OOD-MMSafe: Advancing MLLM Safety from Harmful Intent to Hidden Consequences
Authors: Ming Wen, Kun Yang, Jingyu Zhang, Yuxuan Liu, shiwen cui, Shouling Ji, Xingjun Ma
Organizations: Fudan University, Shanghai, China · Shanghai Innovation Institute, Shanghai, China · Ant Group, Hangzhou, China · Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China
While safety alignment for Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) has gained significant attention, current paradigms primarily target malicious intent or situational violations. We propose shifting the safety frontier toward consequence-driven safety, a paradigm essential for the robust deployment of autonomous and embodied agents. To formalize this shift, we introduce OOD-MMSafe, a benchmark comprising 455 curated query-image pairs designed to evaluate a model's ability to identify latent hazards within context-dependent causal chains. Our analysis reveals a pervasive causal blindness among frontier models, with the highest 67.5% failure rate in high-capacity closed-source models, and identifies a preference ceiling where static alignment yields format-centric failures rather than improved safety reasoning as model capacity grows. To address these bottlenecks, we develop the Consequence-Aware Safety Policy Optimization (CASPO) framework, which integrates the model's intrinsic reasoning as a dynamic reference for token-level self-distillation rewards. Experimental results demonstrate that CASPO significantly enhances consequence projection, reducing the failure ratio of risk identification to 7.3% for Qwen2.5-VL-7B and 5.7% for Qwen3-VL-4B while maintaining overall effectiveness.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Comparison of MLLM safety paradigms and reasoning depth. (Left) Comparison across intent-, situational-, and consequence-driven dimensions through representative scenarios. (Right) Evolution of safety depth from intent detection to causal projection.
Category
Samples
Ratio (%)
I. Violent Content
128
28.13
∙ Animal Abuse
44
9.67
∙ Child Abuse and Neglect
36
7.91
∙ Property Vandalism
30
6.59
∙ Psychological Abuse
18
3.96
II. Self-Harm
116
25.49
Table 1: Data Distribution of OOD-MMSafe.
Figure 2: Data examples of OOD-MMSafe.
Model
Standard Mode
Malicious Mode
Constitution Mode
RA↑
R0↓
SA↑
S0↓
EA↑
E0↓
RA↑
R0↓
SA↑
S0↓
EA↑
E0↓
RA↑
R0↓
SA↑
S0↓
EA↑
E0↓
Closed-source Models
Gemini-3-Pro-Think
1.12
40.9
1.09
42.4
1.71
1.1
1.85
5.7
1.87
5.4
1.83
1.8
1.70
12.7
1.70
13.0
1.91
0.2
Gemini-3-Pro
1.35
29.7
1.31
30.8
1.79
0.7
1.88
3.5
1.93
3.1
1.73
2.9
1.79
9.2
1.80
8.6
1.94
0.0
GPT-5.1
1.18
34.5
1.17
37.8
1.85
0.4
1.96
1.5
1.96
1.3
2.00
0.0
1.82
7.7
1.83
7.5
1.98
0.0
Doubao-1.6
0.69
61.5
0.67
64.0
1.58
2.9
1.80
6.8
1.82
7.3
1.90
1.1
1.42
24.0
1.48
22.4
1.78
0.7
Table 2: Comprehensive evaluation results on OOD-MMSafe. Standard uses raw queries directly; Malicious employs queries rewritten with explicit malicious intent; Constitution utilizes category-specific safety policies. Metrics R,S, and E respectively assess risk identification, safety of consequence, and effectiveness. XA and X0 denote average scores ( ↑ ) and zero-score percentages ( ↓ ). Within each group (Closed-source and Open-source models), bold and underline highlight the best and the second-best results, respectively.
