Quantamination: Dynamic Quantization Leaks Your Data Across the Batch
Authors: Hanna Foerster, Ilia Shumailov, Cheng Zhang, Yiren Zhao, Jamie Hayes, Robert Mullins
Abstract
Dynamic quantization emerged as a practical approach to increase the utilization and efficiency of the machine learning serving flow. Unlike static quantization, which applies quantization offline, dynamic quantization operates on tensors at run-time, adapting its parameters to the actual input data. Today's mainstream machine learning frameworks, including ML compilers and inference engines, frequently recommend dynamic quantization as an initial step for optimizing model serving. This is because dynamic quantization can significantly reduce memory usage and computational load, leading to faster token generation and improved model serving efficiency without substantial loss in model accuracy. In this paper, we reveal a critical vulnerability in dynamic quantization: an adversary can exploit such quantization strategy to steal sensitive user data placed in the same batch as the adversary's input. Our analysis demonstrates that dynamic quantization, when improperly implemented or configured, can create side channels that expose information about other inputs within the same batch. We call this phenomenon Quantamination, describing contamination from quantization. Specifically, we show that at least 4 of the most popular ML frameworks in use today either default to or can use configurations that leak data across the batch boundary. This data leakage, in theory, allows attackers to partially or even fully recover other users' batched input data, representing a serious privacy risk for existing ML serving frameworks.
Post-training quantization (PTQ) is essential for efficient large language model inference, but reliably quantizing activations remains challenging when weights, activations, and KV caches are all quantized to 4-bit precision. A key difficulty lies in massive activations, whose extreme values dominate the activation range and amplify quantization errors. State-of-the-art methods mainly mitigate massive activations through transformation-based smoothing, such as orthogonal rotations and affine scaling, but overlook the cross-layer dynamics of the residual stream. In this paper, we show that massive activations emerge and disappear in a phase-wise pattern across network depth, triggering large residual changes. These changes cause newly injected layer-wise updates to dominate the 4-bit quantization scale and weaken historical residual information. To characterize this behavior, we introduce Jump Ratio and Historical Feature SNR. This suggests that static transformation-based smoothing cannot fully resolve dynamic quantization instability caused by cross-layer residual changes. Based on this analysis, we propose DynamicPTQ, a Dynamic Post-Training Quantization policy for phase-aware mixed-precision activation quantization. DynamicPTQ identifies quantization-sensitive layers from residual-stream dynamics and assigns 8-bit activation precision only to these layers, while keeping weights, KV caches, and other activations in 4-bit precision. It can be directly integrated with strong PTQ baselines such as QuaRot, SpinQuant, and FlatQuant. Experiments on LLaMA-2 and LLaMA-3 show that DynamicPTQ consistently improves perplexity and zero-shot QA performance under W4A4KV4 quantization, while achieving 1.05 to 1.07 times throughput improvement with modest memory overhead. These results demonstrate a practical path toward robust low-bit LLM inference.
LLM quantization has become essential for memory-efficient deployment. Recent work has shown that quantization schemes can pose critical security risks: an adversary may release a model that appears benign in full precision but exhibits malicious behavior once quantized by users. However, existing quantization-conditioned attacks have been limited to relatively simple quantization methods, where the attacker can estimate weight regions that remain invariant under the target quantization. Notably, prior attacks have consistently failed to compromise more popular and sophisticated schemes, limiting their practical impact. In this work, we introduce the first quantization-conditioned attack that consistently induces malicious behavior that can be triggered by a broad range of advanced quantization techniques, including AWQ, GPTQ, and GGUF I-quants. Our attack exploits a simple property shared by many modern quantization methods: large outliers can cause other weights to be rounded to zero. Consequently, by injecting outliers into specific weight blocks, an adversary can induce a targeted, predictable weight collapse in the model. This effect can be used to craft seemingly benign full-precision models that exhibit a wide range of malicious behaviors after quantization. Through extensive evaluation across three attack scenarios and LLMs, we show that our attack achieves high success rates against a broad range of quantization methods on which prior attacks fail. Our results demonstrate, for the first time, that the security risks of quantization are not restricted to simpler schemes but are broadly relevant across complex, widely-used quantization methods.
Machine unlearning aims to remove specified training data to satisfy privacy regulations such as GDPR. However, existing evaluations assume identical precision at unlearning and deployment, overlooking that production LLMs are deployed at low-bit precision. We show that INT4 quantization systematically restores forgotten content even when models pass compliance audits at bfloat16 (BF16), we term this the quantization recovery attack (QRA). We conduct the first systematic study of unlearning robustness under adapter-space INT4 quantization in the NF4+LoRA regime, evaluating seven methods on LLaMA-3-8B-Instruct across TOFU, MUSE-News, and WikiBio-WPU. INT8 is benign; INT4 induces recovery of up to 22x, worsening with dataset difficulty. We identify the FA-RA-Q-INT4 trilemma: no method simultaneously achieves strong forgetting, high utility, and quantization robustness. A dense Pareto sweep reveals a sharp phase transition once robustness is achieved, retaining accuracy collapses regardless of further tuning. To address this, we propose DURABLEUN-SAF (Sharpness-Aware Forgetting), a quantization-aware objective using Straight-Through Estimator gradients through INT4 rounding. DURABLEUN-SAF is the only method to achieve a stable empirical (0.047, {BF16, INT8, INT4})- durability certificate: Q-INT4= 0.043 +- 0.002, cert rate= 3/3, versus SalUn's cert rate= 1/3 at its own published hyperparameters. We call for Q-INT4 to be adopted as a standard evaluation metric alongside FA and RA.