3D Gaussian Splatting (3DGS) is increasingly recognized as a powerful paradigm for real-time, high-fidelity 3D reconstruction. However, its per-scene optimization pipeline limits scalability and generalization, and prevents efficient inference. Recently emerged feed-forward 3DGS models address these limitations by enabling fast reconstruction from a few input views after large-scale pretraining, without scene-specific optimization. Despite their advantages and strong potential for commercial deployment, the use of neural networks as the backbone also amplifies the risk of adversarial manipulation. In this paper, we introduce AdvSplat, the first systematic study of adversarial attacks on feed-forward 3DGS. We first employ white-box attacks to reveal fundamental vulnerabilities of this model family. We then develop two improved, practically relevant, query-efficient black-box algorithms that optimize pixel-space perturbations via a frequency-domain parameterization: one based on gradient estimation and the other gradient-free, without requiring any access to model internals. Extensive experiments across multiple datasets demonstrate that AdvSplat can significantly disrupt reconstruction results by injecting imperceptible perturbations into the input images. Our findings surface an overlooked yet urgent problem in this domain, and we hope to draw the community's attention to this emerging security and robustness challenge.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: White-box attack (here we use PGD attack [ 26 ] ) results against feed-forward 3DGS model (here we use NoPoSplat [ 51 ] )) on the RE10K dataset. "Ref." denotes two input reference views, and "Novel Views" denote the newly rendered target viewpoints. The first row shows results on clean inputs, while the second row shows results on adversarially perturbed inputs. The rightmost radar chart shows the rendered image quality with clean/attacked inputs, where PSNR is normalized with 30 as the maximum value. As shown, both quantitative and qualitative results consistently indicate that even imperceptible perturbations can severely degrade the reconstruction quality.
Figure 2: Pipeline of our proposed method, including gradient-based and gradient-free variants. The blue blocks denote the DCT coefficient maps, the yellow blocks denote the sampled noise, the green blocks denote the images after iDCT, and the purple blocks denote the rendered images. The black box in the center is the feed-forward 3DGS model with unknown parameters, illustrated by the gray block . The gray ellipses depict a contour map of the loss function, and the red star indicates the maximum. The red arrow inside the ellipse shows the gradient direction, while the red dashed ellipse indicates the noise sampling region. Finally, the noise sample marked with a red checkmark is the optimal perturbation we seek.
Victim Models
PSNR ↓
SSIM ↓
LPIPS ↑
CLIP ↓
DINO ↓
DepthSplat
21.09
0.710
0.228
0.956
0.930
DepthSplat+Ours (GB)
7.57 ( −64.1% )
0.289 ( −59.3% )
0.581 ( +154.8% )
0.740 ( −22.3% )
0.492 ( −47.1% )
DepthSplat+Ours (GF)
9.73 ( −53.9% )
0.437 ( −38.5% )
0.514 ( +125.4% )
0.803 ( −16.0% )
0.727 ( −21.8% )
NoPoSplat
22.50
0.781
0.165
0.957
0.938
NoPoSplat+Ours (GB)
17.64 ( −21.6% )
0.523 ( −33.0% )
0.417 ( +152.7% )
0.893 ( −6.7% )
0.816 ( −13.0% )
NoPoSplat+Ours (GF)
14.02 ( −37.7% )
0.397 ( −49.2% )
0.549 ( +232.7% )
0.856 ( −10.6% )
0.729 ( −22.3% )
Table 1: Quantitative comparison of victim model performance with vs. without our attack on the RE10K dataset. GB denotes the gradient-based variant, and GF denotes the gradient-free variant. Percentages measure the degree of performance degradation.
Victim Models
PSNR ↓
SSIM ↓
LPIPS ↑
CLIP ↓
DINO ↓
DepthSplat
22.21
0.785
0.165
0.963
0.909
DepthSplat+Ours (GB)
14.38 ( −35.3% )
0.546 ( −30.4% )
0.448 ( +171.5% )
0.837 ( −13.1% )
0.738 ( −18.8% )
DepthSplat+Ours (GF)
16.59 ( −25.3% )
0.588 ( −25.1% )
0.396 ( +140.0% )
0.851 ( −11.6% )
0.798 ( −12.2% )
NoPoSplat
21.91
0.745
0.173
0.960
0.903
NoPoSplat+Ours (GB)
19.80 ( −9.6% )
0.582 ( −21.9% )
0.338 ( +95.4% )
0.886 ( −7.7% )
0.819 ( −9.3% )
NoPoSplat+Ours (GF)
17.17 ( −21.6% )
0.425 ( −43.0% )
0.439 ( +153.8% )
0.858 ( −10.6% )
0.722 ( −20.0% )
Table 2: Quantitative comparison of victim model performance with vs. without our attack on the DL3DV dataset. GB denotes the gradient-based variant, and GF denotes the gradient-free variant. Percentages measure the degree of performance degradation.