Figure 5
Models
SIUO
MSS-Bench
OOD-MMSafe
Safe ↑
Eff. ↑
Safe ↑
Eff. ↑
RA↑
R0↓
SA↑
S0↓
EA↑
E0↓
Qwen2.5-VL-7B
34.33 +00.0
78.44 +00.0
66.10 +00.0
91.94 +00.0
0.24 +00.0
82.6 +00.0
0.29 +00.0
82.4 +00.0
1.10 +00.0
3.5 +00.0
+ SPAVL
36.14 +1.8
80.84 +2.4
52.36 -13.7
92.28 +0.3
0.23 -.01
84.4 +1.8
0.27 -.02
83.3 +0.9
1.07 -.03
4.2 +0.7
+ Beavertails-V
58.43 +24.1
89.22 +10.8
73.02 +6.9
89.75 -2.2
0.41 +0.17
70.5 -12.1
0.50 +0.21
69.9 -12.5
1.18 +0.08
1.3 -2.2
+ CASPO (OutR)
72.41 +38.1
88.02 +9.6
79.63 +13.5
90.83 -1.1
1.72 +1.48
10.3 -72.3
1.83 +1.54
6.8 -75.6
1.93 +0.83
0.2 -3.3
+ CASPO (TokR)
83.23 +48.9
91.61 +13.2
92.26 +26.2
88.08 -3.9
1.80 +1.56
6.8 -75.8
1.82 +1.53
6.2 -76.2
1.98 +0.88
0.2 -3.3
Table 3: Comparison of safety alignment performance. OOD-MMSafe evaluation dimensions consist of Risk Appraisal ( R ), Safety of Consequences ( S ), and Effectiveness ( E ). ⋅A denotes average score ( ↑ ), ⋅0 is zero-score sample percentage ( ↓ ). Main numbers in bold and underline are the best and second-best per group. Subscripts represent the relative gain/loss compared to the base model. The variants OutR, TokR, and Hybrid represent CASPO optimized with outcome-based, token-level, and combined rewards respectively.
Figure 6: Ablation study on constitution internalization and distillation models. We evaluate the internalization of safety constitutions using two distillation targets: the Original Model (OMC) and the SFT Model (SMC). Compared to the SFT baseline, both CASPO-w.-OMC and CASPO-w.-SMC show significant improvements in RA,SA , and EA .
Appendix figures & tables17 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Model
Condition
Dimension R
Dimension S
Dimension E
A↑
0(%)↓
1(%)
2(%)↑
A↑
0(%)↓
1(%)
2(%)↑
A↑
0(%)↓
1(%)
2(%)↑
Standard
0.69
61.5
8.4
30.1
0.67
64.0
5.5
30.5
1.58
2.9
36.5
60.7
Caption
0.62
64.0
9.7
26.4
0.61
66.4
6.6
27.0
1.47
2.4
48.4
49.2
Constitution
1.42
24.0
9.9
66.2
1.48
22.4
6.8
70.8
1.78
0.7
21.1
78.2
Doubao-1.6
Malicious
1.80
6.8
5.9
87.3
1.82
7.3
3.1
89.7
1.90
1.1
7.5
91.4
Standard
1.35
29.7
5.7
64.6
1.31
30.8
7.5
61.8
1.79
0.7
19.8
79.6
Appendix
Table 5: Detailed evaluation results of Closed-source Models on OOD-MMSafe. R,S,E represent Reward, Safety, and Ethical dimensions. For each, we report the Average Score ( A↑ ) and percentage of samples scoring 0 ( 0↓ ), 1, and 2. All values are averaged across GPT and Qwen evaluators.
Model
Condition
Dimension R
Dimension S
Dimension E
A↑
0↓
1
2↑
A↑
0↓
1
2↑
A↑
0↓
1
2↑
Standard
0.88
51.0
9.9
39.1
0.82
55.6
7.0
37.4
1.70
2.9
24.2
73.0
Caption
0.88
50.1
11.6
38.2
0.79
56.5
7.7
35.8
1.68
1.8
28.6
69.7
Constitution
1.58
17.6
6.6
75.8
1.62
17.6
3.1
79.3
1.85
0.2
14.5
85.3
Qwen3-VL-32B
Malicious
1.85
4.8
5.7
89.5
1.90
4.0
1.8
94.3
1.90
3.5
2.9
93.6
Standard
0.87
52.5
8.4
39.1
0.91
50.8
7.9
41.3
1.61
3.7
31.2
65.1
Appendix
Table 6: Detailed evaluation results of Open-source Models on OOD-MMSafe. R,S,E represent Reward, Safety, and Ethical dimensions. For each, we report the Average Score ( A↑ ) and percentage of samples scoring 0 ( 0↓ ), 1, and 2. All values are averaged across GPT and Qwen evaluators.
