SABER: A Stealthy Agentic Black-Box Attack Framework for Vision-Language-Action Models

Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models have shown strong capabilities in controlling robots across diverse manipulation tasks. However, their adversarial robustness remains largely underexplored, and exploiting this weakness can lead to physical-world harm. Existing attacks on VLA models often rely on pixel-space perturbations or white-box access, resulting in noticeable artifacts and limited deployability in real-world robotic systems. In this work, we propose DURA, a diffusion-based unrestricted robotic attack that generates visually natural adversarial patches for VLA models. DURA supports both white-box and black-box attack settings, where the black-box setting requires only the predicted actions of the victim model. By optimizing along the latent trajectory of a pretrained diffusion model, DURA generates visually natural patches while steering the robot toward attacker-specified target actions. Extensive experiments in both simulation and the real physical world show that DURA consistently outperforms existing methods. Our findings expose a safety risk for physically deployed VLA models and call for stronger defenses.

Recently, Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models have revolutionized robotic manipulation by seamlessly integrating visual perception, language understanding, and action generation in an end-to-end learning framework. However, since these models are designed to interact directly with the physical world and humans, their security is critical, and even small vulnerabilities can lead to catastrophic failures. In this work, we propose the Universal Adversarial Object, a sphere with optimized surface texture that significantly degrades task success rates when placed within the robot's field of view. Specifically, our approach introduces a multi-level attack framework that jointly disrupts trajectory planning, task execution, and action control. We validate our method in both simulated and real-world robotic settings. Experimental results demonstrate that the adversarial object reduces the average task success rates by 31.2%-39.9% for two representative VLA models (Pi0 and RDT), with success rates dropping to near zero in complex scenarios. Index Terms--Vision-Language-Action models, adversarial attack, robotic security, universal adversarial object

Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models have significant potential to enable general-purpose robotic systems for a range of vision-language tasks. However, the performance of VLA-based robots is highly sensitive to the precise wording of language instructions, and it remains difficult to predict when such robots will fail. We propose Quality Diversity (QD) optimization as a natural framework for red-teaming embodied models, and present Q-DIG (Quality Diversity for Diverse Instruction Generation), which performs red-teaming by scalably identifying diverse, natural language task descriptions that induce failures while remaining task-relevant. Q-DIG integrates QD techniques with Vision-Language Models (VLMs) to generate a broad spectrum of adversarial instructions that expose meaningful vulnerabilities in VLA behavior. Our results across multiple simulation benchmarks show that Q-DIG finds more diverse and meaningful failure modes compared to baseline methods, and that fine-tuning VLAs on the generated instructions improves task success rates. Furthermore, results from a user study highlight that Q-DIG generates prompts judged to be more natural and human-like than those from baselines. Finally, real-world evaluations of Q-DIG prompts show results consistent with simulation, and fine-tuning VLAs on the generated prompts further success rates on unseen instructions. Together, these findings suggest that Q-DIG is a promising approach for identifying vulnerabilities and improving the robustness of VLA-based robots. Our anonymous project website is at qdigvla.github.io.