Generative Adversarial Perturbations with Cross-paradigm Transferability on Localized Crowd Counting
Organizations: University of South Florida, Tampa, Florida, USA
Abstract
State-of-the-art crowd counting and localization are primarily modeled using two paradigms: density maps and point regression. Given the field's security ramifications, there is active interest in model robustness against adversarial attacks. Recent studies have demonstrated transferability across density-map-based approaches via adversarial patches, but cross-paradigm attacks (i.e., across both density map-based models and point regression-based models) remain unexplored. We introduce a novel adversarial framework that compromises both density map and point regression architectural paradigms through a comprehensive multi-task loss optimization. For point-regression models, we employ scene-density-specific high-confidence logit suppression; for density-map approaches, we use peak-targeted density map suppression. Both are combined with model-agnostic perceptual constraints to ensure that perturbations are effective and imperceptible to the human eye. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our attack, achieving on average a 7X increase in Mean Absolute Error compared to clean images while maintaining competitive visual quality, and successfully transferring across seven state-of-the-art crowd models with transfer ratios ranging from 0.55 to 1.69. Our approach strikes a balance between attack effectiveness and imperceptibility compared to state-of-the-art transferable attack strategies. The source code is available at https://github.com/simurgh7/CrowdGen
Figures & tables
| Source Model | Target Model | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SASNet | P2PNet | FIDTM | PET | HMoDE | APGCC | Gramformer | |
| SASNet [ 32 ] | 300.82/1.0 | 420.17/1.40 | 338.67/1.13 | 364.59/1.21 | 249.61/0.83 | 397.96/1.32 | 257.54/0.86 |
| P2PNet [ 31 ] | 281.00/0.89 | 316.58/1.0 | 268.90/0.85 | 255.61/0.81 | 189.79/0.60 | 224.67/0.71 | 221.08/0.70 |
| FIDTM [ 18 ] | 313.45/1.21 | 426.89/1.64 | 353.08/1.0 | 373.70/1.44 | 250.52/0.96 | 407.76/1.57 | 277.25/1.07 |
| PET [ 21 ] | 315.00/1.03 | 430.91/1.41 | 350.84/1.15 | 305.43/1.0 | 252.33/0.83 | 406.19/1.33 | 269.92/0.88 |
| HMoDE [ 12 ] | 301.36/1.21 | 420.71/ 1.69 | 338.82/1.36 | 366.16/1.47 | 249.19/1.0 | 397.48/1.60 | 257.62/1.03 |
| Source Model | Target Model | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SASNet | P2PNet | FIDTM | PET | HMoDE | APGCC | Gramformer | |
| SASNet [ 32 ] | 619.74/1.0 | 819.59/1.32 | 741.62/1.20 | 843.36/1.36 | 526.73/0.85 | 808.79/1.31 | 613.61/0.99 |
| P2PNet [ 31 ] | 615.04/0.93 | 663.95/1.0 | 632.00/0.95 | 671.59/1.01 | 437.98/ 0.66 | 686.58/1.03 | 527.64/0.79 |
| FIDTM [ 18 ] | 639.64/0.83 | 833.09/1.09 | 767.54/1.0 | 846.11/1.10 | 530.23/0.69 | 819.93/1.07 | 647.00/0.84 |
| PET [ 21 ] | 630.50/0.83 | 831.23/1.09 | 747.29/0.98 | 763.30/1.0 | 530.11/0.69 | 813.33/1.07 | 621.62/0.81 |
| HMoDE [ 12 ] | 619.96/1.18 | 819.81/1.55 | 741.44/1.41 | 843.42/ 1.60 | 527.32/1.0 | 808.13/1.53 | 614.00/1.16 |
| Overall | Sparse (<100) | Moderate (100-1000) | Dense (>1000) | |||||||||||||
| Method | MAE | MR | PSNR | SSIM | MAE | MR | PSNR | SSIM | MAE | MR | PSNR | SSIM | MAE | MR | PSNR | SSIM |
| Clean | 28.1 | 4.28 | N/A | N/A | 2.83 | 5.06 | N/A | N/A | 16.69 | 3.75 | N/A | N/A | 128.0 | 7.82 | N/A | N/A |
| DI- 2 FGSM [ 42 ] | 77.14 | 11.44 | 20.59 | 0.836 | 4.33 | 6.09 | 23.65 | 0.924 | 56.44 | 11.30 | 20.78 | 0.843 | 273.0 | 15.47 | 17.43 | 0.736 |
| Admix [ 37 ] | 69.21 | 9.73 | 20.80 | 0.841 | 2.83 | 4.60 | 24.14 | 0.930 | 48.61 | 9.44 | 21.00 | 0.848 | 260.8 | 14.71 | 17.48 | 0.738 |
| FIA [ 38 ] | 68.96 | 10.27 | 20.59 | 0.837 | 3.67 | 5.23 | 23.65 | 0.924 | 50.88 | 10.18 | 20.78 | 0.844 | 241.0 | 13.73 | 17.43 | 0.736 |
| SVRE [ 43 ] | 77.83 | 11.76 | 20.58 | 0.836 | 4.83 | 6.72 | 23.64 | 0.924 | 58.35 | 11.68 | 20.78 | 0.843 | 264.6 | 15.11 | 17.43 | 0.736 |
| Loss Equations | MR(%) | PSNR |
|---|---|---|
| 45.35 | 17.67 | |
| 59.47 | 17.67 | |
| 60.46 | 17.75 | |
| 60.26 | 17.65 | |
| 60.89 | 17.47 | |
| 44.93 | 17.71 |
Adversarial Attacks
Adversarial attacks exploit crafted inputs, poisoned data, or system interactions to manipulate AI predictions, behavior, privacy, or reliability.
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