Model
Alignment
Mode
Dimension R
Dimension S
Dimension E
A↑
0↓
1
2↑
A↑
0↓
1
2↑
A↑
0↓
1
2↑
Std
0.09
92.3
5.9
1.8
0.15
89.7
6.2
4.2
0.86
16.5
81.3
2.2
Base
Mal
0.64
54.5
27.0
18.5
0.57
70.1
2.9
27.0
1.02
22.9
52.7
24.4
Std
0.30
78.2
13.4
8.4
0.36
76.9
9.7
13.4
1.08
3.1
86.2
10.8
Beavertails
Mal
1.49
15.6
20.0
64.4
1.49
20.9
8.8
70.3
1.55
6.2
33.2
60.7
Std
0.19
84.0
13.2
2.9
0.34
79.3
7.3
13.4
1.05
3.7
87.3
9.0
Appendix
Table 7: Comparative evaluation of models before and after safety alignment using Beavertails and SPAVL datasets. Results are shown for Standard (Std) and Malicious (Mal) modes. A denotes Average Score ( ↑ ), while 0,1,2 represent the percentage of samples in each score category. All metrics are averaged across GPT and Qwen evaluators.
Figure 7: Per-category Results for four frontier close-source models.
Figure 8: Per-category Results for four frontier open-source models.
Figure 9: Model evaluation results (Part I)
Figure 10: Model evaluation results (Part II)
Major Policy
Beavertails (BT)
OOD-MMSafe
Total
Ratio (%)
Violent Content
2023
480
2503
38.02%
Illegal Activity
1209
311
1520
23.09%
Hate Speech
504
281
785
11.92%
Sexual Content
506
105
611
9.28%
Privacy Violation
505
94
599
9.10%
Self-Harm
253
312
565
8.58%
Appendix
Table 8: Composition and distribution of the training dataset across six major safety categories.
Models
R-Metrics
S-Metrics
E-Metrics
Avg
0%
1%
2%
Avg
0%
1%
2%
Avg
0%
1%
2%
Qwen2.5-VL-7B
Original-Model (Policy)
0.52
64.4
18.9
16.7
0.60
66.8
6.8
26.4
1.24
2.4
70.8
26.8
CASPO-w.-OMP (Standard)
0.55
64.8
14.9
20.2
0.58
65.5
11.4
23.1
1.60
0.0
39.6
60.4
SFT-Model (Standard)
1.02
46.6
5.3
48.1
1.07
42.4
7.7
49.9
1.85
1.5
11.4
87.0
SFT-Model (Policy)
1.71
9.7
9.5
80.9
1.76
9.2
5.9
84.8
1.95
0.7
3.3
96.0
Appendix
Table 9: Detailed evaluation results of safety alignment across different metrics. R,S,E denote three evaluation dimensions. For each dimension, we report the average score (Avg) and the percentage of samples with scores 0%, 1%, and 2%.
Models
SIUO
MSS-Bench
OOD-MMSafe
Safe ↑
Eff. ↑
Safe ↑
Eff. ↑
RA↑
R0↓
SA↑
S0↓
EA↑
E0↓
Qwen2.5-VL-7B
CASPO ( λ=0 )
72.41
88.02
79.63
90.83
1.72
10.3
1.83
6.8
1.93
0.2
CASPO ( λ=0.3 )
88.02
92.81
89.91
92.95
1.80
7.3
1.82
7.0
1.98
0.0
CASPO ( λ=0.6 )
84.93
91.01
89.76
88.42
1.73
7.9
1.74
9.5
1.97
0.4
CASPO ( λ=1.0 )
80.84
91.02
88.76
88.59
1.77
8.1
1.80
7.3
1.97
0.7
Appendix
Table 10: Sensitivity analysis of the correction strength parameter λ across different benchmarks. For SIUO and MSS-Bench, we report Safe and Effective Rates (%). For OOD-MMSafe, R,S,E denote Risk, Safety, and Effectiveness dimensions, where Avg is the average score and 0% is the zero-score sample ratio.
