Failing to Falsify: Evaluating and Mitigating Confirmation Bias in Language Models

It is well established that large language models (LLMs) are sensitive to prompt framing, reflecting patterns in their training data or prior prompts. In this study, we investigate the extent to which LLMs reinforce users biases expressed in the prompts and examine the boundary between implicit framing effects and explicit prompt manipulation. Specifically, we evaluate how susceptible LLMs are to direct and suggestive prompts that encourage models to support or challenge particular positions. We evaluate six LLMs using 160 distinct prompts spanning ten topics across opinion-based and factual domains. The prompts systematically vary in prompting strategy, support versus challenge instructions, prompt polarity, users' expressed beliefs, and topic domain, spanning both opinion-based and factual questions. Our results show that LLMs systematically adapt their responses to align with prompt framing, even in factual contexts. This suggests that prompt framing can outweigh factual consistency in model responses. Overall, our findings delineate the extent and boundaries of LLM manipulability. Furthermore, the results imply that LLMs can reinforce subtle user biases and are susceptible to explicit prompt manipulation even in domains where responses should remain factually stable.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in high-stakes decision-making contexts. While prior work has shown that LLMs exhibit cognitive biases behaviorally, whether these biases correspond to identifiable internal representations and can be mitigated through targeted intervention remains an open question. We define LLM cognitive bias as systematic, reproducible deviations from correct answers in tasks with computable ground-truth baselines, and introduce LLM CogBias, a benchmark organized around four families of cognitive biases: Judgment, Information Processing, Social, and Response. We evaluate three LLMs and find that cognitive biases emerge systematically across all four families, with magnitudes and debiasing responses that are strongly family-dependent: prompt-level debiasing substantially reduces Response biases but backfires for Judgment biases. Using linear probes under a contrastive design, we show that these biases are encoded as linearly separable directions in model activation space. Finally, we apply activation steering to modulate biased behavior, achieving 26--32% reduction in bias score (fraction of biased responses) while preserving downstream capability on 25 benchmarks (Llama: negligible degradation; Qwen: up to $-$19.0pp for Judgment biases). Despite near-orthogonal bias representations across models (mean cosine similarity 0.01), steering reduces bias at similar rates across architectures ($r(246)$=.621, $p$<.001), suggesting shared functional organization.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents in scientific tasks. Yet whether these systems can effectively engage in forms of inductive reasoning relevant to scientific discovery remains an open question. In this work, we introduce FALSIFYBENCH, an evaluation framework for hypothesis-driven reasoning inspired by the classic Wason 2-4-6 task, in which agents must discover hidden semantic properties by iteratively proposing examples and receiving feedback. This task captures key elements of scientific reasoning: hypothesis generation, evidence gathering, and belief revision in response to both confirming and disconfirming evidence. Our evaluation of 12 LLMs across model families and scales shows that reasoning models are generally stronger scientific reasoners than instruction-tuned models, although no model comes close to optimal performance. The primary driver of success is the capacity for negative testing: models that actively seek to falsify their hypotheses consistently outperform those that primarily seek confirmation. Moreover, a fine-grained turn-level analysis, neglected in previous work, reveals that failure is tied to identifiable patterns in how models navigate the hypothesis space.