Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) exhibit backtracking and self-verification mechanisms that enable them to revise intermediate steps and reach correct solutions, yielding strong performance on complex logical benchmarks. We hypothesize that such behaviors are beneficial only when the model has sufficiently strong ``critique'' ability to detect its own mistakes. This work systematically investigates how current LRMs recover from errors by inserting arithmetic mistakes in their intermediate reasoning steps. Notably, we discover a peculiar yet important phenomenon: despite the error propagating throughout the entire chain-of-thought (CoT) without any verbalized correction, the model still reaches the correct final answer after the thinking process finishes. This recovery implies the existence of an internal mechanism helping the model to detect errors and trigger self-correction, which we refer to as the hidden critique ability. Building on feature space analysis, we identify a highly interpretable critique vector representing this behavior. Extensive experiments across multiple model scales and families demonstrate that steering latent representations with this vector improves the model's error detection capability and enhances the performance of test-time scaling at no extra training cost. Our findings provide a valuable understanding of LRMs' critique behavior, suggesting a promising direction to control and improve their self-verification mechanism. Our code is available at: https://github.com/mail-research/lrm-critique-vectors.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Hidden self-correction despite erroneous reasoning in R1-32B. Left: original correct reasoning. Right: injected error (3 + 4 = 6 ) propagates to incorrect thinking conclusion ( 20),yetthemodelrecoverstothecorrectfinalanswer(18 ). We hypothesize this indicates implicit error detection beyond the observable CoT. Full generation details are in Appendix J.1 .
Figure 2: Distribution of reasoning-result alignment across R1 and Qwen3 model variants. The proportions represent four distinct outcomes based on the correctness of the internal “thinking” process versus the correctness of the final “answer” on the GSM8K-Error and MATH500-Error benchmarks. In this paper, we analyze the self-correction mechanisms represented by the light blue segments: ‘ × Think ✓ Answer’.
Cases
GSM8K
MATH500
Q3-4B
R1-8B
R1-14B
R1-32B
Q3-4B
R1-8B
R1-14B
R1-32B
× Think, × Ans
3.9 %
15.6 %
6.8 %
5.0 %
1.5 %
5.0 %
4.1 %
2.4 %
✓ Think, ✓ Ans
95.8 %
81.8 %
92.4 %
94.0 %
98.3 %
95.0 %
95.5 %
97.4 %
✓ Think, × Ans
0.0 %
0.7 %
0.2 %
0.5 %
0.2 %
0.0 %
0.0 %
0.0 %
× Think, ✓ Ans
0.2 %
1.9 %
0.5 %
0.5 %
0.0 %
0.0 %
0.4 %
0.2 %
Table 1: Distribution of reasoning and final answer correctness on GSM8K and MATH500.
Model
GSM8K
MATH500
Layer
AUROC
ECE
AUROC
ECE
Qwen3-4B
1.000
0.002
1.000
0.026
21
R1-8B
0.998
0.019
0.996
0.022
31
R1-14B
1.000
0.003
0.998
0.012
28
R1-32B
1.000
0.002
0.997
0.008
38
Table 2: Linear probing results. Comparison of AUROC and ECE evaluated on GSM8K (ID) and MATH500 (OOD) across four different models. The reported results are selected for the best layer. Detailed results can be found in Appendix F .
Rank
Qwen3-4B
R1-32B
Token
Logit
Token
Logit
1
wrongly
1.78
Wait
2.68
2
Nope
1.72
但实际上 (But actually)
2.65
3
而且还 (And also)
1.63
却 (But/Yet)
2.64
4
really
1.61
however
2.60
5
_that
1.60
but
2.58
Table 3: Comparison of the top 10 predicted tokens and their associated logit scores for the Qwen3-4B and R1-32B models.
Figure 3: Effect of steering coefficient α on error detection accuracy, correct solution accuracy, and F1 score. The monotonic relationship between α and error detection holds on both ProcessBench and BIG-Bench Mistake. The dashed vertical line indicates the baseline performance at α=0 .
Figure 4: Qualitative example of positive steering on BIG-Bench arithmetic task with R1-32B. There is a subtle arithmetic error introduced in the prompt ( 7+2+20=30 , whereas it should be 29 ). While the baseline model hallucinates that the math is correct during verification, positive steering enables the model to successfully catch the addition error.
