ResGuard: Enhancing Robustness Against Known Original Attacks in Deep Watermarking

Deep learning-based image watermarking, while robust against conventional distortions, remains vulnerable to advanced adversarial and regeneration attacks. Conventional countermeasures, which jointly optimize the encoder and decoder via a noise layer, face 2 inevitable challenges: (1) decrease of clean accuracy due to decoder adversarial training and (2) limited robustness due to simultaneous training of all three advanced attacks. To overcome these issues, we propose AdvMark, a novel two-stage fine-tuning framework that decouples the defense strategies. In stage 1, we address adversarial vulnerability via a tailored adversarial training paradigm that primarily fine-tunes the encoder while only conditionally updating the decoder. This approach learns to move the image into a non-attackable region, rather than modifying the decision boundary, thus preserving clean accuracy. In stage 2, we tackle distortion and regeneration attacks via direct image optimization. To preserve the adversarial robustness gained in stage 1, we formulate a principled, constrained image loss with theoretical guarantees, which balances the deviation from cover and previous encoded images. We also propose a quality-aware early-stop to further guarantee the lower bound of visual quality. Extensive experiments demonstrate AdvMark outperforms with the highest image quality and comprehensive robustness, i.e. up to 29%, 33% and 46% accuracy improvement for distortion, regeneration and adversarial attacks, respectively.

Neural image watermarks can be forged by extracting watermark-bearing residuals from released images and transferring them to unrelated content. While prior work has demonstrated this vulnerability, what makes these residuals transferable remains poorly understood. We formalize this vulnerability with residual transferability (RT), a metric that quantifies how well watermark evidence remains decodable after transfer across unrelated images. Through comparative analyses and controlled interventions, we find that common training-side variations do not account for the large RT differences across watermarking systems; instead, architectural design plays a central role. By contrasting high- and low-RT systems and validating their architectural differences through controlled interventions, we identify two mechanisms that strengthen the dependence of watermark evidence on the cover image, thereby suppressing the residual transferability. These findings provide concrete design guidance for developing more forgery-resistant watermarking architectures. Complementarily, for existing watermarking systems where architectural redesign is impractical, we introduce CoverLock, a plug-and-play strategy for existing watermarking systems that strengthens such image dependence without architectural redesign. Across representative watermarking systems exhibiting high residual transferability, CoverLock achieves a more favorable security--robustness trade-off than both traditional handcrafted defenses and learned classifier-based defenses.

Digital watermarking supports source attribution for AI-generated images, but its reliability depends on resistance to removal attacks. Some attacks attempt to remove watermarks by forcing the decoded watermark to differ from the original. However, this can produce an inverted watermark that remains detectable, causing removal to fail, while further attempts to alter the watermark may unnecessarily degrade image quality. To address these limitations, we present LiBRA (Latent In-band Bidirectional Removal Attack), which aims to make watermarks undetectable while preserving image quality. Instead of continually pushing the watermark toward inversion, LiBRA adjusts the image to conceal the watermark without encouraging further changes that could degrade image quality. Some attacks keep pushing decoded bits away from the original watermark, even when further changes preserve detectability and damage image quality. With access to the watermark key and decoder, LiBRA makes bounded changes in a public autoencoder's latent space. Unlike inversion-driven objectives that cannot correct excessive inversion, LiBRA guides average decoding confidence toward random guessing from either direction. This helps avoid an inverted but detectable watermark. Leaving individual bits flexible allows image-quality constraints to favor less damaging changes, while an optional frequency-guided mask limits their location. We verify removal using an exact two-sided binomial test rather than assuming the confidence target guarantees success.