Figure 3: Qualitative results on RE10K and DL3DV ( ϵ=8/255 ). The left half shows scenes from RE10K, while the right half shows scenes from DL3DV. DP denotes DepthSplat, NP denotes NoPoSplat, and AP denotes AnySplat. GB denotes the gradient-based variant, and GF denotes the gradient-free variant. For each method and each scene, we select two reference views and render three novel views. All baselines use clean inputs, whereas our method uses the optimized adversarial examples as inputs.
Figure 4: Visualization of 3D Gaussian point clouds.
Figure 5: Loss comparison with and without DCT. GB denotes the gradient-based variant, and GF denotes the gradient-free variant.
ϵ
Method
RE10K
DL3DV
PSNR ↓
SSIM ↓
LPIPS ↑
CLIP ↓
DINO ↓
PSNR ↓
SSIM ↓
LPIPS ↑
CLIP ↓
DINO ↓
2/255
GB
23.65
0.777
0.350
0.937
0.933
15.61
0.617
0.246
0.956
0.957
GF
23.59
0.772
0.321
0.942
0.946
20.23
0.698
0.231
0.967
0.978
4/255
GB
5.96
0.195
0.504
0.711
0.571
9.71
0.455
0.378
0.907
0.898
GF
9.914
0.464
0.363
0.874
0.802
14.08
0.561
0.292
0.937
0.954
8/255
GB
4.38
0.050
0.663
0.554
0.060
8.09
0.384
0.493
0.858
0.726
Table 3: Victim model performance on the RE10K and DL3DV datasets (We select one scene per dataset and use DepthSplat) under different attack strengths ( ϵ values). GB denotes the gradient-based variant, and GF denotes the gradient-free variant.
Figure 6: Qualitative results under different attack strengths. The gray background is used to better visualize the all-white rendered images.
Appendix figures & tables5 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Victim Models
PSNR ↓
SSIM ↓
LPIPS ↑
CLIP ↓
DINO ↓
DepthSplat
21.09
0.710
0.228
0.956
0.930
DepthSplat+Ours
6.82 ( −67.7% )
0.223 ( −68.6% )
0.594 ( +160.5% )
0.677 ( −29.2% )
0.370 ( −60.2% )
NoPoSplat
22.50
0.781
0.165
0.957
0.938
NoPoSplat+Ours
8.82 ( −60.8% )
0.268 ( −65.7% )
0.692 ( +319.4% )
0.780 ( −18.5% )
0.598 ( −36.2% )
AnySplat
18.94
0.672
0.271
0.928
0.938
AnySplat+Ours
10.20 ( −46.1% )
0.422 ( −37.2% )
0.658 ( +142.8% )
0.763 ( −17.8% )
0.450 ( −52.0% )
Appendix
Table 4: Quantitative comparison of victim model performance with vs. without our white-box attack on the RE10K dataset. Percentages measure the degree of performance degradation.
Victim Models
PSNR ↓
SSIM ↓
LPIPS ↑
CLIP ↓
DINO ↓
DepthSplat
22.21
0.785
0.165
0.963
0.909
DepthSplat+Ours
6.54 ( −70.6% )
0.202 ( −74.3% )
0.625 ( +278.8% )
0.665 ( −30.9% )
0.205 ( −77.4% )
NoPoSplat
21.91
0.745
0.173
0.960
0.903
NoPoSplat+Ours
11.44 ( −47.8% )
0.249 ( −66.6% )
0.634 ( +266.5% )
0.787 ( −18.0% )
0.527 ( −41.6% )
AnySplat
19.34
0.639
0.285
0.950
0.923
AnySplat+Ours
14.43 ( −25.4% )
0.427 ( −33.2% )
0.523 ( +83.5% )
0.860 ( −9.5% )
0.849 ( −8.0% )
Appendix
Table 5: Quantitative comparison of victim model performance with vs. without our white-box attack on the DL3DV dataset. Percentages measure the degree of performance degradation.
Figure 7: Qualitative results for white-box attack on RE10K and DL3DV ( ϵ=8/255 ). The left half shows scenes from RE10K, while the right half shows scenes from DL3DV. The clean reconstruction results are shown in Fig. 3 .
Victim Model
Surrogate Model
PSNR ↓
SSIM ↓
LPIPS ↑
CLIP ↓
DINO ↓
DepthSplat
None
21.09
0.710
0.228
0.956
0.930
NoPoSplat
20.32
0.653
0.406
0.927
0.889
AnySplat
20.10
0.658
0.294
0.947
0.905
NoPoSplat
None
22.50
0.781
0.165
0.957
0.938
DepthSplat
22.36
0.733
0.310
0.934
0.894
AnySplat
22.02
0.743
0.265
0.946
0.911
Appendix
Table 6: Quantitative comparison of transfer attack performance on RE10K. Adversarial examples are generated on a surrogate model and transferred to the victim model. "None" means using the clean data.
