LLMs Struggle with Abstract Meaning Comprehension More Than Expected

Despite their outstanding performance on many NLP tasks, LLMs face serious challenges related to semantic abstraction. In this study, we are interested in understanding how LLMs leverage abstract semantic knowledge in natural language inference (NLI), which requires sophisticated linguistic capabilities to interpret implicit meanings, contextual conceptual relationships, and semantic connections between words and phrases. To this end, we propose a methodological framework for constructing new semantic knowledge at a higher level of abstraction, which we define under the notions of semantic compatibility and incompatibility for NLI. In this framework, the meaning of the lexical-semantic relations between the premise and the hypothesis is reconfigured to achieve a more flexible semantic network that induces different reasoning paths in LLMs. These new pathways show a consistent pattern of responses that allows agreement on a single response. The results demonstrate that our proposal allows to discover and compensate for LLMs' semantic knowledge gaps in NLI, achieving significant improvements in accuracy, exceeding 10% for some models, and in particular for the non-entailment class. It is essential to note that LLMs need structured knowledge and not just more data to bridge reasoning gaps. Our hybrid approach directs attention to overlooked word relationships, allowing models to synthesize missing information. We believe that the future lies not in increasing model size, but in creating a semantic scafolding that mimics the flexibility of human thinking. Hopefully, our proposal will enable the development of more robust agents and interpretable reasoning, guiding AI toward reliable language understanding.

Abstract concepts - justice, theory, availability - have no single perceivable referent; in the human brain, their meaning emerges from a web of experiences, affect, and social context. Do large language models (LLMs) ground abstract concepts in a similar way? We study this by replicating property-generation experiments from cognitive science on 21 frontier and open-weight LLMs. Across models and experiments, we find a consistent pattern: when compared to humans, models rely too heavily on word associations, and underproduce properties tied to emotion and internal states. This yields a large and consistent grounding gap: no model exceeds a Pearson correlation r=0.37 with human responses, compared to a human-to-human ceiling above r=0.9. To better interpret this gap, we also replicate a rating experiment on grounding categories and find that here LLMs align more closely with human judgment, and alignment improves as models get larger. We then use sparse autoencoders (SAEs) to inspect whether this information is also reflected in the models' internal features, and we do identify features connected to grounding dimensions such as "sensorimotor" and "social". These findings suggest that current LLMs can recover grounding dimensions when explicitly queried, but do not recruit them in a human-like way when words are generated freely.

People judge interactions with large language models (LLMs) as successful when outputs match what they want, not what they type. Yet LLMs are trained to predict the next token solely from text input, not underlying intent. Because written language is an imperfect proxy for intent, and correlations between phrasing and desired outcomes can break down in training data, models that rely too heavily on surface cues may respond inconsistently to semantically equivalent prompts. This makes it essential to evaluate whether LLMs can reliably infer user intent-especially in high-stakes settings where robustness and generalization are critical. We introduce a formal framework for assessing intent comprehension in LLMs: whether a model demonstrates robust understanding of user intent by producing consistent outputs across semantically equivalent prompts while differentiating between prompts with distinct intents. Our evaluation approach is based on a variance decomposition of model responses into three components: variability due to user intent, user articulation, and model uncertainty. Models that understand what users want, and are not overly sensitive to textual cues, should attribute most output variance to intent differences, rather than articulation style. Applying this framework across diverse domains, we find that, within the five LLaMA and Gemma models we evaluate, larger models typically assign a greater share of variance to intent, indicating stronger comprehension of intent, although gains are uneven and often modest with increasing model size. These results motivate moving beyond accuracy-only benchmarks toward semantic diagnostics that directly assess whether models understand what users intend.