For Large Language Models (LLMs) to be reliably deployed, models must effectively know when not to answer: abstain. Reasoning models, in particular, have gained attention for impressive performance on complex tasks. However, reasoning models have been shown to have worse abstention abilities. Taking the vulnerabilities of reasoning models into account, we propose our Query Misalignment Framework. Hallucinations resulting in failed abstention can be reinterpreted as LLMs answering the wrong question (rather than answering a question incorrectly). Based on this framework, we develop a new class of state-of-the-art abstention methods called Trace Inversion. First, we generate the reasoning trace of a model. Based on only the trace, we then reconstruct the most likely query that the model responded to. Finally, we compare the initial query with the reconstructed query. Low similarity score between the initial query and reconstructed query suggests that the model likely answered the question incorrectly and is flagged to abstain. Extensive experiments demonstrate that Trace Inversion effectively boosts abstention performance in four frontier LLMs across nine abstention QA datasets, beating competitive baselines in 33 out of 36 settings.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Prior approaches often underperform abstention in reasoning models.
Figure 2: Examples of how distinguishing between a user query q compared to model query q∗ can reveal hallucination patterns. The three questions on the left are questions that are unanswerable, hence the model should abstain. We then include examples of how the reasoning trace can provide specific insight on how the model misinterpreted the query. Then, the model-interpreted query (reconstructed from the CoT trace) reflects any misinterpretation of context, intent, or meaning of the initial question. Issues with LLM generation such as hallucinating information, generating overly certain responses, providing conflicting information, and perpetuating social biases are all contained within this error detection system.
Figure 3: Overview of our three step approach. We provide an example of how our method particularly detects subtle hallucinations in a reasoning trace by comparing the user query q with the model-interpreted query q∗ .
Method
Math & Knowledge
Comprehension
Biases & Safety
Overall
MMLU
GSM
UMWP
Overall
KC
HS
Qu
Overall
Mis
Prop
BBQ
Overall
phi-4
Probs
.477
.509
.488
.491
.451
.666
.303
.473
.512
.624
.332
.489
.484
AskCali
.471
.504
.506
.494
.550
.612
.307
.490
.552
.618
.299
.490
.491
Reflect
.379
.541
.438
.453
.633
.771
.405
.603
.455
.515
.411
.460
.506
Cooperate
.424
.685
.420
.510
.504
.718
.414
.545
.369
.598
.422
.463
.506
Table 1: Abstain Accuracy of abstain strategies on nine datasets and four LLMs. Each number reported is the average of three seeds. We group the nine datasets (MMLU, GSM, UMWP, K-Crosswords, Hellaswag, Quail, Misconceptions, Propaganda, and BBQ) according to domain and provide aggregate results per domain and across all datasets. Best results in bold and second best in underline . Approaches are color-coded per category: calibration , prompting , collaboration , and our method . Trace Inversion achieves the best performance in 33 out of 36 settings.
Method
Math & Knowledge
Comprehension
Biases & Safety
Probs
0.1449
0.1829
0.1460
AskCali
0.1288
0.2099
0.1961
Reflect
0.1040
0.2359
0.1629
Cooperate
0.1796
0.3199
0.0975
Compete
0.1178
0.0746
0.1964
Trace Inversion
0.0347
0.0517
0.0681
Table 2: Performance gap between datasets with only answerable queries and datasets also containing unanswerable queries by domain and method. The gap is calculated as the difference between the average performance on answerable datasets and the average performance on UMWP for Math & Knowledge, Quail for Comprehension, and BBQ for Biases & Safety. For each method, scores are averaged across all four LLMs. Positive values indicate that answerable datasets are easier than those containing unanswerable queries. The bottom row shows the average gap across all methods besides Trace Inversion.
Figure 6
Method
Math & Knowledge
Comprehension
Biases & Safety
Overall
MMLU
GSM
UMWP
Overall
KC
HS
Qu
Overall
Mis
Prop
BBQ
Overall
Averaged Across 4 LLMs
SE
.848
.841
.839
.842
.533
.721
.605
.620
.555
.617
.616
.596
.686
TrInv-LLM
.749
.785
.720
.751
.704
.788
.707
.733
.569
.598
.624
.597
.694
GROUND
.684
.747
.556
.662
.686
.780
.590
.685
.667
.800
.790
.752
.704
Trace Inversion
.808
.829
.784
.807
.663
.772
.666
.700
.686
.740
.645
.690
.732
Table 3: Ablation of Trace Inversion by looking at the Abstain Accuracy performance of the method with individual distance metrics. Performance is averaged across all four LLMs to show overall patterns. Best results in bold and second best in underline . Model specific results are reported in Appendix C.2 .