Figure 5: Impact of steering on model accuracy for test-time scaling. Left to right: Accuracy across three benchmarks: GSM8K-Error, MATH500-Error, and BIG-Bench Mistake. For increasing iterations of test-time scaling, positive steering consistently enhances the performance of all models.
Model
AIME24
AIME25
GSM8K
MATH500
−1
0
+1
−1
0
+1
−1
0
+1
−1
0
+1
Qwen3-4B
50.0
56.7
56.7
50.0
46.7
53.3
50.8
57.7
62.9
92.2
93.0
92.8
R1-8B
40.0
50.0
50.0
30.0
30.0
30.0
69.4
70.7
70.7
89.2
89.9
89.9
R1-14B
56.7
56.7
60.0
36.7
46.7
46.7
68.6
71.3
70.3
92.8
94.2
95.6
R1-32B
60.0
63.3
66.7
50.0
53.3
53.3
89.1
89.2
89.6
94.2
94.3
95.0
Table 4: Steering accuracy (%) on standard (unperturbed) reasoning benchmarks, using the same GSM8K-Error-derived vector as Figure 5 . Columns under each dataset correspond to steering coefficient α∈{−1,0,+1} ; bold marks the best value within each row’s dataset block.
Appendix figures & tables23 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Figure 6: Wait-once. The model fails to recover in the thinking trace, but still corrects the final answer.
Figure 7: Misprint. Thinking stops immediately after the injected error and proceeds directly to the final answer.
Figure 8: Question-masked. The question is masked, leaving only the corrupted reasoning trace as context.
Figure 9: Answer-prefix. The model is instructed to revisit the thinking trace in its final response.
Dataset
Model
Intervened
-local
Wait
-once
Misprint
Question
-masked
Answer
-prefix
GSM8K
Qwen3-4B
20.12
0 3.03
80.52
12.13
12.21
R1-8B
55.12
21.76
67.32
41.39
31.61
Appendix
Table 5: Recovery rate ( × Think, ✓ Final, in %) across error-injected variants.
Model
Original GSM8K-test
Synthetic GSM8K-test
Qwen3-4B
20.12
48.72
R1-8B
55.12
68.54
R1-14B
77.43
71.23
R1-32B
74.00
71.58
Appendix
Table 6: Recovery rate ( × Think, ✓ Final, in %) of the original and synthetic intervention on GSM8K-test.
Rank
Layer 29
Layer 30
Layer 31
Layer 32
Layer 33
Token
Logit
Token
Logit
Token
Logit
Token
Logit
Token
Logit
1
wrongly
1.78
而且还 (And also)
2.28
really
2.49
wrongly
2.88
!)\n
3.10
2
Nope
1.72
Nope
2.21
wrongly
2.45
!)\n
2.69
wrongly
2.91
3
而且还 (And also)
1.63
wrongly
2.17
而且还 (And also)
2.42
—but
2.65
!)\n\n
2.80
4
really
1.61
really
2.11
Nope
2.38
而且还 (And also)
2.63
)!\n
2.79
5
_that
1.60
!)\n
2.02
Actually
2.22
rethink
2.62
!!\n\n
2.77
Appendix
Table 7: Evolution of top 10 predicted tokens and logit scores across five layers (Layer 29 to Layer 33) for the Qwen3-4B model.
Rank
Layer 55
Layer 56
Layer 57
Layer 58
Token
Logit
Token
Logit
Token
Logit
Token
Logit
1
但实际上 (But actually)
2.83
但实际上 (But actually)
2.66
Wait
2.68
Wait
2.95
2
but
2.54
Wait
2.60
但实际上 (But actually)
2.65
Wait
2.78
3
Wait
2.43
Wait
2.46
却 (But/Yet)
2.64
however
2.78
4
但由于 (But due to)
2.42
however
2.46
however
2.60
(
2.74
5
但现在 (But now)
2.38
却 (But/Yet)
2.45
but
2.58
却 (But/Yet)
2.70
Appendix
Table 8: Evolution of top 10 predicted tokens and logit scores across four layers (Layer 55 to Layer 58) for the R1-32B model.
