When Surfaces Lie: Exploiting Wrinkle-Induced Attention Shift to Attack Vision-Language Models
Abstract
Visual-Language Models (VLMs) have demonstrated exceptional cross-modal understanding across various tasks, including zero-shot classification, image captioning, and visual question answering. However, their robustness to physically plausible non-rigid deformations-such as wrinkles on flexible surfaces-remains poorly understood. In this work, we propose a parametric structural perturbation method inspired by the mechanics of three-dimensional fabric wrinkles. Specifically, our method generates photorealistic non-rigid perturbations by constructing multi-scale wrinkle fields and integrating displacement field distortion with surface-consistent appearance variations. To achieve an optimal balance between visual naturalness and adversarial effectiveness, we design a hierarchical fitness function in a low-dimensional parameter space and employ an optimization-based search strategy. We evaluate our approach using a two-stage framework: perturbations are first optimized on a zero-shot classification proxy task and subsequently assessed for transferability on generative tasks. Experimental results demonstrate that our method significantly degrades the performance of various state-of-the-art VLMs, consistently outperforming baselines in both image captioning and visual question-answering tasks.
Figures & tables
| Method | OpenCLIP ViT-B/16 | Meta-CLIP ViT-L/14 | EVA-CLIP ViT-G/14 | OpenAI CLIP ViT-L/14 | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ACC (%) | GPT-4o | ACC (%) | GPT-4o | ACC (%) | GPT-4o | ACC (%) | GPT-4o | |
| Clean | 97 | 3.65 | 98 | 3.65 | 98 | 3.65 | 93 | 3.65 |
| Natural Light Attack ( Hsiao et al., 2024 ) | 94 ( ) | 2.32 ( ) | 97 ( ) | 2.14 ( ) | 97 ( ) | 2.16 ( ) | 93 (–) | 2.07 ( ) |
| Shadow Attack ( Zhong et al., 2022 ) | 84 ( ) | 2.11 ( ) | 82 ( ) | 1.91 ( ) | 95 ( ) | 2.03 ( ) | 79 ( ) | 1.78 ( ) |
| ITA ( Liu et al., 2025 ) | 46 ( ) | 2.11 ( ) | 64 ( ) | 2.15 ( ) | 84 ( ) | 2.17 ( ) | 51 ( ) | 2.15 ( ) |
| Ours (random) | 52 ( ) | 2.71 ( ) | 68 ( ) | 2.47 ( ) | 75 ( ) | 2.89 ( ) | 53 ( ) | 2.64 ( ) |
| Image Encoder | Models | Params | Clean | Natural Light Attack ( Hsiao et al., 2024 ) | Shadow Attack ( Zhong et al., 2022 ) | ITA ( Liu et al., 2025 ) | Ours (random) | Ours (best) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| OpenAI CLIP ViT-L/14 | LLaVA-1.5 | 7B | 78.60 | 77.00 ( ) | 74.60 ( ) | 63.73 ( ) | 56.58 ( ) | 54.51 ( ) |
| LLaVA-1.6 | 7B | 72.10 | 71.70 ( ) | 71.17 ( ) | 61.60 ( ) | 54.45 ( ) | 53.15 ( ) | |
| OpenFlamingo | 3B | 70.20 | 69.53 ( ) | 67.80 ( ) | 53.93 ( ) | 33.59 ( ) | 30.18 ( ) | |
| Blip-2 (FlanT5 XL , ViT-L) | 3.4B | 75.10 | 70.77 ( ) | 68.57 ( ) | 60.93 ( ) | 61.01 ( ) | 58.21 ( ) | |
| EVA-CLIP ViT-G/14 | Blip-2 (FlanT5 XL ) | 4.1B | 74.96 | 71.27 ( ) | 68.80 ( ) | 62.01 ( ) | 59.48 ( ) | 57.08 ( ) |
| InstructBLIP (FlanT5 XL ) | 4.1B | 76.50 | 72.07 ( ) | 69.77 ( ) | 63.20 ( ) | 63.92 ( ) | 56.57 ( ) |
| Image Encoder | Models | Params | Clean | Natural Light Attack ( Hsiao et al., 2024 ) | Shadow Attack ( Zhong et al., 2022 ) | ITA ( Liu et al., 2025 ) | Ours (random) | Ours (best) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| OpenAI CLIP ViT-L/14 | LLaVA-1.5 | 7B | 68.00 | 68.00 ( ) | 67.00 ( ) | 48.00 ( ) | 55.00 ( ) | 45.00 ( ) |
| LLaVA-1.6 | 7B | 64.00 | 63.00 ( ) | 64.00 ( ) | 43.00 ( ) | 47.00 ( ) | 40.00 ( ) | |
| OpenFlamingo | 3B | 45.00 | 39.00 ( ) | 44.00 ( ) | 19.00 ( ) | 20.00 ( ) | 14.00 ( ) | |
| Blip-2 (FlanT5 XL , ViT-L) | 3.4B | 63.00 | 58.00 ( ) | 50.00 ( ) | 38.00 ( ) | 36.00 ( ) | 32.00 ( ) | |
| EVA-CLIP ViT-G/14 | Blip-2 (FlanT5 XL ) | 4.1B | 54.00 | 53.00 ( ) | 54.00 ( ) | 33.00 ( ) | 32.00 ( ) | 28.00 ( ) |
| InstructBLIP (FlanT5 XL ) | 4.1B | 68.00 | 64.00 ( ) | 62.00 ( ) | 44.00 ( ) | 45.00 ( ) | 41.00 ( ) |
Adversarial Attacks on VLMs
Adversarial attacks on vision-language models exploit images, text, and multimodal interactions to manipulate outputs, bypass safety, or degrade reliability.
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