SMGI: A Structural Theory of General Artificial Intelligence

Conventional uniform convergence bounds and empirical risk minimization break down in massive over-parameterized models, such as large language transformers and biological sequence networks. With near-infinite unconstrained internal degrees of freedom, their optimization landscapes develop flat vertical gauge valleys, rendering classical generalization metrics vacuous and inducing severe pathologies, specifically generative hallucination and catastrophic forgetting. We introduce the Statistically Meaningful Geometry (SMG) framework, an information-geometric paradigm lifting deterministic parametric models into infinite-dimensional non-parametric Orlicz statistical manifolds. Modeling the total state space as a differential fiber bundle ($\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{B}, π, \mathcal{V}, \mathcal{H}, ω$), we establish a Two-Fold Inference Paradigm. We formalize an Ehresmann connection 1-form $ω$ as a dynamic geometric filter that strips away vertical gauge noise (Structural Internal Directions, or SID) and isolates learning trajectories along the strictly non-degenerate horizontal distribution (Statistical Variational Directions, or SVD$χ$). We prove that under connection-filtered pre-training, out-of-distribution predictive variance is strictly upper-bounded by the finite diameter of the identifiable quotient base manifold $\mathcal{B}$, establishing a hard geometric containment of generative hallucinations. By projecting downstream updates onto the orthogonal complement of the historical horizontal carriage, we formalize the SMG Sequential Adaptation Flow, proving the total non-asymptotic elimination of catastrophic forgetting. SMG replaces empirical fine-tuning heuristics with coordinate-free topological constraints, bridging advanced differential geometry with structural reliability in AI.

General intelligence, of the kind that underwrites the full range of human cognitive achievement, is not a property of computational architecture alone. This paper advances a single thesis: the structural constraints on general intelligence occupy distinct levels of description and are mutually non-reducible, in the sense that the special-sciences tradition gives to that term. It follows that no single architectural advance, and no continuation of the scaling programme by itself, can produce artificial general intelligence (AGI), and that research programmes must be evaluated against the full constraint profile rather than against performance on any one benchmark. The thesis is developed through a method that reads general intelligence through four evidential lenses, AI systems research, anthropology, law, and economics, each anchored to a distinct level of description, supplemented by speculative fiction used as a disciplined heuristic in the context of discovery rather than the context of justification. Applying the method yields a taxonomy of twenty-three structural constraints organised into eight clusters; six are examined in depth and ordered as an ascending ladder of levels, with explicit bridges showing why progress at one level cannot carry to the next. The argument issues in five falsifiable predictions, each stated with a named benchmark family and a disconfirmation condition, converting a descriptive framework into a research programme with a longer horizon than the scaling hypothesis implies.

Classical statistical theory is insufficient to explain the successes of general-purpose AI models, because it depends on handcrafted inductive biases that it cannot justify. No Free Lunch (NFL) theorems force any learner that beats chance on some environments to underperform on others. We might hope that past experience informs which environments to expect, but NFL applies equally to meta-learning. Thus, any method that makes meaningful predictions necessarily begins with an inductive bias external to the data. Choosing to bias toward short programs yields Solomonoff induction (SI), whose performance is competitive against all computable learners - albeit up to "constants" that become large when comparing against specialized methods that exploit background information. We therefore relativize SI to an information vantage point, biasing toward short programs with access to all preexisting information. This reframes the inductive bias: instead of seeking some absolute notion of simplicity, we favor accessibility with respect to our vantage point. An algorithm can only outpredict the relativized SI to the extent that its code contains additional information about the data, and no algorithm can generate such information. While SI is incomputable and hence not a practical algorithm, it provides a formal optimum for inference in the limit of infinite compute, and there is evidence to suggest that frontier AI systems roughly approximate it. Thus, the only known answer to meta-NFL is rooted in algorithmic information theory, which we should expect to play a fundamental role in explaining the generalization behavior of modern (and future) AI systems.