Modeling Multi-Dimensional Cognitive States in Large Language Models under Cognitive Crowding

LLM cognitive scores are increasingly summarized as per-ability profiles whose dimensions should converge across tasks, respond selectively to matched interventions, and generalize beyond the models used to define them. We introduce CogArena, a procedurally generated 13-paradigm benchmark built around a multimethod framework for determining when cognitive-task scores warrant dimensional labels across five theory-motivated groupings. Across 55 open-weight models, nearly all paradigm correlations are positive and a common axis explains about half the variance. The within-grouping advantage is small, scoring-sensitive, and uncertain across model families. In a separately frozen, fully crossed study across 12 models from six families, targeted scaffolds show a small matched-grouping advantage, but no scaffold-specific contrast survives multiplicity correction and selectivity does not improve held-out-family prediction. The frozen confirmation criterion fails. A post-hoc alternate-wording replication produces a smaller positive estimate and again fails. Together, these results support a boundary conclusion. Theory-aligned prompting produces a small in-battery diagonal tendency, but the present evidence does not establish stable five-dimensional profiles. CogArena provides a workflow joining behavioral signatures, covariance, matched interventions, and out-of-family prediction before cognitive labels are attached to model scores.

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly exhibit behaviors suggesting awareness of their evaluation context, often adapting their reasoning strategies in benchmark settings. Prior work has shown that such evaluation awareness can distort performance measurements; however, it remains unclear whether this phenomenon reflects a single behavioral artifact or a deeper internal structure within the model. We propose that LLMs maintain a decomposable space of functional metacognitive states: internal variables encoding factors such as evaluation awareness, self-assessed capability, perceived risk, computational effort allocation, audience expertise adaptation, and intentionality. Through residual stream analysis across multiple reasoning models, we demonstrate that these states are linearly decodable from internal activations and exhibit distinct layer-wise profiles. Moreover, by steering model activations along probe-derived directions, we show that each functional metacognitive state causally modulates reasoning behavior in dissociable ways, affecting verbosity, accuracy, and safety-related responses across tasks. Our findings suggest that benchmark performance reflects not only task competence but also the activation of specific functional metacognitive states. We argue that understandi ng and controlling these internal states is essential for reliable evaluation and deployment of reasoning models, and we provide a mechanistic framework for studying functional m etacognition in artificial systems. Our code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/xlands/meta-cognition.

Large language models (LLMs) display a unified "general factor" of capability across 10 benchmarks (a finding confirmed by our factor analysis of 156 models), yet they still struggle with simple, trivial tasks for humans. This is because current benchmarks focus on task completion, failing to probe the foundational cognitive abilities that highlight these behaviors. We address this by introducing the NeuroCognition benchmark, grounded in three adapted neuropsychological tests targeting distinct foundational cognitive components: Raven's Progressive Matrices (abstract relational reasoning), Spatial Working Memory (goal-directed spatial updating), and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (cognitive flexibility). Our evaluation reveals that while models perform strongly on text, their performance degrades for images and with increased complexity. Comparison with a human baseline shows that LLMs and humans fail at different parts of the same tasks. Furthermore, we observe that complex reasoning is not universally beneficial, whereas simple, human-like strategies yield partial gains. We also find that NeuroCognition correlates positively with standard general-capability benchmarks, while still measuring distinct cognitive abilities beyond them. Overall, NeuroCognition emphasizes where current LLMs align with human-like intelligence and where they lack core adaptive cognition, showing the potential to serve as a verifiable, scalable source for improving LLMs.