Protecting and Preserving Protest Dynamics for Responsible Analysis

The rapid adoption of generative AI and Large Language Models (LLMs) has spurred interest in synthetic data as a privacy-preserving alternative to sensitive real-world datasets. However, generating high-utility synthetic data often carries the risk of memorizing and regurgitating private information from the training corpus. In this work, we present a customizable empirical auditing framework designed to detect and explain such data disclosures. Our framework introduces a mechanism to distinguish between "true disclosures"-where the system directly reproduces a user's information-and "phantom disclosures''-where the system incidentally generates a user's data. By partitioning input data into training and holdout sets and applying rigorous statistical hypothesis testing, we determine if observed disclosures are consistent with strict privacy baselines, such as zero-learning or specific Differential Privacy (DP) bounds. Crucially, this approach requires no model access, no canary insertion, and no reference model training -only the synthetic output and a held-out control set. We demonstrate that this framework effectively functions as a membership inference attack, providing empirical lower bounds on privacy leakage that are tighter than prior data-based auditing methods. Our approach is model-agnostic, applies to any synthetic data generation mechanism, and requires orders of magnitude fewer computational resources than shadow-model or canary-based alternatives.

Training generative machine learning models to produce synthetic tabular data has become a popular approach for enhancing privacy in data sharing. As this typically involves processing sensitive personal information, releasing either the trained model or generated synthetic datasets can still pose privacy risks. Yet, recent research, commercial deployments, and privacy regulations like the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) largely assess anonymity at the level of an individual dataset. In this paper, we rethink anonymity claims about synthetic data from a model-centric perspective, arguing that meaningful assessments must account for the underlying generative model and be grounded in state-of-the-art privacy attacks. This perspective better reflects real-world deployments, where trained models are often accessible for interaction or querying. We interpret the GDPR's definitions of personal data and anonymization under such access assumptions to identify the identifiability risks that must be mitigated and map them to privacy attacks across threat settings. We then argue that synthetic data techniques alone do not ensure sufficient anonymization. Finally, we compare the two mechanisms most commonly used with synthetic data -- Differential Privacy (DP) and Similarity-based Privacy Metrics (SBPMs) -- and argue that while DP can offer robust protections against identifiability risks, SBPMs lack adequate safeguards. Overall, our work connects regulatory notions of identifiability with model-centric privacy attacks, enabling more responsible and trustworthy assessment of synthetic data systems by researchers, practitioners, and policymakers.

The proliferation of adversarial synthetic content, accelerated by Generative AI (GenAI) is rendering traditional reactive detection methods ineffective. This survey synthesizes emerging research to demonstrate a paradigm shift toward the proactive detection of emerging inauthentic narratives. In this survey, we adopt a unified, lifecycle-based taxonomy to combine socio-technical lifecycle models of adversarial campaigns with advanced computational methodologies for emerging inauthentic narrative detection. By structuring the analysis around the C5 Interaction Model (Context, Causes, Content, Cycle of Amplification, Consequences), we integrate different research streams from machine learning and social science. To differentiate spread patterns of synthetic amplification from authentic baseline traffic, this paper surveys state-of-the-art techniques for modeling the creation, seeding, and propagation of fresh narratives, including the analysis of Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior (CIB), epidemiological modeling, and Hawkes process. This survey also provides a systematic review of proactive detection methods for adversarial threats at different stages in the C5 interaction model, specifically, anomaly detection in high-dimensional embedding spaces, unsupervised coordination detection on multi-layer graphs, and agentic AI systems. Finally, this survey addresses challenges posed by GenAI, including the difficulty of tracking rapidly changing threats and multi-level distributional drift, and it outlines a future research agenda focused on detecting anomalous clusters and building anticipatory and resilient systems. This survey provides a comprehensive, lifecycle-based review of methods for the proactive detection of emerging synthetic threats for more resilient information ecosystems.