Norm, the formal theoretical linguist, and Claudette, the computational language scientist, have a lovely time discussing whether modern language models can inform important questions in the language sciences. Just as they are about to part ways until they meet again, 25 of their closest friends show up -- from linguistics, neuroscience, cognitive science, psychology, philosophy, and computer science. We use this discussion to highlight what we see as some common underlying issues: the String Statistics Strawman (the mistaken idea that LMs can't be linguistically competent or interesting because they, like their Markov model predecessors, are statistical models that learn from strings) and the As Good As it Gets Assumption (the idea that LM research as it stands in 2026 is the limit of what it can tell us about linguistics). We clarify the role of LM-based work for scientific insights into human language and advocate for a more expansive research program for the language sciences in the AI age, one that takes on the commentators' concerns in order to produce a better and more robust science of both human language and of LMs.
Futrell and Mahowald (2025) frame the success of neural language models (LMs) as supporting gradient, usage-based linguistic theories. I argue that LMs can also instantiate theories based on formal structures - the types of theories seen in the generative tradition. This argument expands the space of theories that can be tested with LMs, potentially enabling reconciliations between usage-based and generative accounts.
The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) has intensified debates about their significance for linguistic theory. These debates are commonly divided into three positions: insulationism, which regards LLMs as irrelevant to human language; eliminativism, which claims that LLMs can replace traditional linguistic theories; and conciliationism, which views them as useful tools for linguistic research. To clarify these positions, this paper applies the framework of modal modeling from the philosophy of science. We argue that LLMs possess genuine epistemic value as minimal models, even without structural correspondence to human cognition. In particular, they can provide how-possibly explanations (HPEs) by testing modal claims about language acquisition and linguistic competence. We then examine the conditions under which LLMs could qualify as how-actually explanations (HAEs) of human language, drawing on the mechanistic account of scientific explanation. We argue that current LLMs do not yet satisfy these requirements. On the basis of this analysis, we propose understanding the explanatory power of LLMs as lying on a continuum between HPEs and HAEs. This framework avoids both overstating and understating their explanatory significance and offers a more precise basis for evaluating the role of LLMs in the scientific study of language.
Haruto Suzuki, Saku Sugawara
1Keio University · 2National3UniversityInstituteofofTokyo
As LLMs become increasingly integrated into daily life, understanding how their presence will shape human linguistic behavior is an open question. We present a large-scale study of linguistic convergence in human-LLM dialogue, examining how humans and LLMs accommodate each other's linguistic style during multi-turn conversations. Using an asymmetric convergence metric on WildChat, a corpus of real-world ChatGPT transcripts, we find that while LLMs significantly overconverge toward their users on both function word and open-class features across eight languages, human convergence rates in this setting are broadly consistent with human-human baselines. These findings suggest that accommodation in human-LLM dialogue is asymmetric: while LLMs dramatically overfit to their users' style, humans linguistically accommodate LLMs no differently than they would another person.
Terra Blevins
Khoury College of Computer Sciences Northeastern University, Boston, MA