An Axiomatic Benchmark for Evaluation of Scientific Novelty Metrics

LLMs are increasingly used to generate and judge scientific ideas. This makes novelty evaluation a central problem. Full idea evaluation is difficult because it often requires judging a method, its feasibility, and its empirical promise. We therefore study a cleaner upstream object: the research question (RQ). RQ generation is a prerequisite for scientific ideation, and RQs can be compared against questions pursued in real papers. We introduce RQ-Bench, a benchmark built from recent arXiv papers. For each paper, we reconstruct author-anchored RQs from its cited background, gaps, and contributions. These RQs are not the only valid questions for the same background. They are author-anchored reference points for testing novelty judgments. We evaluate model-generated RQs with standalone LLM judging, comparative LLM judging, and human expert evaluation. LLM judges consistently rate model-generated RQs as highly novel, producing a novelty mirage; in comparative evaluations, this preference becomes even stronger. Domain experts, however, reach the opposite conclusion and prefer the author-anchored reference questions. We further find that many generated RQs are narrow or source-bound, a dimension that LLM judges often miss unless explicitly tested. Overall, the contradictory novelty evaluations between LLM judges and human experts raise a serious concern about the reliability of using LLMs to assess the scientific novelty of research questions.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used in peer review at major AI conferences, yet novelty remains a persistent weak point. Existing benchmarks assess novelty as a single holistic score, making it difficult to diagnose which dimension a model misjudges or whether its evidence is faithful. We present NovGauge, a human-anchored benchmark for fine-grained novelty assessment diagnosis. The benchmark contains 619 paper pairs and 50 multi-paper sets, drawn from two expert sources: ICLR reviewer overlap claims and survey co-citations. Instances are independently labeled along three dimensions: task, problem, and method, capturing application goals, technical challenges, and solution approaches. We propose a cascading diagnostic pipeline that verifies per-dimension correctness, evidence grounding, and logical support. Evaluation of 18 LLMs shows hallucination rates ranging from 0% to 39% across dimensions, and among non-hallucinated correct-positive judgments, over 70% cite evidence fails to logically support the stated reason. The best-performing model, GPT-5.5, achieves 43-72% Verified F1 across dimensions, while most models retain less than half of their raw F1 after faithfulness verification. These results suggest that current LLMs remain far from reliable scientific novelty assessment, particularly when correctness is conditioned on faithful evidence grounding.

Bold projections that artificial intelligence will accelerate scientific discovery have raced ahead of evidence from working scientists, and the field still lacks large-scale, scientist-in-the-loop tests of these claims. Here we mount the largest such evaluation to date and map what AI cannot yet do for science. We invited authors of 121,640 recent preprints across biology, medicine, chemistry, and the social sciences to judge ideas that large language models (LLMs) generated from the context and puzzles of their own papers. 6,749 scientists returned 25,139 sets of ratings on novelty, empirical feasibility, probability of being true, and favorability of adoption. Three patterns emerge. First, non-reasoning LLMs collapse into a narrow "hivemind" of similar ideas; reasoning models roam a wider hypothesis space, yet no model class spontaneously proposes null hypotheses -- a move humans make more freely. Second, scientists reward ideas that resemble their own and prize probability over novelty, though social scientists tolerate risk more readily than life scientists. Senior social scientists are the harshest critics, and their skepticism is well-earned: LLMs falter most in pluralistic fields like the social sciences that demand context-aware interpretation and evolving theories. Third, automated evaluators on which the community currently relies -- LLM-as-a-judge, artificial metrics, and even state-of-the-art (SOTA) models -- agree only weakly with expert judgment, and retrieval augmentation and scientist persona prompting yield only marginal gains. A Qwen3-14B reward model we post-trained on human ratings captures field taste nuances, beats SOTA models by up to 27%, and closes the gap to the inter-rater consistency of independent peer reviewers. For all the hype, today's scientific AI still represents a collaborator whose imagination, outputs and judgment benefit from human grounding.