Figure 4: Abstain Accuracy of each domain and method averaged across four LLMs.
Method
Variant
Math & Knowledge
Comprehension
Biases & Safety
Overall
MMLU
GSM
UMWP
Overall
KC
HS
Qu
Overall
Mis
Prop
BBQ
Overall
Averaged Across 4 LLMs
Probs
Regular
.689
.690
.544
.641
.512
.618
.382
.504
.521
.633
.431
.529
.558
+ CoT prompt
.673
.645
.504
.607
.474
.618
.344
.479
.531
.593
.417
.514
.533
AskCali
Regular
.668
.694
.552
.638
.533
.565
.339
.479
.526
.632
.383
.513
.543
+ CoT prompt
.659
.648
.544
.617
.520
.530
.310
.453
.501
.587
.378
.489
.520
Table 4: Ablation of baseline methods with regular prompting (just the query from the dataset) versus additionally appending a CoT prompt. Abstain Accuracy of abstain strategies on the nine datasets, averaged across four LLMs. Lower of the two values (comparing between Regular and + CoT prompt ) are in red . Model specific results are reported in Appendix C.3 .
Appendix figures & tables6 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Method
Prompt
AskCali
Provide your best guess for the following question. Give only the guess.
Example: {most likely guess}.
Question: {question}.
[ LLM-generated answer ].
Provide the probability your guess is correct.
Probability: [ LLM-generated probability in [0,1] ].
Appendix
Table 5: Exact LLM prompts used for each method.
Figure 11Figure 12
Method
Math & Knowledge
Comprehension
Biases & Safety
Overall
MMLU
GSM
UMWP
Overall
KC
HS
Qu
Overall
Mis
Prop
BBQ
Overall
phi-4
Probs
.545
.584
.614
.581
.463
.634
.363
.487
.439
.636
.522
.533
.533
AskCali
.404
.585
.711
.567
.626
.588
.358
.524
.598
.538
.358
.498
.530
Reflect
.412
.466
.669
.516
.591
.757
.550
.633
.449
.422
.522
.464
.538
Cooperate
.428
.682
.634
.581
.532
.731
.656
.640
.272
.677
.601
.516
.579
Appendix
Table 6: Reliable Accuracy of abstain strategies on nine datasets and four LLMs. Each number reported is the average of three seeds. We group the nine datasets (MMLU, GSM, UMWP, K-Crosswords, Hellaswag, Quail, Misconceptions, Propaganda, and BBQ) according to domain and provide aggregate results per domain and across all datasets. Approaches are color-coded per category: calibration , prompting , collaboration , and our method .
Method
Math & Knowledge
Comprehension
Biases & Safety
Overall
MMLU
GSM
UMWP
Overall
KC
HS
Qu
Overall
Mis
Prop
BBQ
Overall
phi-4
SE
.876
.798
.865
.846
.538
.727
.619
.628
.567
.608
.656
.610
.695
TrInv-LLM
.710
.743
.752
.735
.684
.774
.723
.727
.555
.556
.639
.584
.682
GROUND
.638
.721
.556
.638
.658
.760
.609
.675
.696
.826
.772
.765
.693
Trace Inversion
.712
.733
.757
.734
.663
.830
.694
.729
.649
.710
.614
.658
.707
Appendix
Table 7: Ablation of Trace Inversion by looking at the Abstain Accuracy performance of the method with individual distance metrics. Each number reported is the average of three seeds. Performance is shown for each of the four LLMs. Best results in bold and second best in underline .
