Advances in diffusion-based video generation models, while significantly improving human animation, poses threats of misuse through the creation of fake videos from a specific person's photo and text prompts. Recent efforts have focused on adversarial attacks that introduce crafted perturbations to protect images from diffusion-based models. However, most existing approaches target image generation, while relatively few explicitly address image-to-video diffusion models (VDMs), and most primarily focus on UNet-based architectures. Hence, their effectiveness against Diffusion Transformer (DiT) models remains largely under-explored, as these models demonstrate improved feature retention, and stronger temporal consistency due to larger capacity and advanced attention mechanisms. In this work, we introduce Anti-I2V, a novel defense against malicious human image-to-video generation, applicable across diverse diffusion backbones. Instead of restricting noise updates to the RGB space, Anti-I2V operates in both the Lab* and frequency domains, improving robustness and concentrating on salient pixels. We then identify the network layers that capture the most distinct semantic features during the denoising process to design appropriate training objectives that maximize degradation of temporal coherence and generation fidelity. Through extensive validation, Anti-I2V demonstrates state-of-the-art defense performance against diverse video diffusion models, offering an effective solution to the problem.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Overall pipeline of Anti-I2V . We first generate a reference video input by captions from leverage LVLM [ 9 ] and user-provided image. Then we integrate the IRA and IRC losses with the vanilla training loss as the final objective. The noise is iteratively optimized through both L∗a∗b∗ and frequency space.
Figure 2: PCA visualization of features in each layer. Features from each block are visualized at timestep 500. The first row shows features from OpenSora [ 69 ] , while the second row shows features from CogVideoX [ 24 ] . For clarity, only selected layers are highlighted.
CelebV-Text
UCF101
Model
Method
ISM ↓
C-FIQA ↓
Q-A(F) ↓
Q-A(V) ↓
DINO ↓
ISM ↓
C-FIQA ↓
Q-A(F) ↓
Q-A(V) ↓
DINO ↓
CogVideoX-5B
Clean
0.721
0.522
0.746
0.802
0.828
0.466
0.373
0.361
0.436
0.801
SDS+ [ 63 ]
0.591
0.482
0.473
0.563
0.754
0.381
0.291
0.286
0.344
0.754
SDS- [ 63 ]
0.607
0.497
0.511
0.594
0.747
0.386
0.298
0.313
0.393
0.760
AdvDM [ 29 ]
0.583
0.473
0.463
0.543
0.748
0.370
0.292
0.271
0.342
0.753
MIST [ 30 ]
0.561
0.463
0.476
0.577
0.750
0.355
0.290
0.262
0.340
0.751
Table 1: Quantitative comparison of Anti-I2V against baseline protections. ↓ indicates that lower values correspond to poorer video quality and thus stronger protection. The best scores are highlighted in bold , while the second-best results are underlined .
Figure 3: Quanlitative comparison of Anti-I2V against baseline protections against different video generation models on UCF101. The columns present the generated outputs from the models under different adversarial attack methods.
CogVideoX-5B [ 24 ] - OpenSora 1.2 [ 69 ]
CogVideoX-5B [ 24 ] - DynamiCrafter [ 61 ]
Method
ISM ↓
C-FIQA ↓
Q-A(F) ↓
Q-A(V) ↓
DINO ↓
ISM ↓
C-FIQA ↓
Q-A(F) ↓
Q-A(V) ↓
DINO ↓
SDS+ [ 63 ]
0.606
0.493
0.514
0.582
0.764
0.309
0.428
0.432
0.519
0.614
SDS- [ 63 ]
0.568
0.504
0.563
0.641
0.757
0.286
0.422
0.493
0.579
0.664
AdvDM [ 29 ]
0.608
0.491
0.506
0.593
0.754
0.337
0.428
0.389
0.511
0.631
MIST [ 30 ]
0.547
0.490
0.522
0.636
0.726
0.289
0.440
0.384
0.518
0.633
VGMShield [ 43 ]
0.566
0.503
0.548
0.632
0.751
0.322
0.462
0.387
0.504
0.688
Table 2: Quantitative comparison of Anti-I2V against baseline video protection methods. Lower values indicate stronger protection (poorer video quality). Best scores are bold , second-best are underlined .
