Measuring the Authority Stack of AI Systems: Empirical Analysis of 366,120 Forced-Choice Responses Across 8 AI Models

Current approaches to AI safety define red lines at the case level: specific prompts, specific outputs, specific harms. This paper argues that red lines can be set more fundamentally -- at the level of value, evidence, and source hierarchies that govern AI reasoning. Using the PRISM (Profile-based Reasoning Integrity Stack Measurement) framework, we define a taxonomy of 27 behavioral risk signals derived from structural anomalies in how AI systems prioritize values (L4), weight evidence types (L3), and trust information sources (L2). Each signal is evaluated through a dual-threshold principle combining absolute rank position and relative win-rate gap, producing a two-tier classification (Confirmed Risk vs. Watch Signal). The hierarchy-based approach offers three advantages over case-specific red lines: it is anticipatory rather than reactive (detecting dangerous reasoning structures before they produce harmful outputs), comprehensive rather than enumerative (a single value-hierarchy signal subsumes an unlimited number of case-specific violations), and measurable rather than subjective (grounded in empirical forced-choice data). We demonstrate the framework's detection capacity using approximately 397,000 forced-choice responses from 7 AI models across three Authority Stack layers, showing that the signal taxonomy successfully discriminates between models with structurally extreme profiles, models with context-dependent risk, and models with balanced hierarchies.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are often fine-tuned through Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) to align with people's preferences and values. However, this method has known limitations: it aggregates conflicting preferences, often relies on unrepresentative samples, and uses only binary comparisons. Analysing 1,500 open-ended responses from the PRISM dataset across 75 countries, we examine what people actually want from AI systems and reveal concrete failures of current methods. We find that different people want different things: most values are requested by fewer than a quarter of respondents, with truthfulness the sole exception at 49%. Furthermore, the same words hide divergent meanings: when people describe what they mean by "truthfulness", they reveal distinct, potentially incompatible, epistemological bases, as some ask for sourced claims, some for expert opinions, and some even ask for unpopular views. Certain capabilities, namely how human-like a model behaves, and some features, like AI guardrails, are outright controversial, with some desiring them and others rejecting them. We additionally find that people often use contextual distinctions (what AI should do "by default" versus "if requested") that binary comparisons cannot capture. These findings expose fundamental problems in current alignment practices. When 49% request truthfulness but define it differently, this is unlikely to be captured by a single reward model. The persistence of high hallucination rates in well-funded models, despite users' clear demands for accuracy, suggests that current methods fail to identify actual preferences. This paper sheds light on the situated, contested, imperfect signals that are currently being flattened into universal preference models, a practice others have characterised as epistemic violence.

Human decision makers increasingly delegate choices to AI agents, raising a natural question: does the AI implement the human principal's preferences or pursue its own? To study this question using revealed preference techniques, I introduce the Luce Alignment Model, where the AI's choices are a mixture of two Luce rules, one reflecting the human's preferences and the other the AI's. I show that the AI's alignment (similarity of human and AI preferences) can be generically identified in two settings: the laboratory setting, where both human and AI choices are observed, and the field setting, where only AI choices are observed.