experimental results on the patch radius parameter of the BL+IADM model for the crowd counting task.
Effectiveness
Stealthiness
GAME(0) ↑
GAME(1) ↑
GAME(2) ↑
GAME(3) ↑
RMSE ↑
PSNR_RGB ↑
SSIM_RGB ↑
PSNR_T ↑
SSIM_T ↑
Clean
13.7001
18.3601
22.1256
28.6380
24.4166
-
-
-
-
Color=1
25.8050
30.3045
33.6848
38.7906
34.7603
22.8577
0.9864
25.3934
0.9854
Color=2
25.2305
30.2875
33.9155
39.0918
33.5994
23.8335
0.9816
25.8799
0.9797
Color=5
28.8294
34.7558
39.1652
45.1211
36.9115
24.4387
0.9836
27.1367
0.9848
Color=10
39.5943
51.1300
56.8469
63.9860
44.1738
25.6450
0.9832
28.2151
0.9850
TABLE XI: Experimental results on the patch color number parameter of the BL+IADM model for the crowd counting task.
Effectiveness
Stealthiness
mIoU ↓
Recall ↓
PSNR_RGB ↑
SSIM_RGB ↑
PSNR_T ↑
SSIM_T ↑
Clean
24.41
31.63
-
-
-
-
Color=1
6.65
9.96
19.1507
0.8645
29.8579
0.9833
Color=2
6.71
9.94
19.3025
0.8625
30.3935
0.9829
Color=5
6.69
9.92
19.7081
0.8614
30.8039
0.9835
Color=10
6.69
9.90
20.0540
0.8612
31.8827
0.9834
TABLE XII: Experimental results on the patch color number parameter of the openress model for the semantic segmentation task.
Qabf ↓
PSNR ↓
SSIM ↓
VIFF ↓
CC ↓
Clean
0.4434
15.8424
0.6784
0.6132
0.6249
Color=1
0.4305
15.0364
0.6662
0.5912
0.5618
Color=2
0.4309
14.9952
0.6659
0.5912
0.5600
Color=5
0.4393
15.2879
0.6613
0.6005
0.5847
Color=10
0.4393
15.2915
0.6615
0.6002
0.5843
TABLE XIII: Experimental results on the patch color number parameter of the Res2Fusion model for the image fusion task.
GAME(0)
GAME(1)
GAME(2)
GAME(3)
RMSE
clean
13.7001
18.3601
22.1256
28.6380
24.4166
JPEG
30.0835
40.1116
45.5558
52.6953
36.6276
MF
30.2246
41.7568
47.1867
54.3790
36.6903
AP-PCO(Ours)
40.5543
51.2453
56.7172
63.6817
45.1786
TABLE XIV: Experimental Results of Defense Methods on the Crowd Counting Task.
Deep learning-based visual-infrared fused face detection models are increasingly deployed across a wide range of applications, yet they remain susceptible to adversarial patch attacks. Most prior attacks target either the visual or the infrared image alone in the digital domain, which renders them ineffective against fused models in the physical world. Moreover, many of these methods are readily noticeable, as their patch patterns deviate substantially from those seen in the real world. In this paper, we introduce VIPatch (Visual-Infrared Patch), a novel physical adversarial patch attack that produces inconspicuous, realistic, and natural-looking patches for facial images. Specifically, VIPatch crafts a gradient-color mask together with a band-aid sticker across both the visual and infrared images, and jointly optimizes these two elements; the resulting digital patches further guide the fabrication of their physical counterparts. Experimental results show that VIPatch achieves competitive attack success rates (over 90%) in both the digital and physical domains, while keeping the patches unobtrusive to human observers.
Qiucheng Yu, Tao Ni, Yihe Zhou +2
City University of Hong Kong · King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST)
Vision-language models (VLMs) have achieved strong performance across diverse multimodal tasks, but their adversarial robustness in visible-infrared (VIS-IR) scenarios remains underexplored. This gap is critical because VIS-IR sensing is widely used in real-world perception systems to support reliable understanding under challenging imaging conditions. To address this cross-modal threat setting, we propose CFGPatch, a curved-edge fractal geometric adversarial patch framework for attacking VIS-IR VLMs. CFGPatch builds on triangular fractal geometry and replaces rigid straight-edged primitives with Bezier-curved elements, preserving multi-scale fractal self-similarity while introducing smoother contours, richer directional variation, and more flexible shape deformation. In addition, we design a modality-specific Fraser-spiral rendering mechanism to inject fine-grained texture distortions and misleading perceptual cues into visible and infrared images. By coupling global curved-fractal geometry with local spiral-based appearance interference, CFGPatch disrupts both shape perception and texture interpretation. We further adopt expectation over transformation (EOT) to improve robustness against common image-level transformations. Extensive experiments show that CFGPatch effectively fools VIS-IR VLMs and consistently outperforms standard patch baselines in attack effectiveness and robustness. Moreover, adversarial samples optimized for zero-shot classification transfer well to image captioning and visual question answering, demonstrating strong cross-task transferability and generalizability across downstream tasks.
Visible-infrared object detectors are used for robust perception under challenging illumination and weather conditions. Current physical attacks apply conspicuous patches to spatially aligned target regions, which are noticeable to human observers. Meanwhile, most of these methods only perturb the appearance within the aligned region, without explicitly targeting the correspondence between modalities or the fusion process. In this paper, we propose CamoShift, an adversarial framework for visible-infrared object detection. By combining visual camouflage with object-level infrared shifting, CamoShift breaks cross-modal spatial alignment and disrupts fusion. Specifically, the Semantic Camouflage Module (SCM) generates a stealthy camouflaged patch that can be attached to the host object and maintains its effectiveness in the infrared branch through an RGB-IR adapter. The Object-level Spatial Decoupling Module (OSDM) shifts the infrared target evidence in a scale-aware manner, so as to break object-level correspondence and disrupt cross-modal fusion. Then, the Harmonic Adversarial loss (HarAdv loss) further balances attack strength and visual stealth during optimization. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to target both visual stealthiness and attack success in visible-infrared object detection. Extensive experimental results show that CamoShift achieves a superior balance between attack effectiveness and visual stealth. Code and models will be available on GitHub.
Yueqi Zhu, Qi Ming, Guo Cheng +6
Beijing University of Technology · Peking University · National Key Laboratory of Space Integrated Information System, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences +1