Perceptual misalignment of texture representations in convolutional neural networks

In computational vision science, Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) have emerged as a popular model of biological vision because of the alignment they can exhibit with neural and behavioral data in humans and animals. However, it remains unclear to what extent this alignment persists for visual tasks that extend beyond the canonical object recognition paradigm based on well defined semantic content. In this study, we diverge from the common object-centric view by focusing on another aspect of vision: texture perception. We consider textures of different complexity generated with three different algorithms from the same source images. Using a rank-based statistic, we quantify the information encoded in the internal representations of a CNN and three Vision Transformers (ViTs), and we compare the similarity of these representations to those inferred from human psychophysics data. We find that the representation of textures is aligned in different ViTs, but not between the ViTs and the CNN; that ViTs form similar representations for textures of different complexity; that human performance in recognizing textures can be better predicted from ViTs representations rather than CNN representations. Taken together, these results suggest that ViTs may capture more faithfully than CNNs how texture patterns are visually processed by humans, and that the representations of texture stimuli in computational models may be driven by the network architecture.

Convolutional neural networks (CNNs) and vision transformers are both used to model the human visual system, but whether the two architectures diverge at a specific point in network depth is unclear. We compared six CNNs and two vision transformers by computing the Pearson correlation (r) between each model's predicted and measured EEG response at every layer or block, in ten participants viewing 200 natural images. For the transformer models, we also tested four token representations, from the classification (CLS) token alone to CLS combined with all patch tokens. CNNs showed strongest correspondence at the earliest layers, weakening at deeper layers, particularly later in the post-stimulus response. Transformers instead sustained strong correspondence at their deepest blocks, though not at their earliest ones. This advantage depended on token representation: pooled representations gave weaker peak correlations (r approx 0.48-0.51) than representations retaining all patch tokens (r=0.640 for CLIP-ViT-B/32, r=0.656 for DINOv2-ViT-B/14). Controlled comparisons showed architecture, not training objective, drove this effect: MoCo-v1 and ResNet-50 (matched architecture) performed nearly identically (r=0.673, 0.670), whereas CLIP-RN50 and CLIP-ViT-B/32 (matched objective) diverged until patch tokens were preserved. We propose that CNN training's classification bottleneck compresses brain-relevant information at depth, unlike transformers' self-attention and non-classification objectives. A spatial topography analysis showed a common occipital-dominant pattern across all models, indicating these differences reflect signal strength and persistence rather than distinct brain regions. Patch-preserving transformer representations sustain brain-predictive correspondence where CNNs collapse.

Deep neural networks trained on natural images are shown to produce outputs consistent with human observers for brightness illusions. While this phenomenon has been documented across architectures, all evidence, to date, is measured at the output level: restored pixels, decoded trajectories, or classification decisions. Whether these models actually represent illusions internally, and if so where and how, remains unknown. We show that denoising models develop illusion-sensitive representations at specific internal layers, across varied architectures. Specifically, we identify the layers and channels that discriminate illusory from physically matched control regions. We show that the denoising objective is a more important driver of the effect than the architecture. On domain-appropriate stimuli, these activations track a validated psychophysical model of human brightness perception (FLODOG; Spearman $ρ\geq 0.70$) and scale monotonically with parametric illusion strength. Leveraging these findings, we provide causal evidence via channel ablation showing that illusion-sensitive channels specifically and substantially affect the internal signal. Yet injecting these representations into the generation pipeline produces no measurable pixel shift across all tested architectures; we term such representations perceptual phantoms: active in internal processing yet invisible to any output-based evaluation. While related internal-output dissociations have been characterized in language models, this is the first such characterization for perceptual representations in denoising vision models.