Toward Polymorphic Backdoor against Semantic Communication via Intensity-Based Poisoning

Semantic communication (SemCom) aims to preserve semantic meaning and task-oriented information beyond conventional message recovery over wireless channels. The adoption of SemCom in shared-access wireless networks introduces new vulnerabilities for multi-user semantic inference. This paper considers a SemCom system for two transmitters communicating with a common receiver over a multiple access channel. Each transmitter maps source information into latent semantic representations, while the receiver jointly reconstructs and classifies the semantic information for both transmitters. A selective over-the-air backdoor (Trojan) attack is presented in which an adversary transmits a low-power trigger waveform over the air and injects it into the shared received signal during training. By transmitting the trigger again during testing, this stealthy, low-power attack selectively manipulates the semantic inference for one transmitter while minimally affecting the inference of the other transmitter. To mitigate this vulnerability, a trigger-aware defense mechanism is developed to preserve correct semantic labels under trigger-contaminated wireless observations. The results demonstrate both the vulnerability of shared-access SemCom systems to selective over-the-air backdoor attacks and the effectiveness of trigger-aware robust training for semantic protection.

Poisoning-based backdoor attacks pose significant threats to deep neural networks by embedding triggers in training data, causing models to misclassify triggered inputs as adversary-specified labels while maintaining performance on clean data. Existing poison restraint-based defenses often suffer from inadequate detection against specific attack variants and compromise model utility through unlearning methods that lead to accuracy degradation. This paper conducts a comprehensive analysis of backdoor attack dynamics during model training, revealing that poisoned samples form isolated clusters in latent space early on, with triggers acting as dominant features distinct from benign ones. Leveraging these insights, we propose Cluster Segregation Concealment (CSC), a novel poison suppression defense. CSC first trains a deep neural network via standard supervised learning while segregating poisoned samples through feature extraction from early epochs, DBSCAN clustering, and identification of anomalous clusters based on class diversity and density metrics. In the concealment stage, identified poisoned samples are relabeled to a virtual class, and the model's classifier is fine-tuned using cross-entropy loss to replace the backdoor association with a benign virtual linkage, preserving overall accuracy. CSC was evaluated on four benchmark datasets against twelve poisoning-based attacks, CSC outperforms nine state-of-the-art defenses by reducing average attack success rates to near zero with minimal clean accuracy loss. Contributions include robust backdoor patterns identification, an effective concealment mechanism, and superior empirical validation, advancing trustworthy artificial intelligence.

This paper proposes a novel adaptive dual-path framework for covert semantic communication (SemCom), which integrates covert information transmission with task-oriented semantic coding. Unlike conventional covert communication methods that embed hidden messages through power-domain signal superposition, our framework embeds covert data within task-specific features via semantic-level intrinsic encoding. This new architecture introduces dual encoding paths with adaptive block selection: an Explicit path for public task execution and a Stego path that jointly encodes both public and covert information through contrastive representation alignment. A Gumbel-Softmax enabled adaptive path selection mechanism dynamically activates network blocks based on task require- ments. We formulate a multi-objective optimization framework that simultaneously ensures accurate semantic understanding and reliable covert transmission. We rigorously evaluate our framework's security against a powerful, independently trained attacker. Experimental results on the Cityscapes dataset demon- strate a state-of-the-art level of covertness: our method suppresses the attacker's detection accuracy to a near-random guessing level of 56.12%. This robust security is achieved while simultaneously maintaining superior performance on the primary semantic tasks compared to the baselines.