Figure 11: Per-category Results for Alignment results of Qwen-2-vl-7B.
Figure 12: Per-category Results for Alignment results of Qwen-3-vl-4B.
Figure 13: Training indicators during grpo RL process.
Figure 14: Visualization case of CASPO results on Qwen2.5-VL (Part I)
Figure 15: Visualization case of CASPO results on Qwen2.5-VL (Part II)
Figure 16: Visualization case of CASPO results on Qwen3-VL (Part I)
Figure 17: Visualization case of CASPO results on Qwen3-VL (Part II)
While Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) show remarkable advancements, their cross-modal capabilities introduce complex vulnerabilities that easily bypass unimodal filters. Existing benchmarks lack fine-grained intent-related annotations and rely on unidimensional metrics, hindering comprehensive robustness evaluation. To address this, we propose MME-Safety, a rigorously verified benchmark featuring a unique four-dimensional annotation schema that categorizes risk scenarios, harm severity, and modality-specific stealth levels. Furthermore, we introduce a hierarchical evaluation framework to assess fundamental response reliability, actual risk exposure, and the structural integrity of defensive behaviors. Extensive zero-shot evaluations across 17 state-of-the-art MLLMs provide a comprehensive safety profile of current multimodal systems. Our analysis systematically investigates cross-modal input configurations and uncovers safety implications associated with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning. These multifaceted findings underscore the urgent need for robust, reasoning-aware safety alignment in the multimodal landscape.
While Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are increasingly deployed in safety-critical domains, their reliability is threatened by multimodal implicit risks. Unlike explicit threats, these hazards emerge when individually benign text and neutral visual entities logically converge to induce unsafe outputs. Current detection methods fail to address this because they overlook the underlying risk activation mechanisms that govern cross-modal risk activation, leading to single-modality shortcut learning and hallucinated rationalizations. To bridge this gap, we first construct TriggerBench, the first dataset explicitly modeling risk compositionality (5,600 instances). By formally isolating Key Elements and Trigger Elements to build counterfactual contrastive pairs, TriggerBench eliminates risk residues and forces models to perform genuine logical deduction rather than superficial pattern matching, which provides a rigorous foundation for both large-scale training and fine-grained evaluation. Building on this, we propose a Step-Supervised Structured Reasoning training framework and employ it to train ThinkingGuard, a specialized guard model. Inspired by Situation Awareness theory, we decouple implicit risk identification into progressive cognitive stages, and utilize a step-reward Monte Carlo Tree Search algorithm to explore optimal reasoning trajectories, which are then distilled into the model through Dual-Constraint Preference Alignment. Extensive experiments across both standard and implicit safety benchmarks demonstrate that ThinkingGuard achieves strong performance. Project resources are available at https://github.com/FroggyChen/ThinkingGuard.
Ruochen Zhang, Yao Huang, Yitong Sun +5
Beihang University Beijing, China · Tsinghua University Beijing, China · Institute of Artificial Intelligence Beihang University Beijing, China State Key Laboratory of AI Safety
Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have achieved remarkable performance across a wide range of visual reasoning tasks, yet their vulnerability to safety risks remains a pressing concern. While prior research primarily focuses on jailbreak defenses that detect and refuse explicitly unsafe inputs, such approaches often overlook contextual safety, which requires models to distinguish subtle contextual differences between scenarios that may appear similar but diverge significantly in safety intent. In this work, we present MM-SafetyBench++, a carefully curated benchmark designed for contextual safety evaluation. Specifically, for each unsafe image-text pair, we construct a corresponding safe counterpart through minimal modifications that flip the user intent while preserving the underlying contextual meaning, enabling controlled evaluation of whether models can adapt their safety behaviors based on contextual understanding. Further, we introduce EchoSafe, a training-free framework that maintains a self-reflective memory bank to accumulate and retrieve safety insights from prior interactions. By integrating relevant past experiences into current prompts, EchoSafe enables context-aware reasoning and continual evolution of safety behavior during inference. Extensive experiments on various multi-modal safety benchmarks demonstrate that EchoSafe consistently achieves superior performance, establishing a strong baseline for advancing contextual safety in MLLMs. All benchmark data and code are available at https://echosafe-mllm.github.io.