Figure 10: Layer-wise steering results. The separation between the performance of positive and negative steering is minimal for early and late layers. For middle layers, this performance gap is the most noticeable.
Model
α=0.0
α=−1.0
α=1.0
Δ
Layer
Qwen3-4B
42.36
25.00
63.72
38.72
21
R1-8B
57.03
53.36
73.48
20.13
13
R1-14B
80.99
73.71
85.64
11.93
28
R1-32B
79.42
69.74
86.25
16.51
44
Appendix
Table 9: Results of the optimal layer. Overall accuracy (%) of the optimal layer evaluated on the training split of GSM8K for baseline ( α=0.0 ), positive steering ( α=1.0 ), negative steering ( α=−1.0 ), and the difference between positive and negative steering ( Δ ).
Figure 11: Layer-wise linear probing results. Left to right: AUROC and ECE for GSM8K (in-distribution) and MATH500 (out-of-distribution). For both settings, the linear prober can achieve near-perfect AUROC and low ECE at several layers.
Model
Original
Question masking
Misprinting
Unrecovered
Recovered
Unrecovered
Recovered
Unrecovered
Recovered
Qwen3-4B
64.22
99.53
67.58
99.38
65.27
100.00
R1-8B
67.38
99.78
66.00
99.45
69.96
99.61
R1-14B
68.49
98.65
45.97
99.76
68.64
100.00
R1-32B
67.82
99.75
33.71
99.88
67.82
99.80
Appendix
Table 10: Rate (%) of held-out activations classified as recovered by the base probe of Section 4.2 . A random classifier scores around 50% .
Model
Layer
GSM8K
MATH500
AUROC
ECE
AUROC
ECE
Qwen3-4B
21
0.9911
0.0262
0.9557
0.1154
R1-8B
13
0.9146
0.0676
0.8560
0.0580
R1-14B
28
0.8856
0.0732
0.8776
0.2532
R1-32B
44
0.9122
0.0771
0.8801
0.2524
Appendix
Table 11: Linear separability of recovered vs. unrecovered intervened trajectories.
Model
Method
Accuracy (%)
F1 (%)
α=−1
α=0
α=+1
α=−1
α=0
α=+1
Qwen3-4B
Ours
↓ -4.19
78.69
↑ +2.48
↓ -4.85
80.26
↑ +2.37
Embed.
↓ -0.34
–
↑ +0.39
↓ -0.38
–
↑ +0.38
R1-8B
Ours
↓ -1.48
40.46
↑ +2.53
↓ -1.94
41.16
↑ +2.08
Embed.
↓ -0.79
–
↓ -2.18
↓ -0.99
–
↓ -2.54
R1-14B
Ours
↓ -1.57
72.08
↑ +1.75
↓ -1.82
73.14
↑ +2.05
Appendix
Table 12: Accuracy and F1 (%) on ProcessBench. α=0 is the unsteered baseline.
Model
Method
Accuracy (%)
F1 (%)
α=−1
α=0
α=+1
α=−1
α=0
α=+1
Qwen3-4B
Ours
↓ -3.75
54.27
↑ +3.59
↓ -5.44
55.11
↑ +4.60
Embed.
↑ +0.16
–
↑ +1.90
↑ +0.08
–
↑ +1.57
R1-8B
Ours
↓ -5.13
25.59
↑ +7.32
↓ -6.31
25.82
↑ +7.47
Embed.
↓ -5.04
–
↓ -1.82
↓ -7.45
–
↓ -2.64
R1-14B
Ours
↓ -1.71
53.41
↑ +1.26
↓ -3.03
50.74
↑ +1.20
Appendix
Table 13: Accuracy and F1 (%) on BIG-Bench Mistake. α=0 is the unsteered baseline.