Method
ISM ↓
Q-A (F) ↓
Q-A (V) ↓
DINO-SIM ↓
Ours (RGB)
0.55
0.50
0.58
0.76
+ DiffPure [ 39 ]
0.33 (-0.22)
0.49 (-0.01)
0.59 (+0.01)
0.74 (-0.02)
+ GrIDPure [ 68 ]
0.60 (+0.05)
0.70 (+0.20)
0.75 (+0.17)
0.84 (+0.08)
+ Impress [ 6 ]
0.58 (+0.03)
0.52 (+0.02)
0.61 (+0.03)
0.76 (-0.00)
+ JPEG Compression
0.57 (+0.02)
0.51 (+0.01)
0.58 (-0.00)
0.78 (+0.02)
+ Gaussian Blur
0.63 (+0.08)
0.43 (-0.07)
0.51 (-0.07)
0.80 (+0.04)
Table 3: Quantitative results against various transformations and purifications. Green indicates degrees of improvements, while Red indicates degrees of performance drop.
Method
ISM ↓
Q-A (F) ↓
Q-A (V) ↓
DINO-SIM ↓
RGB
0.582
0.624
0.692
0.788
L∗a∗b∗
0.672
0.707
0.765
0.833
Frequency
0.633
0.576
0.641
0.802
RGB + L∗a∗b∗
0.613
0.525
0.618
0.784
RGB + Frequency
0.587
0.567
0.645
0.796
L∗a∗b∗ + Frequency (DSP)
0.582
0.521
0.610
0.781
Table 4: Quantitative results of perturbation optimization spaces.
Budget
ISM ↓
C-FIQA ↓
Q-A (F) ↓
Q-A (V) ↓
DINO ↓
8/255
0.469
0.456
0.485
0.567
0.775
16/255
0.462
0.448
0.481
0.562
0.760
32/255
0.473
0.468
0.491
0.588
0.775
Table 5: Analysis of perturbation budget for L∗a∗b∗ space.
CogVideoX-5B - Wan2.2-TI2V-5B
Method
ISM ↓
C-FIQA ↓
Q-A(F) ↓
Q-A(V) ↓
DINO ↓
Clean
0.672
0.517
0.841
0.899
0.815
SDS+
0.538
0.478
0.512
0.622
0.741
SDS-
0.608
0.504
0.573
0.667
0.766
AdvDM
0.544
0.456
0.528
0.624
0.743
MIST
0.635
0.476
0.574
0.678
0.790
Table 6: Quantitative comparison of transferbility from CogVideoX-5B to Wan2.2-TI2V-5B.
Loss Type
ISM ↓
Q-A (F) ↓
Q-A (V) ↓
DINO ↓
[A1] : Denoising Loss
0.582
0.521
0.610
0.781
[A2] : [A1] + IRC
0.535
0.518
0.607
0.776
[A3] : [A1] + IRA-VAE (U)
0.514
0.507
0.583
0.774
[A4] : [A1] + IRA-VAE (T)
0.507
0.503
0.580
0.771
[A5] : [A1] + IRA-Denoiser (U)
0.507
0.486
0.572
0.775
[A6] : [A1] + IRA-Denoiser (T)
0.493
0.484
0.575
0.772
Table 7: Ablation Study of Loss Components : Comparison of different loss components on performance metrics. (U) denotes untargeted attack, while (T) denotes targeted attack.
Setting
ISM ↓
Q-A (F) ↓
Q-A (V) ↓
DINO ↓
Full (27+)
0.458
0.479
0.560
0.762
Last-3
0.462
0.481
0.562
0.760
Last-1
0.460
0.486
0.565
0.762
Last-2
0.460
0.487
0.568
0.767
Last-4
0.470
0.489
0.570
0.764
Table 8: Ablation on IRC Layer Selection . We compare applying IRC to different subsets of layers. Full applies IRC to all layers after the 27 th layer. Last- k applies IRC only to the final k layers. Bold indicates the best performance, and underline indicates the second best.
Method
Metric ↓
Clean
Anti-I2V
CogVideoX [ 24 ]
ISM
0.646
0.407
C-FIQA
0.519
0.462
Q-A (Frame)
0.771
0.474
Q-A (Video)
0.825
0.553
DINO
0.869
0.776
DynamiCrafter [ 61 ]
ISM
0.558
0.208
Table 9: Quantitative comparisons of protections with different set of prompts. ↓ indicates that a lower value of the metric signifies poorer video quality and thus better protection.
Method
SSIM ↑
LPIPS ↓
PSNR ↑
SDS (+)
0.84
0.206
32.5
SDS (-)
0.86
0.192
33.7
AdvDM
0.84
0.205
32.6
MIST
0.82
0.271
31.4
VGMShield
0.84
0.191
33.2
Ours
0.80
0.200
32.2
Table 10: Ablation Study of Perturbation Visibility : Similarity metrics between perturbed images and their original images of different methods.
