What do Language Models Learn and When? The Implicit Curriculum Hypothesis

Pre-pretraining language models (LMs) on symbolic data can accelerate and improve natural language acquisition. However, existing pre-pretraining tasks, such as Dyck and procedural algorithms, rely on narrow primitives that fail to capture the expressive capacity of natural language. Moreover, prior studies remain restricted to relatively small token budgets, offering limited insight into skill emergence and representational dynamics. To address these limitations, we propose logic pre-pretraining (Logic-PPT) as a principled initialization strategy, leveraging formal derivations to impart richer structural and linguistic biases. Formal derivations require abstract mechanisms that are central to natural language, simultaneously binding variables, connecting quantifiers and relational dependencies, and composing predicate-argument structures over long contexts. Scaling our evaluation to a 100B-token regime, logic pre-pretraining substantially accelerates skill acquisition in LMs, achieving 80% accuracy on linguistic tasks with 36B fewer tokens than standard initialization, and outperforming alternative pre-pretraining baselines. Mechanistically, formal derivations induce persistent structural reorganization, distinctively characterized by a lower-rank, spectrally concentrated representation space. Crucially, we show that this internal geometry enables improved model compressibility via pruning, matching the dense baseline performance even at $\approx$33% sparsity.

Large language models provide a tractable system for asking how intelligence itself emerges, rather than only how LLMs can be engineered. Although progress is usually attributed to scale, data and architecture, we show that parameter initialization is a gene-like determinant of training and, in particular, of model capacity. Reducing the initialization scale consistently improves pretraining, with the largest gains on reasoning-demanding tasks. We identify two widely used empirical settings that restrain the advantage of small initialization, and show how relaxing them restores favorable scaling. We further uncover a critical initialization that balances the reasoning and training. Mechanistically, small initialization drives a distinct developmental trajectory: parameters first condense into low-complexity structures and later expand into richer representations, giving concrete form to the idea that compression is intelligence. Token-level analyses show that the gains concentrate on non-trivial, context-constrained predictions rather than all tokens uniformly. These results motivate a simple $γ$-initialization rule: expose initialization rage as an explicit knob and use small initialization by default, an almost cost-free intervention that improves pretraining and strengthens reasoning across model scales.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has become central to improving large language models (LLMs) on complex reasoning tasks, yet RL post-training is largely studied in isolation from the pretraining that precedes it. As a result, two basic questions remain open: (1) how do pretraining choices (model size, data) shape the returns to RL compute, and (2) what does RL actually do to the model? These questions are difficult to study in the standard LLM setting: pretraining corpora are vast and uncontrolled, making it hard to attribute behaviors to pretraining versus RL, and systematic compute sweeps across both stages are prohibitively expensive. To address these challenges, we use chess as a controlled testbed for studying reasoning across the full pretraining-to-post-training pipeline. We follow the standard LLM training pipeline by pretraining language models from 5M to 1B parameters on human chess games, supervised fine-tuning on synthetic reasoning traces, and running RL on chess puzzles with verifiable rewards. Using this framework, we find that the post-RL performance at given RL compute level is well-predicted from the pretraining loss, and slope of the RL reward curves improves approximately linearly with the pretraining tokens. Beyond scaling, we find that RL does not simply sharpen the SFT policy: on easy puzzles it amplifies correct moves the SFT policy already preferred, while on hard puzzles it surfaces correct moves that were nearly absent under SFT. We further test whether our findings transfer beyond chess by training a 1B language model on math-domain text, where the same predictive pattern emerges: longer-pretrained checkpoints reach higher post-RL performance and improve faster under RL. In sum, we provide a quantitative account of the pretraining-to-RL interface and a controlled testbed for studying the science of reasoning across the full pretraining-to-post-training pipeline.