Figure 8: Qualitative results for transfer attack on RE10K ( ϵ=8/255 ). Each row corresponds to a victim model, and the surrogate model is indicated in each column. The clean reconstruction results are shown in Fig. 3 .
Feed-forward 3D Gaussian Splatting models offer fast single-pass reconstruction,but scaling them to match per-scene optimization quality is fundamentally hindered by the scarcity of large-scale 3D annotations. A practical compromise is predict-then-refine,where post-prediction optimization compensates for the limited capacity of the feed-forward network. However,standard feed-forward 3DGS is trained solely for zero-step rendering error,ignoring whether its output constitutes a good initialization for the downstream optimizer. We present ForeSplat,an optimization-aware training framework that equips feed-forward 3DGS models to produce initializations explicitly designed for rapid,effective refinement. By offloading part of the scene-modeling burden to the optimizer,ForeSplat substantially reduces the capacity pressure on the feed-forward model,making high-quality reconstruction feasible even with compact networks. At its core is MetaGrad,a lightweight multi-anchor meta-gradient training rule that bypasses costly higher-order differentiation through the 3DGS optimizer. MetaGrad unrolls a short inner-loop refinement trajectory,samples anchor states,and back-propagates aggregated first-order gradients to the prediction head as a surrogate optimization-aware signal. This fine-tuning adds no inference cost and enables high-quality reconstruction within seconds after a few refinement steps. We instantiate ForeSplat on diverse backbones,including AnySplat,Pi3X,and a distilled variant tailored for edge deployment. Across all tested architectures,a ForeSplat-trained initialization converges in fewer refinement steps and reaches a higher peak reconstruction quality than its vanilla counterpart,even fully converged. The framework consistently bridges the gap between amortized prediction and per-scene optimization,establishing a practical path toward lightweight,high-fidelity 3D reconstruction.
Yuke Li, Weihang Liu, Cheng Zhang +8
ShanghaiTech University · GGU Technology Co., Ltd · Stereye
This work explores a simple yet powerful lightweight adapter design for feed-forward 3D Gaussian Splatting (3DGS). Existing methods typically apply complex, architecture-specific designs on top of the generic pipeline of image feature extraction → multi-view interaction → feature decoding. However, constrained by the scale bottleneck of 3D training data and the low-pass filtering effect of deep networks, these methods still fall short in cross-domain generalization and high-frequency geometric fidelity. To address these problems, we propose AdaptSplat, which demonstrates that without complex component engineering, introducing a single adapter of only 1.5M parameters into the generic architecture is sufficient to achieve superior performance. Specifically, we design a lightweight Frequency-Preserving Adapter (FPA) that extracts direction-aware high-frequency structural priors from the shallow features of a powerful vision foundation model backbone, and seamlessly integrates them into the generic pipeline via high-frequency positional encodings and adaptive residual modulation. This effectively compensates for the high-frequency attenuation caused by over-smoothing in deep features, improving the fitting accuracy of Gaussian primitives on complex surfaces and sharp boundaries. Extensive experiments demonstrate that AdaptSplat achieves state-of-the-art feed-forward reconstruction performance on multiple standard benchmarks, with stable generalization across domains. Code available at: https://github.com/xmw666/AdaptSplat.
3D Gaussian Splatting (3DGS) has emerged as a powerful paradigm for real-time and high-fidelity 3D reconstruction from posed images. However, recent studies reveal its vulnerability to adversarial corruptions in input views, where imperceptible yet consistent perturbations can drastically degrade rendering quality, increase training and rendering time, and inflate memory usage, even leading to server denial-of-service. In our work, to mitigate this issue, we begin by analyzing the distinct behaviors of adversarial perturbations in the low- and high-frequency components of input images using wavelet transforms. Based on this observation, we design a simple yet effective frequency-aware defense strategy that reconstructs training views by filtering high-frequency noise while preserving low-frequency content. This approach effectively suppresses adversarial artifacts while maintaining the authenticity of the original scene. Notably, it does not significantly impair training on clean data, achieving a desirable trade-off between robustness and performance on clean inputs. Through extensive experiments under a wide range of attack intensities on multiple benchmarks, we demonstrate that our method substantially enhances the robustness of 3DGS without access to clean ground-truth supervision. By highlighting and addressing the overlooked vulnerabilities of 3D Gaussian Splatting, our work paves the way for more robust and secure 3D reconstructions.
Yiran Qiao, Yiren Lu, Yunlai Zhou +4
Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland OH 44106, USA