Figure 4: Qualitative comparison of adversarial attack methods against against CogVideoX [ 24 ] . The first column shows the reference frame. The remaining columns present the generated outputs from models.
Figure 5: Qualitative comparison of adversarial attack methods against against CogVideoX [ 24 ] . The first column shows the reference frame. The remaining columns present the generated outputs from models.
Figure 6: Qualitative comparison of adversarial attack methods against against DynamiCrafter [ 61 ] . The first column shows the reference frame. The remaining columns present the generated outputs from models.
Figure 7: Qualitative comparison of adversarial attack methods against against DynamiCrafter [ 61 ] . The first column shows the reference frame. The remaining columns present the generated outputs from models.
The rapid advancement of video generation models has led to the increasing misuse of image-to-video (I2V) models. Although substantial progress has been made in detecting AI-generated videos, proactive defenses against I2V models remain underexplored. In particular, current proactive defenses against I2V models predominantly rely on gradient-based adversarial attacks, which require defenders to possess GPUs with substantial memory resources (VRAM) to generate adversarial examples. To address this issue, we propose I2VShield, a privacy protection method based on generative adversarial attacks tailored to Diffusion Transformer (DiT)-based I2V models. The proposed method primarily consists of two components: (1) a text-adaptive perturbation generation framework integrating adversarial learning to mitigate computational overhead while maintaining visual imperceptibility; and (2) an untargeted Multimodal Attention Disruption (MAD) attack that exploits the inherent vulnerabilities of DiT-based I2V models, maximizing the deviation of the internal attention features from their clean states. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our approach achieves highly competitive protection performance across various datasets and mainstream DiT-based I2V models, particularly in disrupting spatiotemporal coherence, while substantially reducing computational costs.
Yimao Guo, Zuomin Qu, Wei Lu
School of Computer Science and Engineering, Sun Yat-sen University Ministry of Education Key Laboratory of Information Technology Guangdong Province Key Laboratory of Information Security Technology Guangzhou 510006, China · Guangdong Province Key Laboratory of Information Security Technology Guangzhou 510006, China · State Key Laboratory of HVDC, China Southern Power Grid Electric Power Research Institute
Image-to-video (I2V) generation has the potential for societal harm because it enables the unauthorized animation of static images to create realistic deepfakes. While existing defenses effectively protect against static image manipulation, extending these to I2V generation remains underexplored and non-trivial. In this paper, we systematically analyze why modern I2V models are highly robust against naive image-level adversarial attacks (i.e., immunization). We observe that the video encoding process rapidly dilutes the adversarial noise across future frames, and the continuous text-conditioned guidance actively overrides the intended disruptive effect of the immunization. Building on these findings, we propose the Immune2V framework which enforces temporally balanced latent divergence at the encoder level to prevent signal dilution, and aligns intermediate generative representations with a precomputed collapse-inducing trajectory to counteract the text-guidance override. Extensive experiments demonstrate that Immune2V produces substantially stronger and more persistent degradation than adapted image-level baselines under the same imperceptibility budget.
Zeqian Long, Ozgur Kara, Haotian Xue +2
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign · Georgia Institute of Technology
Image-to-video (I2V) diffusion models can animate a single reference image into high-quality, subject-consistent videos, posing threats of misuse as anyone can turn personal photos into fabricated videos without consent. A promising solution is to proactively add an adversarial perturbation to the image before release, such that videos generated from it would be unfaithful or visually corrupted. However, due to an insufficient understanding of what governs how subsequent frames read the reference image in modern I2V models, existing protections struggle to offer strong protection under common perturbation budgets. In this paper, we approach the problem by exploring this underlying reading mechanism. Through a convex geometric analysis, we theoretically identify the spread of the reference value vectors as a key factor governing this reading process, and empirically find that even a mild contraction of this spread can severely degrade the generated video, making it an efficient lever for protection. Guided by this insight, we propose LETHE, a novel protection method that directly disrupts this reading process. LETHE pairs two complementary objectives, where a value collapse objective drives the reference value vectors toward uniformity, while an attention attraction objective draws subsequent frames toward these collapsed tokens to amplify corruption. We further construct two human-centric I2V protection benchmarks and conduct extensive experiments with multiple modern I2V models, which demonstrate the state-of-the-art protection performance and versatility of LETHE.
Boheng Li, Yueming Xing, Yiming Li +2
Nanyang Technological University · Wuhan University · SiliconProspect AI