Balancing Privacy-Quality-Efficiency in Federated Learning through Round-Based Interleaving of Protection Techniques

Federated learning (FL) enables collaborative training of machine learning models without sharing sensitive client data, making it a cornerstone for privacy-critical applications. However, FL faces the dual challenge of ensuring learning quality and robust privacy protection while keeping resource consumption low, particularly when using computationally expensive techniques such as homomorphic encryption (HE). In this work, we enhance an FL process that preserves privacy using HE by integrating it with synthetic data generation and an interleaving strategy. Specifically, our solution, named Alternating Federated Learning (Alt-FL), consists of alternating between local training with authentic data (authentic rounds) and local training with synthetic data (synthetic rounds) and transferring the encrypted and plaintext model parameters on authentic and synthetic rounds (resp.). Our approach improves learning quality (e.g., model accuracy) through datasets enhanced with synthetic data, preserves client data privacy via HE, and keeps manageable encryption and decryption costs through our interleaving strategy. We evaluate our solution against data leakage attacks, such as the DLG attack, demonstrating robust privacy protection. Also, Alt-FL provides 13.4% higher model accuracy and decreases HE-related costs by up to 48% with respect to Selective HE.

Heterogeneous Differential Privacy (HDP) in Federated Learning (FL) allows clients to select individual privacy budgets ($\varepsilon_i$) according to institutional policies and data sensitivity. In practice, many HDP-FL systems employ $\varepsilon$-aware server aggregation to improve model utility by re-weighting client updates according to their declared privacy budgets. However, gradient updates in FL retain structural patterns induced by non-independent and identically-distributed (non-IID) data, and these additional signals exposed by $\varepsilon$-aware aggregation create new opportunities for inference by an honest-but-curious server. In this work, we first show that a server equipped with gradient denoising and surrogate modeling can mount a Privacy Inference Attack that infers distributional attributes of clients and links updates from the same client across training rounds, measured via surrogate inference accuracy and linkage success, under realistic knowledge constraints. The Shuffle-Model has been widely studied as a defense against such inference risks by anonymizing update sources, but it is fundamentally incompatible with HDP-FL $\varepsilon$-aware aggregation. To address this challenge, we propose IntraShuffler, a middleware defense framework designed for HDP-FL systems. IntraShuffler introduces a privacy-aware shuffling mechanism that groups clients into privacy-compatible buckets and performs parameter-level shuffling within each bucket to disrupt persistent gradient structure while preserving $\varepsilon$-aware aggregation. Experiments across four different datasets show that IntraShuffler reduces gradient recoverability by over 60% and decreases surrogate inference accuracy from 0.78 to 0.33 while maintaining comparable model utility across multiple FL aggregation rules.

Prior research suggests that differential privacy (DP) can enhance the robustness of federated learning (FL) against backdoor attacks. In this paper, we challenge this assumption. Through an empirical analysis of two baseline attack strategies, we uncover a fundamental tension in DP-FL: while bypassing DP allows state-of-the-art defenses to detect and filter malicious updates, complying with DP inadvertently masks their distinguishing statistical characteristics. Consequently, existing defenses become ineffective as DP reduces the raw backdoor signal. Building on this masking effect, we propose RING, a novel attack that explicitly exploits DP to conceal malicious contributions while maximizing attack impact. By collaboratively crafting adversarial perturbations, compromised clients reconstruct a strong backdoor signal during aggregation without triggering anomaly detection. RING operates as a perturbation layer that is agnostic to the underlying backdoor technique, making it broadly applicable and composable with existing attacks -- a property that significantly amplifies the threat it poses to DP-FL. Extensive evaluations across four image and text datasets under non-iid distributions show that RING achieves an average attack success rate of 90.3% against six state-of-the-art defenses under a moderate privacy budget, an improvement of up to 38.4% over baseline strategies. Finally, we evaluate potential countermeasures and find that mitigating this threat incurs significant utility trade-offs, exposing a fundamental security gap in the deployment of differentially private FL.