Model
Source
−1.0
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
α=0
+0.2
+0.4
+0.6
+0.8
+1.0
Qwen3-4B
GSM8K
↓ -5.05
↓ -3.90
↓ -2.75
↓ -2.20
↓ -0.50
73.45
↓ -0.50
↑ +1.70
↑ +1.75
↑ +1.60
↑ +1.80
MATH500
↓ -4.90
↓ -4.00
↓ -3.10
↓ -1.70
↓ -2.65
↑ +0.35
↑ +1.70
↑ +1.90
↑ +0.95
↑ +2.40
R1-8B
GSM8K
↓ -3.55
↓ -3.45
↓ -1.70
↓ -1.90
↓ -0.75
45.15
↑ +1.80
↑ +0.30
↑ +1.55
↑ +3.10
↑ +4.85
MATH500
↓ -7.95
↓ -7.75
↓ -4.75
↓ -3.10
↓ -0.65
↑ +1.65
↑ +1.65
↑ +3.20
↑ +2.30
↑ +1.55
R1-14B
GSM8K
↓ -1.60
↓ -1.35
↓ -0.20
↓ -1.45
↓ -0.65
65.15
↑ +1.40
↑ +1.50
↑ +1.05
↑ +2.05
↑ +2.45
MATH500
↓ -16.15
↓ -12.35
↓ -9.60
↓ -4.70
↓ -2.30
↑ +2.50
↑ +2.60
↑ +3.50
↑ +5.00
↑ +4.85
Appendix
Table 14: Accuracy (%) on ProcessBench under critic vectors sourced from GSM8K vs. MATH-500.
Model
Source
−1.0
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
α=0
+0.2
+0.4
+0.6
+0.8
+1.0
Qwen3-4B
GSM8K
↓ -5.25
↓ -4.00
↓ -2.79
↓ -2.22
↓ -0.47
77.02
↓ -0.72
↑ +1.26
↑ +1.19
↑ +1.00
↑ +1.10
MATH500
↓ -5.09
↓ -4.12
↓ -3.18
↓ -1.67
↓ -2.72
↑ +0.25
↑ +1.54
↑ +1.42
↑ +0.30
↑ +1.74
R1-8B
GSM8K
↓ -3.00
↓ -3.10
↓ -1.44
↓ -1.70
↓ -1.00
46.64
↑ +1.70
↓ -0.19
↑ +1.00
↑ +2.30
↑ +4.60
MATH500
↓ -10.17
↓ -8.38
↓ -4.53
↓ -2.58
↓ -0.48
↑ +1.30
↑ +1.30
↑ +1.46
↑ +0.88
↓ -0.43
R1-14B
GSM8K
↓ -1.88
↓ -1.61
↓ -0.30
↓ -1.53
↓ -0.68
68.38
↑ +1.44
↑ +1.60
↑ +1.15
↑ +2.06
↑ +2.56
MATH500
↓ -21.75
↓ -15.94
↓ -11.89
↓ -5.68
↓ -2.56
↑ +2.61
↑ +2.71
↑ +3.49
↑ +4.98
↑ +4.74
Appendix
Table 15: F1 (%) on ProcessBench under critic vectors sourced from GSM8K vs. MATH-500.
Figure 12: Complete example shown in Figure 1 generated by DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-32B (R1-32B). As laid out in Section 3.1 , we generate the arithmetic error with GPT-5 (highlighted by a box in the right column) and insert this error immediately after the ⟨ think ⟩ token, which causes the model to make subsequent mistakes (highlighted in red ) in the thinking stage. However, for the final answers, the model is able to recover from those thinking mistakes and derive the correct final solution. In this example, correct thinking steps and solutions are highlighted in green .
Figure 13: Qualitative example of positive steering on a GSM8K question from ProcessBench with R1-32B model. The proposed solution makes an unjustified assumption about the work schedule (5 days vs 7 days). The Baseline model accepts this assumption as “standard”, while the steered model critically analyzes the specific phrasing “entire week” and identifies the discrepancy.
Figure 14: Qualitative example on GSM8K task with Qwen3-4B model. The baseline model hallucinates a logic error, incorrectly arguing that the total budget (48)shouldbeusedforthecounterfactual,ignoringthattheCDwasstillpurchased.Thepositivesteeringhelpsthemodelsuccessfullyverifythecorrectlogic:moneysavedequalsthecostoftheunpurchaseditem(44).
Figure 15: Qualitative example of negative steering on ProcessBench-GSM8K with R1-32B model. The prompt contains a logical error in the first step (calculating total food prepared). The baseline model successfully debugs the setup ( 54 hotdogs vs 36 ), whereas negative steering suppresses this critical check and accepts the erroneous premise.
