Ulterior Motives: Detecting Misaligned Reasoning in Continuous Thought Models

Continuous Chain-of-Thought methods replace verbose reasoning traces with a short sequence of dense latent representations. Earlier continuous CoT methods indirectly supervise the latent representations such that its final state match that of verbose reasoning traces, requiring autoregressive, slow generation during training. We introduce C-MTP, a simpler, faster direct supervision approach that models each latent as an average of the embeddings in the CoT traces to be compressed. Our approach outperforms a prior direct supervision method that approximates the distribution of compressed tokens, and performs competitively to slower indirect supervision approaches in existing evaluation setup with simplified CoT traces (less than 100 tokens). Lastly, we extend the evaluation of Continuous CoT methods to complex tasks with longer reasoning traces ($\ge$ few hundreds reasoning tokens). We find both direct and indirect supervision training methods perform poorly (roughly 65% performance drop) in this setting, revealing the limitations of current continuous CoT methods. The code and checkpoints are released at https://github.com/Varun221/cmtp_research

Chain-of-thought (CoT) is a standard approach for eliciting reasoning capabilities from large language models (LLMs). However, the common CoT paradigm treats thinking as a prerequisite for answering, which can delay access to plausible answers and incur unnecessary token costs even when the model is able to identify an answer before extended thinking, a behavior known as performative reasoning. In this paper, we introduce CopT, a reformulated reasoning pipeline that reverses the usual order of thinking and answering. Instead of thinking before answering, CopT first elicits a draft answer and then invokes subsequent on-policy thinking conditioned on its own draft answer for reflection and correction. To assess whether the draft answer should be trusted, CopT recasts continuous embeddings as inference-time contrastive verifiers. Specifically, it contrasts the model's support for the same generated tokens under discrete-token inputs and continuous-embedding inputs, yielding a sequence-level reverse KL estimator for answer reliability. Our analysis shows that under certain assumptions, the expected estimate equals the mutual information between the unresolved latent state and the emitted answer token, explaining why it captures answer-relevant uncertainty rather than arbitrary uncertainty in the latent state. When the answer is deemed insufficiently reliable, CopT performs further on-policy thinking, where a second KL estimator dynamically controls draft-answer visibility, preserving useful partial information while reducing the risk of being misled by unreliable content. Across mathematics, coding, and agentic reasoning tasks, CopT improves peak accuracy by up to 23% and reduces token usage by up to 57% at comparable or higher accuracy, without any additional training. The code is available at https://github.com/sdc17/CopT.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) monitoring is an increasingly important component of AI safety stacks but relies on the assumption that a model's reasoning trace is informative about its actions. This work studies the limits of CoT monitoring through the lens of model poisoning. We demonstrate that backdoors can be implanted into reasoning models to elicit an attacker-chosen behavior while their CoT traces appear entirely benign. We find that these CoT-Hidden backdoors can be induced through simple fine-tuning recipes across reasoning-model architectures and sizes. When direct poisoning is ineffective, we introduce a curriculum training approach that progressively teaches the model to produce an attacker-chosen output while concealing the behavior from its reasoning traces. These findings suggest that CoT monitoring may be better framed as a question about the consistency between a model's reasoning trace and its final response than as anomaly detection within a trace. We further examine the mechanisms that allow models to suppress evidence of the target behavior from their reasoning traces. Causal interventions locate a trigger-conditioned activation pathway that does not depend on the visible reasoning, and residual stream verbalizations provide an anomaly warning near answer generation, but do not identify the trigger, target, or backdoor mechanism.