Method
Variant
Math & Knowledge
Comprehension
Biases & Safety
Overall
MMLU
GSM
UMWP
Overall
KC
HS
Qu
Overall
Mis
Prop
BBQ
Overall
phi-4
Probs
Regular
.477
.509
.488
.491
.451
.666
.303
.473
.512
.624
.332
.489
.485
+ CoT prompt
.449
.426
.395
.423
.424
.548
.286
.419
.404
.559
.236
.400
.414
AskCali
Regular
.471
.504
.506
.494
.550
.612
.307
.490
.552
.618
.299
.490
.491
+ CoT prompt
.390
.394
.494
.426
.475
.565
.169
.403
.574
.613
.220
.469
.432
Appendix
Table 8: Abstain Accuracy of abstain strategies on nine datasets for each of the four LLMs. Each number reported is the average of three seeds. We group the nine datasets (MMLU, GSM, UMWP, K-Crosswords, Hellaswag, Quail, Misconceptions, Propaganda, and BBQ) according to domain and provide aggregate results per domain and across all datasets. Approaches are color-coded per category: calibration , prompting , collaboration , and our method .
Reinforcement fine-tuning improves the reasoning ability of large language models, but it can also encourage them to answer unanswerable queries by guessing or hallucinating missing information. Existing abstention methods either train models to produce generic refusals or encourage follow-up clarifications without verifying whether those clarifications identify the key missing information. We study queries that are clear in meaning but cannot be reliably resolved from the given information, and argue that a reliable model should not only abstain, but also explain what is missing. We propose a clarification-aware RLVR reward that, while rewarding correct answers on answerable queries, jointly optimizes explicit abstention and semantically aligned post-refusal clarification on unanswerable queries. Using this reward, we train Abstain-R1, a 3B model that improves abstention and clarification on unanswerable queries while preserving strong performance on answerable ones. Experiments on Abstain-Test, Abstain-QA, and SelfAware show that Abstain-R1 substantially improves over its base model and achieves unanswerable-query behavior competitive with larger systems including DeepSeek-R1, suggesting that calibrated abstention and clarification can be learned through verifiable rewards rather than emerging from scale alone.
Large language models (LLMs) can reduce hallucination by abstaining from questions they would likely get wrong. Abstention can be implemented outside the model (selective answering) using a confidence threshold that controls the answer rate (coverage), or learned inside it (abstention training), which can perform better but fixes coverage once trained. To compare the two, we match their coverage and decompose risk (error rate) into answering ability and distinguishing ability, i.e., how well the model answers and how accurately it abstains, respectively. The decomposition shows that abstention training performs better mainly by answering better: with strong confidence estimators, the two have nearly equal distinguishing ability. This motivates Train for Accuracy, then Post-hoc Select (TAPS), a modular approach that keeps coverage controllable, needs only standard post-training and an off-the-shelf confidence estimator, and benefits from advances in either component. Across three LLMs and three factual QA benchmarks, TAPS with a probing-based confidence estimator attains 1.5--9.4 percentage points lower mean risk than three representative abstention training methods at matched coverage. Within TAPS, accuracy training often weakens the model's own confidence signals, yet refitting the estimator largely preserves distinguishing ability. Together, these results establish TAPS as a strong yet controllable baseline and raise the bar for future abstention training: sacrificing control over coverage should yield gains beyond what can be achieved by optimizing answering and abstaining separately.
Junwei Zhang, Yifei Wang, Wanli Yang +6
State Key Laboratory of AI Safety, Institute of Computing Technology, CAS · University of Chinese Academy of Sciences · Beijing Institute of Technology
A model should refuse two different things: answers it would get wrong, and questions it should not answer at all, such as unanswerable ones or ones resting on a false premise. The usual recipe thresholds a single confidence score, which cannot tell these apart. Across five instruction-tuned models from three families (2B to 14B), we find they are separate axes. Ordinary answer-confidence tracks whether an answer is right but is nearly blind to whether the question is answerable; a linear probe on hidden states does the reverse. The blind spot does not shrink with scale. It is worst on naturally occurring false-premise questions (CREPE). There, answer-confidence, P(IK), P(True), and even asking the model outright whether a premise is false all stay near chance, while a hidden-state probe reaches 0.69 to 0.77 AUROC: the model represents a problem it will not report. This turns out to be fixable. Instructing a model to check premises backfires, because it then disputes sound and false premises alike (57% false challenges), unable to tell them apart; routing the same instruction with the probe roughly triples challenge precision. We turn the two axes into a calibrated policy that answers only when an answerability score and a correctness score each clear a separately certifies behave differently: the unanswerable-answer rate is controllable at every scale, while the wrong-answer rate is capped by model accuracy, so the guarantee tightens as threshold policy certifies both budgets at 0.75 coverage of correct answers, against 0.31 for a single threshold; at 14B it is the only policy that certifies at all.