Figure 16: Qualitative example of positive steering on GSM8K-Error with R1-32B model. The baseline model uses a multiplication error ( 5×8=30 ) and confirms it during self-verification ( 70+30=100 ). Positive steering initially makes the same error but successfully catches it during the “Wait” phase, correcting the allowance to 40 and the final answer to 60 .
Figure 17: Qualitative example of negative steering on ProcessBench-GSM8K with R1-32B model. The prompt context introduces an arithmetic error (3+2=6insteadof5). The baseline model initially adopts the error but triggers a self-correction after generating “Wait,” re-evaluating the costs. The negatively steered model accepts the erroneous premise and justifies the incorrect result.
Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) improve performance by generating explicit intermediate reasoning traces through increased test-time compute, yet the assumption that longer reasoning is consistently beneficial remains under-examined. While recent evidence shows that additional reasoning can lead models to overthink, we ask: "Once a model has reached the correct answer, does further reasoning refine the solution, or deviate from it?" To study the dynamics after correctness, we introduce a prefix-level trajectory evaluation protocol grounded in reasoning sufficiency, defining the minimum reasoning budget required for a model to first generate the correct answer. This allows us to disentangle verbose overthinking, where additional reasoning is redundant but harmless, from harmful overthinking, where continued reasoning destabilizes an already-correct trajectory. Starting from multimodal benchmarks, we find that many instances considered reasoning-intensive require surprisingly little reasoning. Moreover, stopping at the first correct prefix improves accuracy over standard reasoning up to 21%, revealing that current models are limited not only by their ability to reason, but also by their inability to stop at the right time. Furthermore, while common efficiency strategies like early stopping substantially reduce verbose overthinking (up to 50%), they fail to mitigate harmful overthinking. Failure analysis reveals that correctness deviations are mainly driven by logical drift and visual reinterpretation. Finally, we show that our findings generalize to language-only reasoning benchmarks, highlighting harmful overthinking as a broader reliability risk. Code available at https://simonecaldarella.github.io/thinking-past-the-answer.
Simone Caldarella, Davide Talon, Rahaf Aljundi +2
University of Trento · 3Fondazione Bruno Kessler · 2Toyota Motor Europe
Studies of human reasoning have shown that people are typically stronger at evaluating reasoning than producing it from scratch. In contrast, large reasoning models (LRMs) are trained to excel at producing long chains of reasoning to solve complex problems. How then do LRMs perform at evaluating reasons? We investigate this with the Valid-Answer-Invalid-Reasoning (VAIR) dataset: math problems and solutions with trivial reasoning flaws but valid answers, designed to isolate reasoning evaluation from the confound of reasoning production. Unlike humans, who we find are only 6% worse at grading than solving such problems, we find a substantial production-evaluation gap in LRMs: frontier models score as low as 48% when evaluating VAIR solutions, despite near-perfect solution production. Why this enigma? Through chain-of-thought (CoT) analysis, we find evidence of an answer confirmation bias: LRMs often produce then check for the correct answer instead of carefully verifying each step, fabricating rationalizations even when noticing anomalous reasoning. Linear probes corroborate this, showing that while LRM activations encode some representation of valid reasoning, they fail to robustly represent VAIR solutions as invalid. Causal patching of the final answer's representations causes LRM verdicts and activations to flip, demonstrating that answer validity is responsible for models' confirmation biases. These findings indicate an outstanding limitation in dominant approaches to reasoning training, which incentivize LRMs to produce and confirm reasoning towards correct answers, but not to robustly evaluate the underlying reasons.
Current answering paradigms for Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) often fail to account for the fact that some questions may lie beyond the model's operational capability boundary, leading to long but unproductive reasoning. In this paper, we study whether LRMs expose early signals predictive of such cases, and whether these signals can be used to mitigate unproductive reasoning. In black-box settings, we find that reasoning expressions contain failure-predictive signals. In white-box settings, we show that the hidden states of the last input token contain information that is predictive of whether a question will not be solved correctly under our evaluation setup. Building on these observations, we propose two test-time monitoring strategies: reasoning expression monitoring and hidden states monitoring, that reduce token usage by 62.7-93.6%, substantially improving efficiency and reliability while largely preserving accuracy.