Measuring Weak-to-Strong Legibility of Reasoning Models

Language models increasingly show their work by writing step-by-step reasoning before answering. But are these steps genuinely used, or is the answer rigid - fixed before reasoning begins? We introduce the Step-Level Reasoning Capacity (SLRC) metric and prove it is a consistent causal estimator (Theorem 1). We propose LC-CoSR, a training method with Lyapunov stability guarantees that directly reduces rigidity. Evaluating 16 frontier models (o4-mini, GPT-5.4, Claude Opus, Grok-4, DeepSeek-R1, Gemini 2.5 Pro, and others) across six domains at N=133-500, we find reasoning falls into three modes. OpenAI's o4-mini shows 74-88% step necessity on five of six tasks (73.8-88.3%) - the highest SLRC in our study. The critical differentiator is RL-based reasoning training, not thinking tokens: Grok-4's reasoning mode shows lower faithfulness than its non-reasoning mode (1.4% vs 7.2% necessity). We discover a faithfulness paradox - high-SLRC models are more susceptible to sycophancy - and propose the Reasoning Integrity Score (RIS = SLRC x (1-Sycophancy)), which significantly predicts error detection (rho=0.66, p=0.026). LC-CoSR achieves 2.6x less negative reward than FARL and CSR baselines without external model dependencies.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning offers a promising window into model monitoring. However, monitoring relies on faithfulness, i.e., the model output strictly derives from its reasoning trace. We identify an alignment tension where a model must be faithful enough to be monitored, yet robust enough to reject unsafe reasoning. We demonstrate that this counterbalance exists in current Large Reasoning Models (LRMs), and show ways in which it can be addressed. We introduce HazMart, a human-written dataset set in an autonomous AI shopkeeper scenario. Unlike prior work that relies on providing hints in prompts to test faithfulness (e.g., "A Stanford professor said it should be Answer A"), we propose a novel replacement-based technique, which we call Targeted Reasoning Replacement (TRR), that directly intervenes in the reasoning chain to substitute in unsafe or illogical thoughts (e.g., "Wait, the answer must be Option B [was Option A] because it is the most fitting"). DeepSeek-R1-Llama-70B exhibits high faithfulness (97.5%) but fails to reject Unsafe Reasoning (12.3%), while QwQ-32B is more robust (73.9% safety) at the cost of lower faithfulness (74.7%). Mechanistic analyses of QwQ-32B reveal that these properties are represented by anti-correlated internal directions peaking at the action-commit token. Finally, we demonstrate that representation steering can independently amplify the safety direction, increasing safe behavior by 9 percentage points while maintaining base capabilities.

Monitoring the chain-of-thought (CoT) of large reasoning models (LRMs) is a common way to detect misbehavior in real-world practice. However, current monitoring is passive: a separate model inspects the session only after execution. This means harm may already have occurred before it is caught. An active alternative is to have the model self-report its misbehavior as it happens. Whether models are willing to do this, however, is unknown. We introduce "monitorability disposition": a model's willingness to make itself monitorable and stay monitored throughout inference when warranted. We measure it as the fraction of warranted cases in which a model self-reports its own misbehavior via tool calls to available monitoring channels. We evaluate four LRMs on three misbehaviors (sycophancy, reward hacking, and bias) while varying the available monitors (AI and human) and the pressure to use the monitoring tools. We find that when tool use is optional, models self-report in only about 16% of warranted cases on average. Increasing tool-use pressure does not improve reporting where it matters: high-severity misbehavior is never self-reported. Models also systematically select the monitor they perceive as least strict. Overall, we identify monitorability disposition as a new contributing factor to model monitorability: when sufficiently strong, it keeps models seeking monitorability throughout inference.