Therefore I am. I Think

We provide evidence of performative chain-of-thought (CoT) in reasoning models, where a model becomes strongly confident in its final answer, but continues generating tokens without revealing its internal belief. Our analysis compares activation probing, early forced answering, and a CoT monitor across two large models (DeepSeek-R1 671B & GPT-OSS 120B) and find task difficulty-specific differences: The model's final answer is decodable from activations far earlier in CoT than a monitor is able to say, especially for easy recall-based MMLU questions. We contrast this with genuine reasoning in difficult multihop GPQA-Diamond questions. Despite this, inflection points (e.g., backtracking, 'aha' moments) occur almost exclusively in responses where probes show large belief shifts, suggesting these behaviors track genuine uncertainty rather than learned "reasoning theater." Finally, probe-guided early exit reduces tokens by up to 80% on MMLU and 30% on GPQA-Diamond with similar accuracy, positioning attention probing as an efficient tool for detecting performative reasoning and enabling adaptive computation.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning is the dominant paradigm for inference-time scaling in language models, yet the causal influence of individual steps on the final answer remains poorly understood. In this work, we use answer logits at the end of each reasoning step to estimate each step's causal importance to the final answer and intermediate guesses, shedding light on the answer formation process of several reasoning model families. Across diverse tasks, we find that reasoning typically crosses a commitment boundary, a sharp transition from transient intermediate guesses to a stable, high-confidence answer. This transition often happens in a single step, well before the model's reasoning block ends, and is followed by epiphenomenal CoT steps that leave the final answer probability unaltered. Using attention probes, we show that answer-formation stages can be linearly decoded from the activations of intermediate reasoning steps with high accuracy, showing robust generalization to unseen reasoning tasks. We leverage this property for early-exiting reasoning blocks at the commitment boundary location, reducing the length of CoTs up to 55% with negligible impact on model performance.

As chain of thought (CoT) has become central to scaling reasoning capabilities in large language models (LLMs), it has also emerged as a promising tool for interpretability, suggesting the opportunity to understand model decisions through verbalized reasoning. However, the utility of CoT toward interpretability depends upon its faithfulness---whether the model's stated reasoning reflects the underlying decision process. We provide mechanistic evidence that instruction-tuned models often determine their answer before generating CoT. Training linear probes on residual stream activations at the last token before CoT, we can predict the model's final answer with >0.9 AUC on most tasks. We find that these directions are not only predictive, but also causal: steering activations along the probe direction often flips model answers, with flip rates substantially exceeding norm-matched orthogonal baselines across most model-dataset pairs. When steering induces incorrect answers, we observe two distinct failure modes: confabulation (fabricating false premises) and non-entailment (stating correct premises but drawing unsupported conclusions). While post-hoc reasoning may be instrumentally useful when the model has a correct pre-CoT belief, these failure modes suggest it can result in undesirable behaviors when reasoning from a false belief.