When Understanding Becomes a Risk: Authenticity and Safety Risks in the Emerging Image Generation Paradigm

The realism of images generated by multimodal large language models (MLLMs), such as GPT Image2 and Nano Banana2, has improved rapidly in recent years. Compared with early generative models, current models have made clear progress in text rendering. They can produce high-quality images that closely resemble real-world application scenarios. The enhanced generation capabilities of current MLLMs pose increasingly severe challenges to AI-generated image detection. Detection is no longer limited to identifying obvious artifacts left by early generators. Instead, it requires systematic and realistic benchmarks for the new generation of generated content. However, most existing benchmarks are still built around early generative models and cannot fully evaluate the forensic challenges introduced by high-quality and multi-form generated images. To address this gap, this paper constructs a benchmark dataset for detecting images generated by MLLMs. The benchmark covers several realistic application scenarios and adopts three generation protocols to simulate direct generation, reference-based reconstruction, and local editing. Based on this benchmark, we evaluate detector degradation from traditional scenarios to MLLM-generated images and analyze false positive rates and false negative rates across three sample types, revealing the failure modes of existing methods. We further propose a structural-artifact-prior-guided dual-stream prompt framework (SAP-DSP) as a strong baseline. SAP-DSP uses dual-stream prompt learning and structure-aware routing fusion to improve representation learning. Extensive experiments show that the proposed benchmark exposes the performance degradation of existing detectors on high-quality generated images, while SAP-DSP achieves more stable detection results on this benchmark. Our code and dataset are publicly available at https://github.com/xbrainnet/SAP-DSP.

As image generation models become increasingly capable of producing highly realistic content, traditional forensic techniques are struggling to keep up. This paper investigates whether MLLMs can instead be used as a form of forensic analysis by identifying synthetic media. Specifically, the study aims to determine whether these models detect fake images by recognising physical inconsistencies, or whether they rely on digital artefacts such as embedded watermarks. Six MLLMs (GPT-4o, GPT-5, GPT-5.2, Gemini 2.5, Gemini 3, and Seed 1.6) are benchmarked using a dataset of 400 images. Fifty images are authentic photographs, while the remaining 350 are generated using seven leading image models: Gemini 3, Gemini 2.5, Flux.2 Pro, GPT-Image-1, GPT-Image-1.5, Seedream 4.0, and Seedream 4.5. The evaluation is structured in three stages: single-image classification, pairwise comparison, and a focused "self-detection" experiment on Gemini. Several MLLMs achieved a high detection accuracy, with GPT-5.2 reaching a peak of 97.9% in the pairwise experiment, against specific generators and an overall mean pairwise accuracy of 82.5% by identifying structural or physical inconsistencies within images. However, results from the self-detection experiment indicate that the presence of invisible SynthID watermarks leads to a 10% reduction in Gemini's detection accuracy compared to the clean control group. One possible explanation is that SynthID embedding reduces some of the visible artefacts the models rely on for detection. These results imply that MLLMs can detect structural artefacts without relying on watermarks, but performance varies substantially across model generations. The findings also suggest that SynthID embedding may suppress some of the structural artefacts used during detection.

As Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) transition toward natively unified architectures, evaluating their safety in synergistic harmful image-text generation tasks becomes a critical challenge. Unlike unimodal threats, synergistic risks emerge when text and image modalities are coordinated to produce harm that significantly exceeds their individual components. We introduce UnifiedAttack, a novel benchmark designed to evaluate LMM safety in collaborative scenarios by focusing on the harmfulness gain achieved through cross-modal synergy. The benchmark incorporates samples filtered for their multimodal potential alongside a novel subset of synthesized disinformation queries. To verify identified vulnerabilities, we propose a synergistic hijacking framework featuring In-Context Reskinning (ICR) and Cognitive Planning Injection (CPI). ICR utilizes few-shot learning to wrap adversarial intent in benign virtual shells to desensitize safety filters, while CPI hijacks the reasoning path by enforcing a plan-then-execute paradigm. By compelling the system to commit to a neutral logical plan, we exploit its internal drive for consistency to induce the synchronized generation of harmful multimodal content. Extensive evaluations on state-of-the-art architectures demonstrate that UnifiedAttack consistently bypasses modern alignment. Our findings reveal that the structural helpfulness and logical coherence of unified models can be systematically weaponized, highlighting the urgent need for logic-aware defenses in synergistic generation tasks. Code is available at https://github.com/bingjunluo/UnifiedAttack .