Strategic Bidding in 6G Spectrum Auctions with Large Language Models

This paper presents an autonomous agentic resource negotiation framework designed to enable zero-touch network slicing in 6G architectures using Large Language Model (LLM) agents. While LLMs offer powerful reasoning capabilities, we demonstrate that such agents inherently suffer from anchoring bias, rigidly adhering to initial heuristic proposals and causing severe network over-provisioning. To systematically mitigate this cognitive bias, we propose a novel randomized anchoring strategy modeled via a Truncated 3-Parameter Weibull distribution. This mathematically bounded approach seamlessly integrates with burst-aware Digital Twins (DTs) employing Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) to rigorously guarantee strict Service Level Agreement (SLA) tail-latencies. To validate our methodology, we introduce and prove the \emph{Bimodal Constraint-Avoidance Utility Theorem}, demonstrating that while feasible negotiations follow classical convex bounds, highly constrained scenarios undergo a phase transition governed by an inverse rational decay envelope. Empirical results generated using a locally hosted 1B-parameter model otel-llm-1b-it confirm these dual-regime bounds. Our cognitive de-biasing successfully dismantles rigid negotiation patterns, forcing agents into active exploration to safely ride SLA boundaries and boost system energy savings up to 25%. Crucially, the lightweight 1B LLM achieves sub-second inference latencies (0.95s mean), ensuring our multi-agent framework is compatible with the operational timescales of the O-RAN non-Real-Time RAN Intelligent Controller (non-RT RIC)\footnote{Our source code is available for non-commercial use at https://github.com/HatimChergui.

Negotiation is a fundamental strategic interaction in management science, characterized by agents attempting to reach agreements while protecting private information, such as reservation costs and hidden valuations. A prevalent yet complex scenario involves a single seller negotiating concurrently with multiple buyers, each possessing heterogeneous, private budgets. In such settings, constrained by a limited number of communication turns, the seller must balance exploring the broader market to discover the highest valuation with concentrating sufficient turns on a single target buyer to secure the best possible outcome. Our analysis reveals a significant gap in standard Large Language Models (LLMs): while these models are linguistically proficient, they fail to act as effective economic decision-makers. Specifically, they exhibit a failure to explore the buyer pool, often fixating on the current highest bid rather than strategically investigating the market to discover latent high valuations. In this paper, we propose a specialized training recipe using Reinforcement Learning from Verifiable Rewards (RLVR). By anchoring the reward function to objective economic outcomes, the strategic balance between market discovery and surplus extraction emerges natively through the learning process. Our results demonstrate that the trained seller undergoes a multi-stage strategic evolution, learning to leverage price anchoring and strategic probing to identify more profitable counterparties. The agent extracts a substantially higher surplus than frontier models by both improving its persuasive bargaining skills and consistently closing deals with high-value buyers. Finally, we show that our seller strategies generalize robustly to unseen buyer negotiation styles and budget distributions.

Auto-bidding plays an essential role in online advertising, automatically adjusting bids for advertisers to optimize their commercial goals. The emerging AI-Generated Bidding (AIGB) paradigm widely adopts generative modeling to optimize bidding strategies, yet suffers from the limited mode coverage of offline datasets and inadequate task-state understanding, hindering effective exploration of optimal strategies. Large Language Models (LLMs), with prior world knowledge and reasoning capabilities, offer a promising approach to overcome these limitations. However, directly applying LLMs to auto-bidding tasks faces inherent challenges in limited numerical precision, hallucinations, and inference latency. To address these limitations, we propose AIGB-R1, a hierarchical self-evolving auto-bidding framework aiming to enhance AI-Generated Bidding via LLMs' Reasoning capabilities, comprising a high-level Planner module for macro-level strategy planning and a low-level Executor module for fine-grained decision-making. Building upon this, we design an experience-driven self-evolving loop, enabling autonomous strategy exploration and optimization from accumulated experience. We adopt a two-stage pipeline of offline pre-training and post-training alignment, and build an interactive bidding simulation environment for strategy rollout. Furthermore, we propose Decoupled Group Relative Policy Optimization (D-GRPO) to achieve end-to-end optimization via advantage decoupling. Experimental results on a large-scale public dataset demonstrate the effectiveness of AIGB-R1.