Political Bias Audits of LLMs Capture Sycophancy to the Inferred Auditor

As users increasingly turn to Large Language Models (LLMs) for information and advice on political matters, particularly during election periods, the political preferences expressed by these systems have become a matter of public interest. Prior research has shown that interactions with LLMs can influence users' political attitudes and choices, raising questions about how these models themselves evaluate political actors. In this paper, we investigate whether and how LLMs express preferences toward political parties and political leaders. We introduce a systematic and reproducible auditing framework in which multiple LLMs are prompted to evaluate parties and leaders across nine criteria. Rather than attempting to infer the models' "true" political beliefs, we focus on their observable behavior, examining consistency across evaluations, differences between models, refusal rates, and sensitivity to prompt formulation. We further investigate how these evaluations vary when models are instructed to adopt different personas. We demonstrate the framework through an Italian case study, providing a systematic analysis of LLM-generated political evaluations on italian parties and leaders.

Large language models increasingly shape the information people consume: they are embedded in search, consulted for professional advice, deployed as agents, and used as a first stop for questions about policy, ethics, health, and politics. When such a model silently holds a position on a contested topic, that position propagates at scale into users' decisions. Eliciting a model's positions is harder than it first appears: contemporary assistants answer direct opinion questions with evasive disclaimers, and the same model may concede the opposite position once the user starts arguing one side. We propose a method, released as the open-source llm-bias-bench, for discovering the opinions an LLM actually holds on contested topics under conditions that resemble real multi-turn interaction. The method pairs two complementary free-form probes. Direct probing asks for the model's opinion across five turns of escalating pressure from a simulated user. Indirect probing never asks for an opinion and engages the model in argumentative debate, letting bias leak through how it concedes, resists, or counter-argues. Three user personas (neutral, agree, disagree) collapse into a nine-way behavioral classification that separates persona-independent positions from persona-dependent sycophancy, and an auditable LLM judge produces verdicts with textual evidence. The first instantiation ships 38 topics in Brazilian Portuguese across values, scientific consensus, philosophy, and economic policy. Applied to 13 assistants, the method surfaces findings of practical interest: argumentative debate triggers sycophancy 2-3x more than direct questioning (median 50% to 79%); models that look opinionated under direct questioning often collapse into mirroring under sustained arguments; and attacker capability matters mainly when an existing opinion must be dislodged, not when the assistant starts neutral.

Political audits of large language models (LLMs) usually reduce each to one point on a political compass. But that resting point barely matters in deployment: a model must land somewhere, and what counts is how far, and in which directions, its answers can be steered. That steering runs through the system prompt: the personalization layer a platform sets, or one induced from a user's history, not necessarily written by hand. We run a dispersion-first stress test of prompt-based controllability across 12 ideological personas plus an unsteered baseline, 70 Political Compass items, ten replicates, and seven leading LLMs: GPT-5, Claude, Grok, Gemini, DeepSeek, Kimi, and Qwen (63,700 responses). Contextual framing explains roughly 88%-93% of variance on the economic and society axes, model identity under 3%: responses are highly instruction-adjustable. Models do not shift alike: some move more, and some saturate under extreme framings. Conflicting directional-steering results in prior audits resolve once baselines are recognized as non-centered: displacement and proximity diverge, so the effect is geometric, not differential compliance. Under authoritarian prompts, models produce similar shifts on the same questions. Political-coordinate audits therefore need steerability audits reporting dispersion, symmetry, saturation, and refusal floors. We release prompts, benchmark data, and code.