A Dual-Task Paradigm to Investigate Sentence Comprehension Strategies in Language Models

A recent study (Kuribayashi et al., 2025) has shown that human sentence processing behavior, typically measured on syntactically unchallenging constructions, can be effectively modeled using surprisal from early layers of large language models (LLMs). This raises the question of whether such advantages of internal layers extend to more syntactically challenging constructions, where surprisal has been reported to underestimate human cognitive effort. In this paper, we begin by exploring internal layers that better estimate human cognitive effort observed in syntactic ambiguity processing in English. Our experiments show that, in contrast to naturalistic reading, later layers better estimate such a cognitive effort, but still underestimate the human data. This dual alignment sheds light on different modes of sentence processing in humans and LMs: naturalistic reading employs a somewhat weak prediction akin to earlier layers of LMs, while syntactically challenging processing requires more fully-contextualized representations, better modeled by later layers of LMs. Motivated by these findings, we also explore several probability-update measures using shallow and deep layers of LMs, showing a complementary advantage to single-layer's surprisal in reading time modeling.

Surprisal theory posits that the processing difficulty of a word is determined by its predictability in context, offering a potential link between human sentence processing and next-word predictions from language models. While language model (LM) surprisals successfully predict reading times in naturalistic text, they systematically underpredict the magnitude of difficulty observed in controlled studies of syntactic ambiguity, particularly in garden path sentences. This mismatch might arise from differences in the computational constraints between humans and LMs. Here we test one such hypothesis, specifically, that LMs may be able to simultaneously consider a greater number of distinct sentence interpretations at once, compared to humans. Using Recurrent Neural Network Grammars (RNNGs) with word-synchronous beam search, we systematically vary the number of simultaneous parses used to compute word surprisal, and then use these surprisals to predict human reading times. Reducing the number of simultaneous active parses indeed increases the magnitude of predicted garden path effects, but not nearly enough to capture the full magnitude of the effects in humans. This suggests that differences in the number of simultaneous parses available to LMs and humans cannot reconcile LM-based surprisal with human sentence processing.

Humans effortlessly go beyond literal meanings: If you mow the lawn, I will give you fifty dollars, is typically understood as implying that the speaker will pay only if the lawn is mowed, whereas If you are hungry, there is pizza in the oven implies that pizza is available regardless of the hearers hunger. Large Language Models - LLMs - show human-like performance on many tasks, yet it remains unclear whether they reason like humans. To address this, we conducted a population-matching experiment assessing how twentyfive LLMs compute conditional inferences across four languages, compared to an equal number of humans per language. We find that humans enrich logical reasoning through pragmatic inferences across languages. Model behavior is more variable. Some LLMs perfectly follow the truth-table of conditionals but they ignore pragmatic inferences, while others deviate from the truth-table, adhering to a single interpretation across the board, thus reflecting accurate rule-based processing but not human-like reasoning. Overall, LLMs are accurate semantic operators, but fail to capture the pragmatic enrichments characteristic of human reasoning. Crucially, LLM accuracy is neither predicted nor boosted by open vs. closed status, training orientation, or architecture type, suggesting that pragmatic reasoning is still an emerging ability in the cognitive toolkit of artificial systems.